&ILGORB 'V. OROSS.
coach, drawn by four horses, himself driving. In or near Hot Springs the horses drawing the coach took fright, ran away and overturned the coach, seriously injuring the plaintiff. The extent and character of this injury is the turning point in this case and will be more fully considered hereafter. On the next day after he received his injury the plaintiff directed one of his hired men to take his coach and five horses to Little Rock and sell or trade them at his discretion, and on the sixteenth of July his hired man proceeded to Little Rock with the property upon the understanding that he was to sell or dispose of the same for the plaintiff according to his own discretion, unless the plaintiff should, himself, go to Little Rock by rail the next day. On the seventeenth of July the stock and coach arrived at Little Rock, and were put up at defendants' stable, and in the afternoon of the same day the plaintiff arrived by rail. . The naxt day the plaintiff and defendants effected an exchange of property, as follows: the plaintiff gave the defendants his five horses, two sets of harness, and stage coach and $150, for an old glass front Clarence carriage. The $150 was not paid in'money, but the plaintiff gave his notes for that sum; and, to secure its payment, executed to defendants a mortgage on the carriage. The defendants loaned plaintiff a span of horses to haul the carriage which he received in the trade to Hot Springs, and it was driven to the latter place by the plaintiff's hired man. The plaintiff arrived at Hot Springs with the carriage on the nineteenth or twentieth of July, and within a week thereafter returned to Little Rock with the carriage, and tendered it back to the defendants and demanded a return of the property which they had received from him for the carriage, upon the ground that at the time he made the trade he was non
The defendants refused to rescind the trade, and thereupon the plaintiff filed his bill, alleging that by reason of the injury plaintiff received when thrown from his coach he was, at the time of the trade, incapable of transacting business, or knowing what he was doing, and was in fact non compos mentis;
and that defendants, knowing his condition, fraudulently worried and bewildered him, by artful language and constant offers and proposals, until they finally induced him to make the trade. The bill prays for a rescission of the contract and a return of the property, or judgment for its value. There is much conflict in the evidence in relation to the value of the property included in the trade, the valuation of plaintiff's property by the witnesses running from $650 to $1,400, and of the defendant's carriage from $250 to $800, but the weight of evidence warrants the conclusion that the property which defendants received from the plaintiff was worth, at a fair cash valuation, $750, exclusive of the mortgage for $150, and that on a like scale of cash valuation the carriage which plaintiff received from the defendants was not worth at most over $400. In other words, the plaintiff agreed to pay for the carriage more than twice its value in this or any other market, and this disparity in the value of the property and received does not disclose the extent of the plaintiff's improvidence and folly in making the trade, for the only use plaintiff had for the carriage, and the use to which he expected to put it, so far as he had any comprehension on the subject, was that of a public hack or carriage to carry passengers in and about Hot Springs. Its age and construction rendered it unfit for such service on the rough and rocky roads of that region, and at that place and to the plaintiff it was worth but little more than the amount of the mortgage lien retained upon it by the defendants. The evidence ltS to the mental condition of the plaintiff at the time he made this contract is voluminous and somewhat conflicting, but the weight of evidence establishes these facts: That the plaintiff, for some years preceding the making of this trade, had been first a stage driver, and afterwards a mail contractor a.nd proprietor of horses and mail coachell, and that for some months immediately pl'eceding the trade he had been at Hot Springs engaged in keeping hacks and other vehicles and teams for carrying persons and hauling freights for IJire. In the conduct of this business he em. played two or more teamsters, and was unusually diligent
KILGORB V. OROSS.
