Patents-Terms of Art-Extrinsic Evidence. HEALD 'D. Rl:CE. Error to the court of the United States for the district of California. This w&s an action at law brought to recover damages for .an alleged infringement of reissued letters patent granted for improvements in steam-boilers. The invention consisted, among other things, of a combination of a straw-feeding attachment with the furnace door of a returnflue steam-boiler for the use of straw alone as fuel in generating steam ample for practically operating steam-engines. The case was tried bya jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, to reverse which the writ of error is prosecuted. The supreme court of the United States rendered, its decision on March 6, 1882, reversing the decision of the circuit court. Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court. Where the question of identity of the invention in the original and reissued patents is to be determined by their face 'from mere comparison, and if it appears from the face of the instruments that extrinsic evidence is not needed to explain terms of art or to apply the descriptions: to the subject-matter, so that the court is able from mere comparison to say what are the inventions described in each, and to affirm from such comparison that they are not the same, then the question of identity is one of pUl'e construction and not of evidence, and consequently is matter of law for the court, without any auxiliary matter of fact to be passed on by the jury, where the action is at law. Where it appears from the mere reading of the two specifications that the invention described in the first was for a return-flue boiler, while that described in the second, abandoning the claim for the boiler itself, is for a particular mode of using it, with straw as fuel, by means of an attachment to the furnace door for that purpose, they are essentially diverse, and the patent lawfully issued for one cannot be sllrrendered as the basis for a reissue for the other. A new and analogous use of an old device operating in the very manner intended by its inventor, and its use in the new application. is not the subject of a patent. George Harding and John H. Boalt, for plaintiff in error. M. A. Wheaton, for defendant in error. :Patents-Change of Method. WILSON PACKING CO. 'D. CHICAGO PACKING & PROVo Co., .AND WILSON PACKING CO. O. HUNTER, (two cases.) Appeals-the former from the United States circuit court of the northern, and the latter (two cases) for the southern district of lllinois. By stipulation of the parties these cases were argued together as one case. They were decided in the supreme court of the United States on May 8, 1882. Mr. Justice Woods delivered the opinion of the court affirming the decrees of the court below dismissing the bills. In reissued letters patent granted for improvements in processes of preserving and packing cooked meats, a change in the mode of cooking the meat from broiling, roasting, or steaming, to boiling, all the other parts of the process remaining unchanged, is not an invention which will entitle the party who suggests the change to a patent for the process. Where all the elements in the process are old and are merely aggregated, and the aggregation brings out no new product, nor any old product in a cheaper or otherwise more advantageous way, the
NOTES OF DEOISIONS.
claim cannot 'stand; and where the second claim is for the product made by the process described il;1 the first claim"it is invalid for want of invention and for want of novelty. Where there is nothing new in the shape,construction, or material of the cans used in pl,l.cking the meats there is no invention, and the patent is invalid for want of novelty. ,WID., Clifford and John N. Jewett. for appellants· . 'L. and John W. Noble, for appellees. , ,The cases.cited in the opinion were: Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U. S. 112; Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. HOWlU'd, 20 Wall. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248; Stimpson v. Hardman, 10 Wall. 117. The case or WILSON PACKING CO. v. CLAPP, on appeal frQm the circuit C9.urt of the United,States for ;the northern district of lllinois. was disposed of the same time, upon the, v;iews expressed in the above cases. ,
Paterim.:-Reissue-Abandonment of, Invention. GUIllEt 'I). CITY ,QJI' BROOKLYN. Appeal from the circutt court of the frnited States for the eastern f)istrict of New: York. The invention in th,is case covered by the reissue was for qhamfered edges 'of the of stone ufled in ·streetpavements. ,The hi the claim on the reissue is that if blocks are selected with their sides roug/) enough, joints can be made that will furnish a suitable foothold without the use of strips and without chamfering. The case was determined in the Justice Waite supreme court of the UnitedStl\tes on ApriU7,1882, Mr. delivering the opinion of the court affirming the decree. Where it was' shown that if stone ,were used with rougher side surfaces than those found in old, pavements, and that all artificial (,)f keeping the transverse joints open might be abandoned and the requisite surface secured, it was simply carrying forwar':! an old idea, and doing what had peen suI:). stantially done before, but with better results. Such a change is only in de-gree, and is not patentable. "
Admiralty-Jurisdiction. Ex PARTE GORDON. This was an application by the owner of the British steamer Leversons for a writ of prohibition to restrain the district court .of the United States for the district of Maryland, sitting in admiralty, from proceeding further in a cause begun against his vessel to recover damages .for the drowning' of certain persons in consequence of a collision'on Chesapeake bay, caused by the fault of the steamer. The case was decided in the supreme court on January 9, 1882, when the petition for the writ of prohibition was denied. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. The district courts having the power to hear and decide all cases arising under this jurisdiction when a prohibition is applied for, the question pre.sented is not whether a libellant can recover in the suit he has begun, but whether he can go into a court of admiralty to have his rights determined. Where the injury complained of was the result of a collision it is a subject of admiralty jurisdiction; and the question whether pecuniary damages are to be awarded for the loss of life in the collision may properly be decided by the admi-