FEDERAL REPORTER. /
supposing that they had undertaken a salvage service. Nothing was said by either party at the time; and if the wind had gone down rapidly, and the barkentine had been towed to Boston without much difficulty, we might never have heard of a. salvage claim. But matters did not turn out in this way. There was difficulty and danger, and another tug was obliged to come to the assistance of the libellants, to prevent serious danger if not loss to the Frank Lambirth. That tug was undoubtedly a salvor, and has been paid as such since the case left the district court. Upon the whole evidence, which was very elaborate and full, I am of opinion that the Frank Lambirth was in danger at the time the tug Woolley came up. I think there had been one failure to tack. Some of the witnesses deny this, but they are, perhaps, referring to a later period than at which the second mate of the barque says that they did try to go about without success. Whether he is accurate or not, I think the vessel either was, or was thought to be, unable to tack, and would have found it necessary to come to anchor in a very short time; and, as she was on a lee shore, there can be no doubt that if she had been at anchor there would have been, as the wind and sea then were, need of speedy relief. I do not think that the libellants were as careful as they should have been in respect to the scope of hawser, and it is not improbable that the parting of the hawser would not have occurred if more scope had been given. But I am not at all sure that this accident had much effect upon the result of the adventure. Without it the tug must have had assistance, and the assisting tug would have been a salvor. Upon the whole, while I would not encourage any l'eal or supposed readiness which owners of tugs may have to convert a simple towage service into one of salvage, I find that the peculiar facts of this case relieve it of any such appearance. The amount awarded was liberal, but no serious objection was raised to it. Decree affirmed, with costs.
IN BE EDWAl\D S. :MAY.
(District Court, E. D. ltficltigan. --,1880.)
CONTEMPT-.JUROR-OONFERRING WITH A PARTY TO THE SUIT-REv. ST. ; 72lh-Under section 725 of the Revised Statutes, a juror in II federal court is guilty of a contempt in corruptly confelTing with a plrty tOll. suit during the trial, it appearing that the court had expressly forbidden the jury to converse with anyone regarding the case. SEMBLE.-It seems that he would be guilty of contempt even if no such direction were given. CONTEMPT-ANSWER OF RESPoNDENT.-In proceedings for criminal contempt the answer of the respondent, in so far as it contains statements of facts, must be taken as true; if false, the government is remitted to a prosecution for perjury. !3AME-SAME.-But the answer must be credible and consistent with itself; and if the respondent state facts which are inconsistent with his avowed purpose and intention, the court will be at liberty to draw its own inferences from the facts stated.
Motion for an attachment for contempt of court. Respondent was duly empanelled as a juror in the ca.se of The United States v. Sigmund and Feist Rothschild, indicted with Marcus Burnstine and others for conspiracy to defraud the government. A petition and affidavits having been produced tending to show that respondent had been guilty of misconduct in his capacity of -juror, an order was issued to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt. Upon the trial of the principal case the jury were cautioned not to talk with any person, nor allow any person to talk with them, and upon a subsequent day the court again took occasion to direct the jury not to allow any person to converse with them concerning the case, and to accept no treats or hospitality from any person interested in or connected with the case. The order to show cause set forth that on the twenty-eighth of December, 1879, respondent went in the night-time to the house of Marcus Burnstine, one of the said defendants, but not then on trial, for the purpose of corruptly conferring with said Burnstine of and concerning said cause, and of and concerning the verdict to be rendered therein, and did then and there talk with said Burnstine, and did allow Burnstine v.1.no.10--47
to talk with him, concerning the facta and evidence in the caae, and alao did corruptly negotiate with said Burnstine as to the verdict he should render in said cause, and that respondent was guilty of misbehavior in the presence of the court, .or so near thereto as to obstruct the ends of justice, in the facts above set forth. The answer of the respondent admitted hearing the orders of the court above referred to, but denied that he violated said Respondent further denied that he had any conversation or negotiations with Burnstine whereby, for any consideration, he would, in declaring his verdict, favor the defendants. With regard to the alleged interview with Burnstine, which took place after the arguments had been concluded, and· the night before the charge was given and the case committed to the jury, respondent averred that he was a physician, practicing his profession in Detroit, within a half a block of Burnatine's residence; that on Sunday, the twentyfirst day of December, a man, calling his name Miller, residing, as he said, upon Gratiot street, called upon the respondent for professional treatment; that, after examining and prescribing for him, Miller said to him, "You are a juror in the tobacco trial," and began to talk of the innocence of Rothschild, and his standing in the community, when the respondent said to him, most emphatically, that he must not talk in that way to him, as it was against his duty to speak of the case; that Miller then stated that the respondent's conscience was too tender, or words to that effect, and that he could just as well make money out of this; that he had himself once been a juror, and got $250, and nobody ever heard of it. Respondent protested against such talk; and when Miller was going toward the door he said that respondent could make $4:00 or $500, and that he would call again. He further says that he made up his mind to inform the court of the matter next morning. But on further refleetion, remembering the man's statement that he would call again, respondent determined to wait, accept what he might offer him, and present it to the court with a public exposure; that on the same day he prepared an envelope and addressed it to