'GREEFE . iI. OORTIS.
is, in my judgment, an offer of pilot service within the letter and spirit of the law, and, being refused, entitles the libelant to full pilotage. If the law were otherwise, it would be very easy to have an understanding between coasters and the tugs at the mouth of the river by which the pilots who cruise for vessels in a pilot boat outside would be unjustly deprived of all benefit of their enterprise in hailing vessels beyond the bar, in favor of the tug pilots who wait inside in ease and safety until they are signaled by the a.pproaching vessel. All that is necessary is to give the master directions on leaving port not to go into the river until met by a tug, and then to go in with the tug and its pilot, unless he there receives orders to the contraryorders which he is certain not to receive, and no one ever expected he would. Indeed, when all the circumstances areconsidered,-thoseof general notoriety as well as those set out in the pleadings,-it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this defense is a mere preconcerted device to prevent the schooner pilots from making an effectual offer of pilot service to the Whistler before she was taken in tow by the tug, as per previous arrangement with the owners of both. The exceptions are allowed.
(Dl8trlct (Jourt, E. D. New York. July ,27, 1882.)
8B.umN-DISCOUNT OF ADVANCE SECURITY.
Where defendant did not ship the seamen, nor employ the shipping agent to ship them, nor was he owner of the vessel, nor did he know of the giving of the agreements sued on, the fact that he was authorized to collect the inward and procure outward freight, and pay the ship's disbursements,upon the master's certificate, does not make him an agent who" authorized thegiving of the advance security," although he paid the shipping agent's bill on which the advances were
Henry Heath, for plaintiff. McDaniel tJ Souther, for defendant. BENEDIOT, D. J. This is an actioJ} in which, by virtue of section
4534, Rev. St., it is sought to hold t,he defendant liable for the advance wages of three seamen of the ship James Aiken, upon three agreements'made by a shipping agent named RaveroD, which had
been indorsed to the libelant. The .defendant did not ship the sea· men, nor did he employ the shipping agent to ship them. He was not the owner of the vessel, nor did he know of the giving of the agreements sued on. The fact that the defendant was authorized to collect the inward freight of the vessel, and to pr,ocure for her an outward freight, and to pay the ship's disbursements upon the master's certificate, does not make him an agent who "authorized the giving of the advance security" within the meaning of the statute. Nor is he made out to be such agent by the further proof that upon the master's certificate he paid the shipping agent's bill in which the advances in question were charged. If the defendant had employed the shipping agent to ship the men, the case would have been different. The libel must be dismissed.
RUSSELL 'V. FARLEY, U. S. Sup. Ct., October Term, 1881. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota. The case was decided in the supreme court of the United States on April 3, 1882. Mr· .Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court affirming the decree of the circuit court. An appeal does not lie from an appeal in equity as to the costs merely. The circuit court of the United States is not governed in its practice in equity by the laws of the state in which it sits, but by the rules of practice prescribed by the supreme court, and by the circuit court not inconsistent therewith, and when these are silent by the practice of the high court of chancery in England when the equity rules were adopted. 'The courts of the United States, under the general principles and usages of.equity, may impose terms or require security for damages befo!e granting an injunction, and this power is independent of"any statute. dSO it may. relieve from, or modify such terms during the progress or at the termination of the canse,and enforce or'carry out the conditions imposed, or the' undertakings entered into; bilt while the coult may have the power to assess damages, yet Hit has that power it is in its discretion to exercise it, or to leave the parties to their action at law. R. S. Ashurst and T. H. Hnbbard, for "." , Henry J. Horn, for appellee. . Cases cited in the opinion: Canter v. IJ)s. Co. 8 Pet. 307;' Fab. Co. v. Smith, 110 U. S.; 112; Marquis,of v.Lady Sandys, 6 6 Ves'. Jr. 110, note; Wilkfnsv. ,Aitkin, Ves. Jr. 107; Wombwell 17 Ves. Jr. 422; Novellov. James, 5 De Gex, M. &G. 876; Bein v.Heath, 12 How. 179; Merryfieldv.Jolles, 2 Curt'; 306.