BROWNSVILLE MANUF'a 00. V. LOCKWOOD.
same claims against the estate of the debtors in the assignment ceedings, and received a dividend thereon of about 43 per cent.; and that they now prove the same debt in bankruptcy, and, under such proof, seek to consent to the discharge of the bankrupts. These debts were barred as legal claims against the bankrupts by the dividends declared and accepted under the state assignment laws; and, however willing the debtors may be that they should be revived and proved, the court cannot consent that they should be filed here for the sole purpose of swelling the columns of creditors consenting to the discharge. They are filed for no other purpose, as the estate has been barren of all assets from the start. Striking out these proofs of debt, and the consents founded on them, creditors representing one-third of the whole amount of claims against the estate have not consented, and the discharge must be refused.
(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-COMPosrfION DEED.
April 27, 1882.)
A composition deed to which some of the signatures have been procured a pa)7Dent of more than their pro rata shares to the signers is invalid.
Motion for aNew Trial. This was a suit for the price of goods sold and delivered. The defendant alleged in his answer that plaintiff had signed a composition deed whereby it agreed to accept 50 cents on the dollar in full satisfaction of its claim, and that pursuant to the terms of said deed 50 per cent. of its demand had been paid. Plaintiff replied that certain creditors had been paid in full who had refused to sign said deed, and that certain others who had signed had been paid more than 50 per cent. of the amount due them. Judgment for plaintiff. Silas B. Jones, for plaintiff. Pattison et Grance, for defendant. TREAT, D. J. There is only one proposition in this ease, viz.: Whether the defendant's composition deed is valid against this plaintiff. Without reviewing the evidence, or the legal propositions under.,
"Reported by B. F. Rex, Esq., of the St. Louis bar.
lying such inquiries, the court finds that the signatures of some of the 'creditors to the composition deed were obtained by giving to them more than their pro rata under the deed, with the view of securing their signatures, and that thereby the equality on which the validity of such deeds must rest was not observed. Hence said composition deed is invalid, and the plaintiff is entitied to recover what remains due to him.
(Circuit Com·t, W. D. Tenne88ee. April 7, 1882.)
'tRADE-MARx':""Um OF TRADE' NAME AND MARX-AFTER PATENT ExPIRED.
Where a patentee useS his name andmatks to designate his invention, and also the product of it, as manufactured by himself, so that the public cannot separate the one from the other, he cannot acquire any right to the exclusive use of the name and marks after the patent has expired. Held, therefore, that the Singer Manufacturing Company, of New Jersey, has no exclusive property or trade name in the word" Singer," and that their shuttle device, as a trademark, had not. been' violated .by the devices used on the Williams machine, of Montreal, or the Sigwalt machine, of Chicago, the alleged irnitationsllot being calculated to deceive a purchaser.
In Equity. Application for injunction. The bill and amended bill allege that the plaintiff manufactures and sells "Singer Sewing-Machines;" has done so for many years; in all the countries of the world; and that by their excellence the machines have acquired a valuable It claims a trade name for the use of the word "Singer," and alleges that the defendants are fraudulently using it for purposes of injury to the plaintiff and to deceive the public. They also claim a trade-mark in certain devices, described in the bill, which it is alleged the defendants have violated. The pra;yer is for an injunction: The answer denies that the defend- ' ants have ever pretended to sell machines of plaintiff's manufacture, and avers that they sell machines as good or better in point of manufacture. But defendants admit that' they do use the name "Singer," either alone or in combination with other descriptive names of machines they sell. They explain this by averring that one Singer procured a patent for an invention of sewing-machines of great excellence of mechanical construction, and enjoyed a monopoly of the patent for many years, until recently, when the patent expired and congress refused to renew it; that this peculiar patented construction was from the beginning designated by the word "Singer," and the