Her trips being made from this city, it would seem that the charterer had sent the steamer across the river to Hobokeh for no other purpose than to obtain coal and water of the libellants, and that, not for a.ny voyage from that port, but simply preparatory to her trips to be afterwards made from this city to Rockaway. It may be doubted whether the rule giving a maritime lien in a foreign port for necessary supplies to complete a voyage could be properly appliea to supplies thus furnished· for such a purpose; but without regard to this point I am clearly of opinion that the supplies in this case cannot be held to have been lawfully furnished upon the credit of the vessel, but only upon. the personal credit of the charterer. The libel should, therefore, be dismissed, with costs.
(DiBtriet Oourt, 8. D. NfIUJ York.
June 16, 1882.)
TUG AND Tow-RIGHT OP WAy-RIVER NAVIGATION.
A tug with a heavy tow upon a long hawser, coming down the river with the tide, having to Pl,\Bs a sharp bend where the tide sweeps rapidly towards the opposite shore, has the right of way as agaimt a similar tug and tow coming up the stream below the bend. Where the M;., with such a tow, came round West Point, on the Hudson river, after signaling the tug C., with a similar tow, below the Point, and receiving similar blasts in return, and kept within 25 or 50 feet of the flats below the Point, and drew as near the Point as was safe, but the end of her tow swung with the tide so as to collide with the tow of the C., held, that the M. was not in fault, as she ought neither to have stopped sooner nor to have attempted to cross the C.'s bows to the easterly side of the stream.
INJURY TO Tow-NEGLIGENCE-ACTlON AGAINST ALL VESSELS IMPLICATED.
Where a barge in tow isinjured without her own fault! through the negligence of some one of other vessels, the suit ought to be against all, unless some are clearly not liable, in order that the respective rights of the parties may be determined in a single suit.
Thomas C. Campbell, for libellant. Benedict, Taft it Benedict, for claimants. BROWN, D. J. By the statute of this state, steamers navigating the Hudson river are bound to keep upon the right-hand side. The Marshall, in coming down the river with the tide, would have been clearly in the wrong, therefore, in undertaking to go to the left, unless there was clearly no alternative. That no such necessity ex.
isted is evident front the fa.ot tows nearlY'cleared each other, though the Cayuga was in the'middle of the river, instead .of being upon the easterly side as required by law, which would have enabled the Marshall's tow topasBuliin:jured. The evidence shows that signals were exchanged half a mila 'ttrpart for each to pass to the right. and the Marshall had a right to assume that the Cayuga was in the easterly half of the stream, and 'far' enough over to avoid the known necessary swinging of the tow' 'passing around West Point witll the tide. It is'established 'by a. evidence that the. Ma.rshall, in. coming a1"Oundthe.point, went as near the rocks as was, safe, and drew her hawser tier very near to the westerly shore, as near as they were ever 'k'ilown;to'so,while sh&hugged the,Jlats upon the westerly side, below the Point, within 25 or 50 feet of their edge. So far as the Marshall was concerned the collision was caused, it seems to me, solely by the swing of the ebb tide. It was no greater than was usual at that point; on this occasion, so far and until a collision was seen tq be inevitable, it,was plainly the duty of the Marshall to keep on hauling as close to the westerly shore as pracpicablE!, because this'tended topnll the tow out of the swing., of the tide and away froID. the CaYllga,'s tow below. When it was seen that the collision could not be belped, it was th her duty to' stop, m in ordei that the blow might be lightened. In both these respects the Marshall's :t;lavigation was correct. In going along 'within 25 or approached them as near as prudent 50 feet of, the navigation would allow, and lam unable to perceive any fault in her navigation. It was impossible f,or her to stop before reaching the Cayuga, because her tow upon a hawser 100 fathoms long, and drifting with the tide, would have gone wild and become unmanageable. Had there been any real difficulty in the two tows passing each other off Westp'oint, it was the legal duty of the Cayuga; which was com· ing against the stream with 'her tow, to have stopped below the Marshall and her tow had passed. The Marshall clearly had the right of way, and had a right to assume that the Cayuga would either stop or go far enough to the easterly side of the river to allow the Marshall and her 'tow to pass. The Galatea, 92 U. S. 439; The Defender, 1 Bond. 3U7. It is nrgedthat the plaoing of the libellant's boat in the fourth hawser'tier was a fault in making up the tier instead of as is claimed,she was deeply ,and by her weight in
., TlIlI1 ALICE.
the rear part of tow increased the natural swing with the tide to the eastward. I do not find any evidence to show that the collision was caused by the place of the libellant's boat in the tow, or that it would have been avoided had it been placed elsewhere·.·The difference between the weight of his boat and others, and whether in the first or second tier, or the fifth, is not shown by any evidence to be material in causing the collision; and, as the hawser was from 100 to 120 fathoms long, any difference in the swing of the tow from this cause must have been very slight, if any; nor does it appear that the tow was made up in any unusual manner. As the libellant is himself apparently without fault, I regret that through some misapprehension of the facts all the parties concerned were not joined in this suit, so that the libellant's rights could have been finally adjudicated in one action, and the loss imposed where, upon hearing all the parties, it should seem to belon". But upon the proofs, as they appear in this action;! can find no legal fault in the Marshall, and have no alternative but to dismiss the libel, with oosts.
July 14, 1882.)
(District COU'I't, 8. D. Flo'I'ida.
That a party had but one blll of lading and did not deem it prudent to incur the risk of tke sea voyage from Antwerp, when it might be needed in more important suit, not deemed suflicient to admit in evidence a paper certified by United States consular certificate to be a true copy. 2.
A consular certificate is not evidence.
D. J. This is a suit for damages and possessIOn or cargo. The libellant presents by his proctor a paper by the United States consul at Antwerp to be a correct copy of an original bill of lading in the possession of Weber, the libellant, and asks that it be accepted as evidence in lieu of the origitial, upon the grounds that "libellants have but one copy of the original bill' of lading,and they deem it best not to expose that to the risk of long sea voyages before they can judge where their principal claim must be enforced." This refers to the fact of a fraudulent shipment and false bills of lading
which have appeared in other suits against the same. property, and