to follow, very plainly, that this voluntary conveyance of his property, for the purpose of defeating that claim, was fraudulent and void, as against the holders of the claim. No reference to particular authorities is necessary to establish this. But it is said that if that property can be followed into the hands of the wife defendant at all, the claim for it is distinct from that against her as executrix for the property belonging to the estate, of which she is executrix, and that joining the two makes the bill bad for multifariousness, which objection was seasonably taken; and Ward v. Duke of Northumberland, 2 Aust. 469, and Sabridge v. Hyde, Jacobs, 157, are strongly relied upon in support of the objection. The claims, however, are not distinct. There is really but one claim, and that is in favor of the orators against the estate of the testator in her hands as executrix. That property is claimed because, as between her an,d the orators, it is a part of the same estate, to be reached in her hands in the same manner as any other part. If the property had been conveyed to a third party it would have been different. Then a suit against the other party would have been necessary, and she would be the proper party to bring it, and if she refused the orators could proceed against both. Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 29. The cases mentioned as relied upon are both distinguishable from this in this respect. The orator in each had claims against the testator and against the executor in the life-time of the testator, each independant of the other. In attempting to enforce both in one suit they were pursuing distinct claims, and not, as is only attempted here, one claim against the same person in the same right. Let a decree be entered for an account of the amount due the orators, and of the estate of the testator in the hands of the defendant executrix, and of the value of the personal estate mentioned in the bill as conveyed by the testator to her in his life-time, and the amount of the estate of the testator in her hands, and if necessary that so conveyed, or so much as is necessary, be paid to the orators in satisfaction of their claim, with costs.
'GEBHARD V. CANADA SOUTHERN BY. CO.
THE CANADA SOUTIIPJBN RAILWAY CoMPANY.
(Circuit Court, 8. D. Ncw York. January 24, 1880.)
CONTRA,CT-PLAClll 011' PERlI'OIDIANCE-LEX FORI.-The payment of cer. tain first mortgage railroad bonds executed and issued in the dominion of Canada. and payable in the city of New York, is not discharged by virtue of an act of parliament of the dominion of Canada authorizing wch railroad to issue new bonds, bearing a lower rate of interest, in wbstltntion of such former bonds.
WALLAOE, J. The plaintiff sues upon certain obhgations executed and issued by the defendant representing instal. roeds of interest due and unpaid upon the defendant's issue of first mortgage bonds. The case, for convenience, may be considered .as though the action were brought to recover sev· eral instalments of interest due on the first day of January, 1877, upon the first mortgage bonds of the defendant. These bonds were' executed and issued in Canada, but by their terms were payable at the city of New York. The defendant is a Cft.nadian corporation, and insists in defence that it is discharged from ·payment of these bonds by virtue of an act of the parliament of the Dominion of Can. ada, passed in April, 1878, whereby the defendant was au. thorized to issue new bonds, payable in 30 years, in substi. tlition of its first mortgage bonds, and bearing a lower rate of interest. This act declares that the assent of the holders of the first mortgage bonds shall be deemed to have been given to the substitution of the n.ew bonds. The pJaintiff in fact never assented to the substitution of the new bonds in the place of the first bonds. . On first impression the defence seems an extraordinary' one. It rests upon the theory that the original bonds hav· ing been issued in Canada are contracts controlled, as reo spects the obligation and its discharge, by the law of Canada j. a.nd that the Canadian parliament, in the exercise of its unlimited powers, has discharged or modified the obligation of the contract, and that, even though this be an arbitrary or unjust act, it is conclusive upon the rights of the parties. Several generarl propositions applicable to the case are ele.
mentary. The law of the place of the contract determines the nature, the obligation, and interpretation of the contract. But when the contract is to be performed in a different place to that in which it is made, the law of the place of performin conformity to the pl'esumed intention of the parties, deteTmines the nature, obligation, and interpretation of the contract. A defence or discharge, good by the law of the place of the :lontract, is good wherever the contract is sought to be enforced; but when the place of performance is not the place where the contract was made, the defence or disoharge is valid or invalid according to the law of the place of performance. The doctrine that a defence or discharge good by the law of the place of the contract is good everywhere, is subject to several qualifications, one of which is that the discharge or defence must not be of such character that it would conflict with the duty of the state where it is sought to be enforced towards its own citizens to recognize it. The laws of a state have no extraterritorial vigor, and are enforced by other states only upon considerations of comity, and these always yield to those higher considerations which demand of every state the protection of its own citizens against the unwarrantable acts of a foreign sovereignty. These familiar general propositions require no citation from the authorities to support them. Applying them here the defence cannot succeed. The plaintiff sues upon s contract which was made in Canada, but was to be performed in ,the state of New York, the place of payment being the place of performance; and a discharge of the obligation which derives its vitality solely from the authority of a. foreign sovereignty, is of no more effect than would be the c.ase if New York were the place where the contract was made. One of the most common instances, in illustration of the rule, is where the defence of usury is interposed, in an action brought here upon an obligation made in .. foreign state, and bearing a higher rate of interest than is permitted by the lawlil of that state. When the obligation is payable here, the cases all agree that the usury laws of the foreign state have no application.