both defences was admitted andwentto the jury, relieves the uncertainty in the record, and shows that the question raised by the pleadings in this suit was litigated and. determined in the formElr action. It is true, the plaintiff in this action was not a party to the former suit, but his privity with. :the plaintiff in former aotion is not doubtful. Both nlaintillsclaimed through Ba.nnatyne, the 'payee and first indorser. Motjon for new trial denied. MoCBABY, C. J., concurs.
BOATMEl('S SAVINGS B.A.NK t1.
01' TBlI LoUISIANA COD. 01'
(Circuit Oourt, E. D. Loui8iana. April, 1882.)
ExECUTORY PROCESS UNDBR ARTICLBS PRACTICE.
732 TO 753
An order of seizure and sale, unless ,there is opposition, is a :dnal order; it there is OPpollition, it i8 a mere process to a litigation. v. Fitzgerald, ill 167,· followed.
SAME-ORDER OF SEIZURE AND BALB.
When the issue is made up by the opposition, the order of seizure and sale, though :drst in the point of time, becomes merely an incident in the cause, and when .the cause is transferred to the circuit court the order comes as a part of it, under section 4 of the act of M.arch 3, 18711, (18 Bt. 471,) and there the practice inequity governs. Lalley, 17 Walt 14, followed.
David N. Barrow and George L ·. Bright, for comnlainants. J. R. Beckwith, for defendant. . BILLINGS, p. J. This cause is submitted on a rule to show cause why the order for exeoutory, prooefjs should not be set aside as having been granted upon Insufficient evidenoe. An order of seizure and had been issued in one of the state courts. .An opposition had beElll:filed and an injunotion obtained, the petition of the mortgagor, removed to when the cause was, this court. where he has taken this rule. It is objected (1) that this is a motion for a new trial of a matter. tried and adjudged in the state court, or an effort to enjoin a cause or proceeding pending or undecided in a state court. The sufficiency of this objection depends upqn whether the order of seizure and sale has been transferred to this court, or now remains as a decree in the
-Reported by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar.
BOATMEN'S SIoVINGS lUNK.V·.WAGENSPAOE.
state court. It is objected(2) that the order for seizure and. sale cannot be reviewM upon an order to show cause, but only upon an appeal. The conclusiveness' of this objection, as well as that of the first, must depend upon the nature and character of this order under our la.w, and therefore I shall oonsider both pbjactions together. The record shows the petition for an executory process; a. conditional order for such a process, e., an order that there be a seizure and sale. after due demand, the lapse of three days, a writ of seizure and sale, the filing of an opposition and an injunction granted restraining the Boatmen's Savings Bank from fuJ:ther proceeding by executory process with the execution of the order of seizure and sale issued in the above-entitled cause, or from. seizing the mortgaged property; a responsive pleading, termed a peremptory exception, filed by the party who claims as mortgagee; and lastly a petition in a cause entitled Boatmen's Savings Bank to the mortgagor, by the for a removal, an"d an order in a cause similarly entitled that "this cause be removed." There hadbeen aconditional order of sale, an injunction of that order, an exception, and a transfer of the cause. It is the cause which is transferred. What is the cause? The C. P., arts.. 732 to 753, inclusive, gives this right to executory process, and the manner in which it may be judicially resisted and finally arrested. The mortgage creditor may seize, the mortgagor may oppose and enjoin, and thus the issue is made. That issue is as to the right of the mortgagee to have the Bummary process, and that issue constitutes the cause or controversy. If the judgment IS in fa.vor of the mortgagee the seizure and sale are enforced. If in favor of the mortgagor, they are perpetually enjoined. The cause or controvel'sy includes all the proceedings incidental to its decision. Jurisdiction is obtained, and can be operative only by control over the seizure. The removal of the cause, therefore, brings all orders issued therein. The order of seizure and sale, unless there is opposition, is a final order; if there is opposition, it is a mere process introductory to a litigation. This view is distinctly announced by the supreme court of the United States in Levy v. Fitzpatrick, 15 Pet. 167. This is also the view of the supreme court of this state as to the nature and function of this proceeding. In Hurrod v. Voorhies, 16 La. 256, the court
"But such a decree is not a judgment, in the true and legal sense of the term, and possesses none of its features. It issues without citation to the adverse party; it decides on no issue made up between the parties. nor does it adjudicate tl).e party obtaining it any right in addition to those secured by his nota.riaJ
contract. If such an order was a real judgment, it would be ont of the power it to set it aside, After rendering this decree he wonld of the judge be divested of all jurisdiction, and it could be reversed only by means of an appeal, or a separate acLion of nullity; whereas it is every-day practice for the judge issuing such orders to set them aside on an order to show cause or an opposition; and in most cases the proceedltlgs are turned into an oi'dinary suit, in which a final judgment is afterwards .rendered. Such a decree, then, can be viewed only as giving the aid of the officers of justice to execute an obligation, which by law produces the effects of a jnl1gment in relation to the particular mortgaged property."