and careful in the direction and management of his business, and the care of his property, attending at the stable where his stock was kept early and late, exacting from his hired men the strictest attention to their duties, constantly supervising them himself, and seemingly indisposed to trust the care 'and management of his stock to anyone. He was a good judge of vehicles of all kinds and horses, and knew their value; was a. shrewd and close trader in such property, 'and those who dealt with him had to pay full value for what they got. When his team ran away with him on the fourteenth of ,July, and upset his coach, he was thrown from the driver's seat, and his head and other parts of his body struck the ground with considerable force. He was conveyed to his boarding house, and Dr. Barry, a respectable physician, of more than 20 years' practice, called to Bee him. The doc. tor found him suffering from concussion of the brain, &nd a. painful injury to tlie foot or a.nkle-joint. He was then, in the language of the doctor, "partially delirious, and his acts and speeches indicated a deranged condition of mind." The doctor 3aw him no more, but he testifies thai the condition of mind in which he found him might have continued 10 or 15 days, and other witnesses testify that there was no change in his condition up to the time the trade was made. Those who were with him during this time testify that he begged them to kill him, threatened to commit suicide, seemed utterly indifferent as to whai became of his property; that he was in this condition when he directed his hired man to take his property to Little Rock and dispose of it; that he was in this condition when he a.rrived at Little Rock, and during all the time he remained there; that he had to be assisted in and out of the hack, and could walk with difficulty by the aid of crutches; that he seemed to be suffering intense pain from his injuries, and had to be watched while in bed at night; that the night after he got to Little Rock, in the absence of his watchers, he got out of his bed, and went out in town at one or two o'clock in the morning to find a purchaser for his property; that against the earnest protest and advice of his hired man he made the trade in qneEtion that morning; that
he exaggerated the value of the carriage he got, saying it was
worth $10,000, and that the speaking tube, extending from the inside of the carriage to the driver's seat, was worth $500. Other acts and speeches of plaintiff are detailed by the witnesses, going to show his reasoning faculties were more or less deranged. His condition remained the same for four or five days after the trade, when his mind seemed to be restored to its normal condition, and he inquired for his property, and seemed quite confounded when told he had traded it for the carriage. He testifies that he has no knowledge or recollection of anything that he said or did from the fourteenth of July, the date he received his injury, until the twenty-second day of that month. Persons who saw the plaintiff casually during this time testify that they observed nothing in his speech or action io indicate that he was not sane; but those who were well acquainted with him, and who were with him much before and after the injury, and who had the best opportunity of forming a correct opinion on the subject, agree in saying he was not in his right mind, and was utterly incapable of transacting business, or forming or exercising a deliberate and intelligent judgment on any subject. Opinions of witnesses not experts are competent evidence in cases where the object is to prove capacity or incapacity to make a contract when the facts or circumstances are disclosed on which they found their opinions. Kelly's TIeir8 v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 601. In answer to a hypothetical question, which fairly stated the plaintiff's condition as disclosed by ths evidence, Dr. Barry giyes it as his opinion that the facts indicate a deranged condition of mind at the time the trade WitS made. One of the physical causes of insanity is severe injuries to the head from blows, causing concussion of the brain. 'rhe evidence satisfactorily estab:ishes the fact that the fall plaintiff received produced concussion of the brain, and that this condition continued until after the trade with defendants. Against the consequences of mistaken judgment or mere imprudence and folly on the part of one m1.king a contract
KILGOBB II. OBOSS.
courts can grant no relief. If the party was capable of entering into a contract, and thero was no fraud, it is binding, though it may be obvious that he acted improvidently, and paid for property purchased greatly more, or received from' property sold greatly less, than it was worth. It is impossible to define with exactness the degree of unsoundness of mind that renders a party incapable of entering into a binding contract. Weakness of understanding, or thai deficiency of intellect which errs in judgment and easily makes mistakes, is not enough of itself to avoid a contract. But the acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understanding, and who are thereby liable to imposition, will be held void in courts of equity, if the nature of the act or contract justifies the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but has been imposed upon, circumvented, or overcome by cunning artifice or undue influence. 1 Story Eq. Jur. § 238. In Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 603, the court say: "If a person, although not positively non compos' or insane, is yet of such great weakness of mind as to be unable to guard himself against imposition or resist importunity or undue influence, a contract made by him under such circumstances will be set aside;" and in Beller v. Jones, 22 Ark. 92, 99, the court said: "No evidence was introduced by Jones so effective, none could be introduced more convincing, to show mental derangement or want of natural sense as is the agreement itself charged by him and admitted by Beller to have been made." It must be conceded that the contract from which the plaintiff seeks to be relieved cannot be said to be so grossly improvident as in itself to justify the conclusion of insanity on his part, or fraud on the part of the defendants; nevertheless, its improvidence and folly are an important circumstance, tending to strengthen the conclusion, supported by the evidence, that his mental capacity was not adequate to the making of a valid contract, for it shows that in the very matter under consideration he did not act like So sensible or sane man, but quite the contrary.
