107 F. 3d 870 - Graham v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association

Private secondary school athletes challenging a rule limiting the number of varsity athletes receiving financial assistance appeal the denial of preliminary injunctive relief and the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. For the reasons that follow, we DISMISS this consolidated appeal.

Plaintiffs, five student athletes at the McCallie School, a private secondary school in Chattanooga, Tennessee, filed this action challenging a provision of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association ("TSSAA") Bylaws containing a financial aid rule limiting the number of varsity athletes receiving financial assistance, the so-called "Quota Rule."1 TSSAA is a not-for-profit corporation regulating athletic activities at member schools in Tennessee, including McCallie School.

During the 1994-1995 school year, McCallie did not adhere to the "Quota Rule." As a consequence, McCallie's athletic teams were prohibited from post-season interscholastic athletic competitions. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Hamilton County, Tennessee Circuit Court on the eve of the state basketball and wrestling tournaments and sought a temporary restraining order enjoining TSSAA from excluding McCallie from the tournaments. The state court granted the requested relief. TSSAA then postponed the tournaments and removed the case. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. The district court denied the motion to remand and scheduled a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. The hearing lasted two full days. Finding that Richards lacked standing because he was not entered or certified to participate in the state wrestling tournament, and that Hagaman and Lindsey, who are Caucasian, lacked standing to assert racial discrimination claims, the district court then reached the merits of the remaining claims. Concluding that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI2 and Tennessee Human Rights Act3 claims, the court denied the preliminary injunction and dissolved the state court temporary restraining order.

Plaintiffs then appealed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief and filed a motion for an emergency injunction pending appeal. The emergency motion was denied. In June of 1995, defendant moved to dismiss, contending that the conclusion of the 1994-1995 school year rendered the appeal moot. Defendant's motion was denied on the basis that the relief sought by plaintiffs extended beyond the 1994-1995 school year.

The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on October 11, 1995. In its ruling, the court found that the claims of plaintiffs Graham, Hagaman and Lindsey were moot because they had already graduated from the McCallie School, and that the remaining plaintiffs,4 Westfield and Richards, lacked standing as a result of the sanctions imposed on McCallie School for violation of the Quota Rule and TSSAA's Constitution.5 In addition, the court noted that even assuming that plaintiffs Westfield and Richards had standing, their claims would fail on their merits.

Plaintiffs Westfield and Richards timely appealed from the order of summary judgment entered on November 11, 1995. Defendant then filed a second motion to dismiss the appeal of the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction, claiming that the trial court's grant of summary judgment rendered the denial of preliminary injunctive relief moot. Plaintiffs disagreed and requested that the appeals be consolidated. A panel of this Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, finding the issue of mootness intertwined with the merits of plaintiffs' appeal from the final judgment, and consolidated Case Nos. 95-5260 and 95-6511.

Before addressing the merits of petitioners' appeal, we must first determine whether petitioners' appeal presents a justiciable case. United States v. Van, 931 F.2d 384 (6th Cir.1991). Article III of the United States Constitution limits the "judicial power" to resolution of "cases" and "controversies." Briggs v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 61 F.3d 487, 491 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)). Article III mandates that we adjudicate only actual, on-going controversies. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988).

Four of the five named plaintiffs, Graham, Hagaman, Lindsey and Westfield, have graduated from the McCallie School.6 The controversy between these four named plaintiffs and the TSSAA over the "Quota Rule" is thus moot. Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (6th Cir.1995); see also Bd. of School Comm'rs of City of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130 (1975) (where all named plaintiffs had graduated and the case was not certified as a class action, appeal was moot). The "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply to these four plaintiffs "because the exception requires not only that 'the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,' but also that 'there was reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the same action again.' " Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (per curiam)). The graduation of Graham, Hagaman, Lindsey and Westfield precludes repetition of another controversy between them and TSSAA over the "Quota Rule."

We next consider whether petitioner Richards' appeal, while not moot, presents an Article III case or controversy. Standing is an essential element of Article III's case or controversy requirement. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is comprised of three elements: (1) "injury in fact;" (2) a causal relationship between the conduct complained of and the injury; and (3) a strong likelihood that the injury could be redressed by judicial action. Id. at 560-61.

To meet the injury in fact requirement, Richards "must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" as a result of the Quota Rule "and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); see also Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1508 (6th Cir.1995) (injury must be distinct and palpable, hypothetical or imagined detriment not sufficient). While Richards' alleged injury is that the Quota Rule prohibits him from participating in post-season athletic competition, he has not yet suffered any such injury. During the 1994-1995 school season, Richards, then a freshman, was not entered in the state wrestling tournament. Because of the TSSAA sanctions, McCallie School's entire wrestling program was prohibited from participation in athletic competition during the 1995-1996 school year when Richards was a sophomore.

Because Richards cannot establish that he has suffered an injury resulting from application of the Quota Rule, he must show that he is "immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury." Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102. This he cannot do. Assuming Richards has remained at McCallie for his junior year in 1996-1997, the Quota Rule will not operate to exclude him from the state tournament because he will not be eligible for the tournament; the TSSAA sanctions7 prohibit the wrestling team from participating in post-season tournaments during the 1996-1997 school year. The state tournament of the 1997-1998 school year is the first one during which Richards might suffer an injury--if he is still at McCallie School, if he is still wrestling, if the wrestling program survives its probationary period with the TSSAA such that McCallie wrestlers are eligible to participate in post-season competition, and if he performs well enough to qualify for the competition. This "injury" will not occur until more than a year from now and is predicated on multiple conditions precedent. Thus, Richards fails to establish an "injury in fact" because he cannot show that the threat of injury to him resulting from the Quota Rule is both real and immediate.8 We therefore conclude that Richards has no standing to contest the district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief and final judgment.

Since Richards lacks standing to appeal the merits of the case, he is also unable to contest the dismissal of McCallie.9 Given this disposition, we need not address the remaining arguments.

Accordingly, we DISMISS as moot the appeals of Graham, Hagaman, Lindsey and Westfield; and we DISMISS Richards' appeal for lack of standing.