These orders are issaed in France by notaries, who are there quasi judicial officers. The order for executory process is in form a decree or judgment, but it is in substance only an order ex parte, founded on the consent of an absent defendant, and only a proceeding in rem,. for no judgment can be given against the mortgagor for any deficiency. When the issue is made up by the opposition, this order, though first in time, becomes merely an incident to a cause. When the cause is transferred to the circuit court, this order comes as a part of it. Section 4 of the act of March 3, 1875, provides that "all orders and other proceedings had in such suit prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the court to which such suit shall be removed." That is. they become the orders of the circuit court. / It is urged that the decision of Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 82, is in point. But the distinctitm is that there was a final judgment, the definitive character of which was absolute, the question was whether any other court could by its decree operate upon it to annul it. Here is no judgment, provided there is an opposition, but only an order which initiates a judicial controversy. and the maintenance of which depends upon the result of that controversy. There is no doubt but that, as is contended by the solicitors for the mortgagor, it is well settled now by the supreme court of the state that the order for executory process can be reviewed only by appeal. See City of Shreveport v. Flournoy, 26 La. Ann. 709; Heft v. Kelty, 17 La. Ann. 143; Naughton v. Dinkgrace, 25 La. Ann, 538. But this result has been reached merely as a rule of practice and not from the intrinsic nature of the proceeding, and as a rule of practice it ceases to have any force when the cause is transferred to the equity side of the United States circuit court; there the practice in equjty governs. By that practice even a final decree fIlay be set aside at any time during the term at which it is rendered. A fortiori, a pro-
visional interlocutory order may be so set aside. That such a cause pending in the circuit court is to be dealt with as a cause in equity, is decided in Marin v. Lalley, 17 Wall. ]4. Now, as to the manner in which this matter of the insufficiency or incompetency of the authentic proof can be "Passed upon. It seems to me that that is the entire controversy, and that it' must be passed upon by the court by a final decree, otherwise the chief and in this case the only question in the case would be decided by an interlooutory order, without any termination of the cause, and in case tlie decision should be in favor of dissolving the order, would leave the mortgagee without opportunity to continue his seizure by a suspensive appeal, which, in justice, he ought to be placed in a position to have, and would deprive him of the right to elect to turn his proceedings into a suitfQr foreclosure via ordinaria. The rule is, therefore, discharged,' as presenting a matter which mus.t..beconsidered upon a final hearing, when a decree can be ret1will dispose of the case.
In re BROCKWAY, Ban}trupt.
(Di8trict Court, S. D. New York. April 28',1882.)
PRACTICE-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON FORMER ,'I;illlrAL-BANKRUPTCY.
The rules in regard to the reception of evidence tllkenupc;>n 8: former tri'l<l are applicable to proceedings in bankruptcy upon two su:Jcessive and independent petitions for a discharge, in reference to made by the same creditors. Both petitions, though independent, arc parts ofobe bankruptcy proceeding. The first petition by a bankrupt for his discharge having been denied, but not upon the merits, held;that upon a: subsequent application and a hearing before the register thereon, upon the same objections first filed, that the testimony of a witness taken on the hearing under the first petition was competent evidence on the second proceeding, the witness having in the mean ti.rtle died. Held, also, that the former testimony of another witness,whose death was not shown, nor his absence from the jurisdiction of the court certain, was not competent. ,
2. BANKRUPTCy-SUCCESSIVE·A.Pl'J.ICATIONS FOR DISCHARGE.
S. DI8CHAUGE, WHEN DENIED.
The bankrupt having been engaged in the business of a brewer, and not having kept any cash-book or invoice-book or stock-book, and 'from such books as were kept it being impossible, even with the aid of any explanations which the bankrupt could or would give, to ascertain or explain satisfactorily the course, situation, or' pecuniary result of his business, held, that dis· chargr. must be denied. '. ,