It is obvious from the evidence that the plaintiff, at the very time he made this trade, ought to have been in his bed receiving proper medical treatment for his injuries; and he probably would have been there if the purpose of visiting Little Rock to dispose of his property had not been the one thought fixed in his mind and in course of execution at the moment of the injury. In his delirious condition, after the injury, he fancied that purpose must be carried out; and his trip to Little Rock, while laboring under concussion of the brain, and suffering excruciating pain from the injury to hiR ankle, was itself an insane act, or at least an act that no man in the full possession of his senses would have attempted. A party is not bound by a. contract entered into where his mental condition is such as to preclude any fair or reasonable exercise of the reasoning faculties. While the plaintiff's injuries did not produce a. total eclipse of his mental faculties, they did so weaken and derange them that he was not capable of comprehending the subject of the contract, and its nature and probable consequences, and he is not, therefore, bound by it. It is a fortunate circumstance that the carriage received by plaintiff from the defendants has been securely housed during this litigation, and that it remains in the same condition as when plaintiff received it, so that defendants can be placed in statu quo. The defendants having parted with the property received from the plaintiff must account for the fair cash value of the same at the time the trade was made, which is found to be $750, and 6 per cent. interest on the same to date of decree. The cross-bill of defendants, seeking to foreclose the mort· gage on the carriage, given to secure the $150 "boot money." must be dismissed, and the defendants required to Burre "ler the notes and mortgages for cancellation, and to pay all costs.
IN lUiI ElWil ROLLING lULL 00.
THE MATTER OJ' THB ERm ROLLING MILL COMPANY.
(Di&trice OOU'I't, W. D. PennsylfJauia.
February 5, 1880.)
BANKRUPTCy-ORDERS FOR GOODS IN FAVOR OF LABOREHS-PREFERRED CLAIMS-ItEV. ST. § 5101.-0rders for goods, drawn by a manufacturing company in favor of their employes, are not preferred claims in the hands of the drawee, against the estate of the bankrupt company, within the meaning of section 5101 of the Revised Statutes, or the act of assembly of the state of Pennsylvania (April 9, 1872; Pur. Dig. 1464;) relating to wages and money due for labor.
In Bankruptcy. Swr petitions of H. V. Claus and of Julius Heffner for ord.ers on the assignee to pay certain alleged labor claims as preferred claims. . ACHESON, J. Section 5101 of the Revised Statutes gives a priority to "wages due to any operative, - - - to amount not exceeding $50, for labor performed within six months next preceding the first publication of the notice of proceedings in bankruptcy." The Pennsylvania act of assembly of April 9, 1872, (pur. Dig. § 1464,) provides that "all moneys that may be due, or hereafter become due, for labor and services rendered by any miner, mechanic, laborer or clerk, for any period not exceeding six months immediately preceding the sale and transfer of any manufactory," etc., shall be a lien thereon and preferred in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale thereof; no such preferred claim of any miner, mechanic, laborer or clerk to exceed $200. The petitioners, H. V. Claus and Julius Heffner, respectively claim the benefit of the above cited statutory provisions.. The assignee refuses to recogni3e the validity of these claims, and the court is asked to make an order directing the payment of said claims as preferred debts. The facts, as they appear from the petitions and the statements of the petitioners' counsel, are as follows: Prior to its bankruptcy the "Erie Rolling Mill Company" issued to its operatives, on account of their wages, orders in writing, of which the following is a specimen, viz.:
tlNo. 573. "ERIE, PA., October 12, 1875. "Pay to Mr. J. Heffner, or bearer, five dollars in goods, and charge to "$5. ERIE ROLLING MILL Co." The petitioners each hold a number of such orders, and they are the basis of their claims to preference. The petitioners were merchants at Erie, and upon the presentation to them of the said orders, by the operatives to whom they were issued, paid the latter the amount of the orders in goods. Under this state of facts is the claim to preference which the petitioners set up well founded. It is not pretended that they themselves are operatives or laborers. Can they be regarded as assignees of the operatives, or entitled to stand in the shoes of the latter by substitution? It is certain that the petitioners have no formal assignment of these claims, and there is nothing to show that the operatives intended to assign them. Such intention, it seems to me, is not to to be presumed. To keep such liens alive, in favor of parties paying the orders, might be highly prejudicial to the laborers; for these orders, in the hands of the merchant paying them, if still alive, might come in competition with the claims of the laborers themselves for preferences under the law. In my judgment the true view of the case is this, that when the petitioners paid the orders in question by furnishing goods to the operatives, the labor claims were extinguished, and the Erie Rolling Mill Company became debtors to the petitioners, respectively, for the amount of goods furnished to the operatives pursuant to said orders. And now, to-wit, February 5, 1880, the rules to show cause why the petitioners' claims should not be paid as preferred claims are discharged, and said petitions are dismissed.