UNITED STATES V. LOUP.
TREAT, J. The question presented involves the constru,,tion of the United States statutes pertaining to internal revenue, and particularly section 3376. The defendant is charged in the indictment with having had in his possession internal revenue stamps that had been theretofore used and eancelled. .It appears from the arguments and statements of counsel, rather than otherwise, that the facts are that defendant did have in his possession parts or halves of several stamps which had theretofore been used, which could readily be placed on a package in such a position as to give them the appearance of a complete stamp; but no complete, unbroken or unmutilated stamp. Under the stipulation of counsel this court IS asked to determine whether, on such a statement of facts, the defendant can be found guilty of the offence charged under section 8376. Reference has been made to many other sections or the statute, supposed to be in pari materia j and, on the other hand, the rules of construction as to criminal statutes have been invoked. Where a statute containing many provisions as to distinct subjects, each of which has its own peculiar requirements, is presented for interpretation, the requirements and penalties of one cannot, in a criminal proceeding, be imported into another. Stamps, according to the law and regulations, are to be placed on packages of snuff in a prescribed manner, whereby the opening of the package will destroy the stamp. As to brewer stamps, the statute is very specific as to the mode of placing them on the packages and destroying them; and, as to stamps to be used for some other purposes, it is provided that they shall be "utterly" destroyed, etc.; yet as to snuff stamps no such requirement exists, because it is presumed that if attached a8 demanded they will necessarily be ruptured or torn into parts. The fact that more specific provisions are contained in the statutes as to other articles would indicate, not that such provisions should obtain as to snuff, but snuff stamps were intended to follow a different rule-a rule specific as to them. The statute has several provisions which will adequately
protect the government a.gainst fraud by manufacturers or dealers in snuff without importing into section 3376 words not there. It would have been very easy for congress to have enacted that the possession of any part of So stamp previously used should be punishable, if lIuch had been the purpose; or it might have been enacted that the possession of parts which were capable of being united or reunited, etc., should be an offence. When the specific mode of using stamps for tobacco and snuff, as prescribed by the statutes and regulations thereunder, is considered, it is evident that seotion 3376 contemplated stamps detached as a whole, and not the mere possession of fragments of stamps, no matter how capable of being used. H stamps previously used are a.gain affixed to So package, or if not destroyed when the package is emptied, etc., the section provides for appropriate penalties. Why, then, should a court go beyond the terms of the section to declare that to be an offence, by construction, which the statute does noi make an offence, especially when the same section makes punishable any failure to destroy the stamp on opening the package, or any affixing of the stamp to a new package? The question must be resolved in favor of the defendant, although the facts stated indicate a. fraudulent purpose OD his part. MCCRARY, J., concurs.
AMERIOAN UNION TELEGRAPH Co. v. BELL TELEPHONE Co.
(Circuit OO'llJrt, B. D. MZ68ouri.
April Iil, 1880.) )lANDAMUS-JURIsDICTION OF TRllI CmCtJI'l COURTs.-The jurisdiction of the circuit courts in mandamU8 proceedings is not enlarged by the ac& ot 1875.
Motion for discharge of order to show cause why writ of mandamus should not issue. Cline, Jamison cf: Day, for petitioner. Edmund T. Allen, for respondent.
AM. UNION TELEGRAPH 00. V. BELL TELEPHONB
TREAT, I. To have the jurisdictional question tested, the order to show cause issued in this case; a.nd now, on the motion to discharge said order, the court is to determine whether, by force of the act of 1875, the powers not theretofore existing as to an original proceeding for mandamus have been granted. All the decisions prior to that act, it is conceded, denied such jurisdiction in the United States circuit courts j but it is contended that the act of 1875 not only enlarged the jurisdiction as to parties, but also as to the subject-matter and forms or modes of proceeding. The language invoked is that said courts "shall have original cognizance, etc., of all suits of a. civil nature a.t common law or in equity." There still remain: on the statute book sections 629 and 716, which are Bubstantially a reproduction of sections 11 and 14 of the judiciary act, (1789,) unless their restrictions are repealed by the act of 1875. The latter enlarged the jurisdiction as to parties, but used the same ianguage as liO the nature of the suits which had prevailed since 1789, viz.: ..All suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity," under which the United States supreme court has uniformly held that, taken in connection with section 14 of the original act-now 716 of the Revised Statutes-the power claimed did not exist. It is held, therefore, that the United States circuit courts have not, under the statutes of 1875, any other jurisdiction in mandamus proceedings than theretofore existed. The same reasons that caused congress originally to withhold the authority exist more forcibly to-day, growing out of the large multiplica.tion of offices and corporations. The motion to discharge tha order is granted. If the parties wish to further taRt the question a demurrer to the jurisdiction may be intorposed and sustained.