ME1'iGlS V. LEBANON MANUF'G CO.
MENGIS awl others v. LEBANON MANUF'G Co.(Cire/tit Court, S. D. NC1JJ York.
1. VEllDICT-WUEN COGItT WII,L SET ASIDE.
It is only where it is so palpahlc that the jury have erred as to suggest the prol;ahility that the verdict was the result of misapprehension or partiality, that th(' court will interfere to sct aside the verdict. It is not enough that the judge might havc arrived at a <ii/I('rent conclusion, nor that there may have been a strong prepOll(!crallCe of evidence in favor of the defeated party.
Motion to Set Aside Verdict. WALLACE, D. J. As one of the questions of fact in this case, the jury were called on to decide whether the plaintiff understood Mr. Meily to have general authority to represent the defendant in making a contract for the sale of cars, or understood him to be a broker for the defendant in the particlllar transaction. There was undoubtedly cogent evidence to show that the defendant's officers held Meily out to the plaintiffs as having general authority to bind the defendant in making such a contract; but, on the other hand, there was explicit testimony to the effect that the officers of the defendant had told one of the plaintiffs very recently that Meily was not their agent; that they would not appoint any agent; and that they acted, and intended to act. personally in such transactions. It was also fairly inferable, from the fact that plaintiffs asked for evidence of Meily's authority, that they were not satisfied to treat with him as a. general agent without the proof of his agency. It was a question of credibility of witnesses whether such written authority was or was not furnished by Meily. There was also indicia in the transaction which might justify an inference that the plaintiffs and Meily were co-operating together more with a view to securing commissions for than to obtain a satisfactory contract for the defendant. Upon the whole case, therefore, I am of opinion that a case is not made which would justify setting aside the verdict. It is not eI).ough that the judge might have arrived at a different conclusion, nor even that there may have been a strong preponclerance of evidence in favor of the defeated party. It is only where it is so palpable that the jury have erred as to suggest the probability that the verdict was the result of misapprehension or partiality, that the court will interfere. Motion denied.
v. Memphis rt C. R. Co. 7 FED. REP. 51.
*Rcjlorted by S. "'elson While, Esq., of the New York bar.
FEDERAL REPORTER. WOOSTER v. Hown: Co.*
(Oi1'cuit Uourt, S. D. New York.
PnACTICE-ExTEKSION OF TIME TO TAKE TESTIMONY.
The time to take testimony extended, wbere such testimony, if admissible under the answer, applies equally to other cases in which the time to put in proofs had not expired.
In Equity. F. H. Betts, for plaintiff. J. F .. Dillon and W. H. L. Lee, for defendants. BLATCHFORD, C. J. In this case, and in t}le cases against Schenck and the Singer Company, if these three cases stood alone, and there were not the two cases in which the three months have not expired, and in which the testimony referred to in the notice of motion has been or can be put in, I should regard the defendants as precluded by laches and by their stipulation from asking for the extension in these three cases to put in such testimony. But, as the testimony will apply to every case equally with every other case if admissible under the answer in the case, it seems proper, as the testimony is not fully closed, to allow the extension for the purpose named in the notice, subject to all objections to be made, or already made, on the record to its admissibility or relevancy, except the objection that the time to take it has expired.
and another.February 10, 1882.)
(Uircuit Court, S. D. New York.
LETTERS PATENT-SHADE-HoLDERB FOR LAMPS-CONSTHUCTION OF.
Reissue 7,511, granted to B. B. Schneider, February 13, 1877, for an II improvement in shade-holders for lamps," held to be limited to the particulaz form of sbade shown in the drawings, as nothing is said in the specification 0::: claims as to the shape or size or proportion of the of the sharle.
Gifford et Gifford, for plaintiff. J. P. Fitch, for defendants. BLATCHFURD, C. J. This suit is bronght on reissued letters patent No. 7,511, granted to the plaintiff, February 13, 1877, for an "improve.Reported by S. Nelson White, Esq., of the New York lJar.