James Lowndes, for plaintiff in error. James R. Chalmers, for defendant in error. The cases cited in the opinion were: Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 15 Wend. 481; S. C. reversed, 22 Wend. 215; Dorchester & Milton Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Cush.177; Warren Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 10 Cush. 582; Bowling v. Arthur, M Miss. 52; Tiernan Commercial Bank of Natchez, 7 How. (Miss.) 648; Commercial Bank of Manchester v. Agricultural Bank, 7 Smedes & M. 592. Life Insurance-Forfeiture of Policy. THOMPSON '0. KNIOKERBOCKER I,IFE INS. CO. 'rhls case was brought up on error to the circuit court for the southern district of Alabama, and decision was rendered in March, 1882, by Bradley, J., to the effect that payment of the annual premium is not a condition precedent to the continuance of a policy of life insurance. It is always open for the insured to show a waiver of the condition, or a course of conduct on the part of the insnrer, which gave him just and reasonable ground to infer that a forfeiture would not be exacted. But it was held, in this case, that the grounds set up by the insured were not just and reasonable, and on which he had any right to rely, viz.: the mere taking of a premium note; sickness and inability of the insured when the note fell due; ignorance by the plaintiff of the outstanding note; want of notice by the insurer, according to its usage. when the premium fell due; a parol contemporary promise by the insurer that the policy should not be forfeited by reason of such non-payment; the usage and custom of the insurer to give grace in the matter of the payment of premiums. J. Hubley Ashton, for plaintiff in error. Thos. H. Herndon, for defendant in error. 'rhe cases cited in the opinion were to the point that sickness or incapacity for business is no ground for avoiding the forfeiture of a life policy, (Klein v. New York Life Ins. Co. - - ; ) that time of payment of premium is a material part of the contract, (New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24.) Notice U. S. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572. Redemption from Mortgage Sale. BURLEY, Assignee, '0. FLINT, Executor. This case was decided at the October term, 1881, of the supreme court of the United States, where it was taken on appeal from the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois, Miller, J. If a party designs to avail himself of the right of redemption purely statutory, he should bring"himself within the terms of the statute. His offer to redeem must be made within the time prescribed by the statute. F. H. Kales and C. A. Busby, for appellant. McCagg & Culver, for appellee. The cases cited in opinion were: Suitterlin v. Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. 90 TIL 483; Brine v. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627.
MELCHERT V. AMElUCAN UNION TELEGRAPH 00.
AMERICAN UNION TELEGRAPH
January Term. 1882.)
Contracts for the sale of property to be delivered at a future time at the plaintiff's option, where it was not the intention of the parties that the property should be delivered either by consignment or the transfer of warehouse receipts, but that said contracts should be adjusted and settled by the payment of differences, are void.
This case was submitted by counsel to the court for trial without a jury. It is an action in which the plaintiff claims damages result· ing from the alleged negligence of the defendant in transmitting a telegram from Davenport. in the state of Iowa, to the plaintiff's factor in Chicago. It appears that the plaintiff had, in the months of July and August, 1880, made, through his factor in Chicago, certain contracts for the sale of some 15,000 bushels of rye at 65t and 68! cents, to be delivered at the plaintiff's option during the month of Septem'ber in the same year. On the eighth day of September, 1880, the plaintiff delivered to the operator of the defendant's line, at Davenport, at 10 o'clock A. 111., a dispatch directed to his factor operating on the board of trade, Chicago, a message directing him to "cover rye as best he could," suggesting "that if he could buy cash he could save more;" adding, "if possible, cover immediately." It does not appear that the plaintiff gave any explanation to the operator of the object, importance, or meaning of the telegram, and it is evident that the operator was wholly uninformed as to the contracts of July and August. The defendant's direct line to Chicago being in trouble, the operator sent the message over its line indirectly by way of Omaha and St. Louis. The message, in the regular course, would have reached Chicago in 10 or 15 minutes from the time of its transmission at Davenport j but it did not, in fact, reach its destination till 2 o'clock and 45 minutes in the afternoon. It was delayed in the office at St. Louis in consequence of some trouble in the defendant's line between that city and Chicago. The operator at Davenport received the message without notifying the plaintiff that the direct line was in trouble, and it does not appear that the office at St. Louis informed the office at Davenport of the delay occurring there. The plaintiff was in the defendant's office at Davenport in the course of the day, manifesting anxiety about the message, but received no inv.ll,no.3-13