NOTEB OP DEOIBIONS.
years. to purchase them back and pay in money the $25.000 for which rne, were takt'n. the executors crediting him with what had, in the mean time, been collected on the judgment, with interest at the rate of 7 per centum pel annum. The case was decided at the October term, 1880, and the decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Waite. affirming the decree of the lower court On the day fixed for mutual stipulations in a contract to be performed, eithel party may require the other to perform, and neither can insist on the default of the other 80 long as he is himself bebind in his own performance. The plaintiff could not demand a deed until he tendered the money, and the executors could not require the money until they had offered a deed. The failure ot both parties to perform on the day was equivalent to a waiver by each of the default of the other, and either, by tendering performance of his stipulation within a reasonable time, may enforce the performance of the contract against the other. William M. Randolph, G. Cole, and G. G. Wright, for appellant&. Nourse & Kaufman and Seymour Dexter, for appellees. NOT& see /Judl411 ·· H/1,l/fJI/1,rtl. /1,n'" Ma.
Bemoval of Causes-State Laws Enforced.
OUAcmTA COUNTY.,. WOLCOTT. Enor to the clrcuU court of the eastern district of Arkansas. This case was brought up on a certificate of division between the judges of the circuit court of the eastern district of. Arkansas. The circuit judge, from the facts of the case, was of opinion that as plaintiff was a citizen of another state, and had brought the present suit before the time limited for bringing in county warrants for cancellation under the order of the county court, they were not barred under the statute;, while the district judge was of opinion that because of the failure to comply with that order the suit could not be maintained. The case was decided in the supreme court of the United States in the October term, 1880. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court reversing the judgment of the circuit court. The statute of the state of Arkansas ,of January 6, 1857, 'authorizing the county court to make an order calling in for cancellation certain county warrants, and barring all which are not brought in by a certain date, is a valid law, as it merely intended to expedite and make safe the keeping of the county warrants, and did not intend, by ¢ving the county court authority to make such an order, to deprive the federal court of its jurisdiction. and such oruer is valid and binding on the plaintiff in this case, even in a suit in the federal oourt after removalof the cause. F. W. Compton and A. II. Garland, for plaintiff in error. U. M. Rose, for defendant in error.
NOTE, See Son.,iOy
Keeley. ""''' p. 678, and note.
Contract-Vitiated by Fraud. WARDELL '0. PAO. R. Co. Appeal from the elrcutt Murt of the United States for the district "i' This case was decided at the Oc!ober term, 1880. by the supreme court of the United States. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court affirming the decree of the circuit court. Arrangements entered into bi the directors of a corporation to secure'
an undue advantage to themselves, at its expense, by the formation of a new company, as an auxiliary to the original one, with the understanding that they, or some of them, are to take stock in it, and then that valuable contracts are to be given to it, on the profits of which they, as stockholders of such new company, are to share, are so many unlawful devices to enrich themselves to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors of the original company, and will be condemned whenever brought before the courts for consideration. In such case a complainant can derive no benefit from the contract thus tainted, made with the original company, and afterwards assigned to the new corporation. James M. Woolworth and James O. Broadhead, for appellant. A. J. Poppleton, for appellees. 'fhe cases cited in the opinion were: Great Luxembourg' Co. v. Magnay, 25 Beav. 586; Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Younge & CoIL 326; Flint & Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Dewey, 14 Mich. 477; European & N. A. R. Co. v. P()(il',59 Me. 277; Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299. Construction of State Statutes-Rule of Decision. MOORES v. CITIZENS' NAT. BANK, 14 Cent. L. J. 228. This waS a case taken up on error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio, and decided in the supreme court of the United Statel:l on March 6, 1882. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court reversing the jUdgment of the court below. The construction given to the statute of limitations of a state by the highest court of such state is binding upon the federal courts, and the sustaining of a demurrer to plaintiff's reply, raising an issue which had been adjUdicated by the state snpreme court, and contrmy to such adj udication, was prejudicial to the plaintiff, and requires the reversal of final jUdgment rendered in favor of defendant. The cases cited in the opinion were: Ong v. Sumner, 1 Cin. Snp. Ct. 124; Lawrence R. R. v. Cobb, 35 Ohio St. 94; Tioga Railroad Co. v. Blossburg &; C. R. Co. 20 Wall. 137; Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U. S. 674; Fairfield v. Gallatin Co. 100 U. S. 47, to the points of limitations and binding effect of the decisions of the state supreme court; and Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 795; Knox Co. Bank v. Lloyd, IS Ohio, 35::1; Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369; 'felegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369, to the point that the ruling was prejUdicial.