138 US 501 Louisville St Co v. Wilson
138 U.S. 501
11 S.Ct. 405
34 L.Ed. 1023
LOUISVILLE, E. & ST. L. R. CO.
March 2, 1891.
[Statement of Case from pages 501-503 intentionally omitted]
Alex. P. Humphrey, for appellant.
Bluford Wilson and W. S. Opdyke, for appellee.
Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
We think the appeal was properly taken. At the time the order of August 10th was entered the receiver was not in possession; he had surrendered the property more than nine months prior thereto. When he surrendered the property, he closed up his receivership. A decree against him was not personal, but official. It was not the contemplation of the court that any personal liability should be cast upon him. He not only had no railroad funds or property in his possession, out of which to pay this allowance, but he had no right to retake that which he had surrendered. The reservation made in the order entered in the Indiana court, of the right of the court to retake possession of the property surrendered, conferred no rights on the receiver; it was simply a reservation to the court, which might, under that reservation, by the old or a new receiver, at any time retake possession when its allowances within the scope of the order of surrender were not paid. So, the order of August 10th was a mistake. It neither bound the appellant nor the property which it had received. It was not a purchaser of the railroad property, and did not become, until August 29th, a party to the record in the Illinois court. It is true that, on August 29th, the circuit judge, directing the entry in the Illinois court of the order made nearly a year before in the Indiana court, directed that it should be entered as of October 8, 1886, the date of its entry in the Indiana circuit court; but such nunc pro tunc entry, while proper for the protection of the receiver, could not antedate the subjection of the new corporation to the orders and decrees of the Illinois circuit court. It could justly say that it was not a party to the proceedings in that court until the entry of August 29, 1887. There was no misunderstanding, no misrepresentation, no deceit, in these matters. Immediately, on the* entry of this order of August 29th, a transcript of the order from the Indiana circuit court, a new decree in favor of the intervenor, was entered,—a decree for the first time binding the appellant. This was notan order in execution, merely, of the former decree, such as those noticed in the case of Central Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 135 U. S. 207, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736, but it was the first order against and binding the appellant. We are therefore compelled to notice the merits of this allowance.
The allowance to the appellant was for three matters. He does not sue for services as general counsel of the mortgagor company, or for salary as an officer of that company. With respect to the provision in the order of appointment, he claims to come under the descriptive words therein used, 'wages of employes.' If that fails him, then he appeals to the general equity powers of the court to compensate him as one whose services were beneficial to the security holders. On the meaning of the words 'wages of employes,' he cites the case of Gurney v. Railway Co., 58 N. Y. 358, in which an order directing the receiver of a railway company, thereby appointed, to pay debts 'owing to the laborers and employes,' for labor and services, was held broad enough to include a debt due to Hon. Jeremiah S. Black, for professional services as counsel. Without criticising that decision, or noticing the special circumstances which seemed in the judgment of that court to justify the inclusion of professional services within the descriptive words of the appointment, we are of the opinion that the term 'wages of employes,' as used in the order now under consideration, does not include the services of counsel employed for special purposes. Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220, 237, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 60.
The terms 'officers' and 'employes' both alike refer to those in regular and continual service. Within the ordinary acceptation of the terms, one who is engaged to render service in a particular transaction is neither an officer nor an employe. They imply continuity of service, and exclude those employed for a special and single transaction. An attorney of an individual, retained for a single suit, is not his employe. It is true, he has engaged to render services; but his engagement is rather that of a contractor than that of an employe. The services of appellee, therefore, did not come within the order appointing the receiver. We would not be understood as asserting, even by implication, that the terms of an order of appointment of a receiver vest in all claimants an absolute right as against the security holders. Such terms may be, and doubtless are, a protection to the receiver; and what he does and pays within those terms may be, thereafter, beyond the challenge of any party interested in the property. But when he has not acted, and the question is presented to the court as to the liability of the property for any claim, the court is not foreclosed by the order of appointment, but may consider and determine equitably the extent of liability of the property to such claim, and what its rights of priority may be. Hence, as the receiver did not pay this claim, the parties in interest may rightfully challenge its priority, even if it were within the very letter of the order of appointment of the receiver.
What were the services for which the appellee made his claim, and were they so beneficial to the security holders that a court of equity might justly give them priority? And the question, it will be borne in mind, is not whether out of the earnings of the road such claims are payable, but whether, where there are no surplus earnings, they may be paid out of the corpus of the property in preference to secured liens.
The first matter is this: Prior to the appointment of a receiver, the railway company leased to the Illinois Midland Railway Company certain engines. When the latter road passed into the hands of a receiver, intervenor was employed to get the engines back and rental for their use. In this service he secured an allowance against its receiver for $1,500, upon which $1,340.13 was paid, and paid after the receiver in this case was in possession. The only testimony as to the value of such service fixed it at $300. Part of such service was rendered more than six months prior to the appointment of a receiver in this case; but, apparently, the important part within such time. This recovery inured to the benefit of the security holders, as placing so much more money in the hands of the receiver for the purpose of discharging obligations against the company payable before the bonds. We think it may fairly be held that the party who takes the benefit of such a service ought to pay for it, and that equity may properly decree payment therefor. As justly remarked by Lord KENYON in Read v. Dupper, 6 Term. R. 361, 'the principle has long been settled that a party should not run away with the fruits of a cause without satisfying the legal demands of his attorney, by whose industry and expense these fruits were obtained.' In Renick v. Ludington, 16 W. Va. 392, it is said: 'The lien (even in cases of quantum meruit) is in the nature of an equitable lien, (Vanleer v. Vanleer, 3 Coop. Ch. 23,) and is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff ought not to be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.' See, also, Mahone v. Telegraph Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 702, and In re Paschall, 10 Wall. 483. We think, therefore, there was no impropriety in alloing intervenor $300 for these services.
The second item of intervenor's claim is this: The railroad company was not paying operating expenses and interest; it was running behind. Certain parties interested in and officers of the road advanced moneys to continue its operation and prevent foreclosure proceedings. After advancing a considerable sum, they became anxious to secure their advances, and upon the intervenor's advice they took asssignments of pay-rolls, so as to bring them within the scope of the rulings of this court, as to preferential payment of employes; and on foreclosure these claims, thus evidenced and secured, were recognized and given equality of right with the security holders in the reorganization scheme. One of the witnesses as to the value of these services testified that they were worth $5,000, adding, 'Of course, I mean that such fees should be paid by the parties benefited.' That states the true equities of the case. The parties who, acting under the intervenor's advice, took such steps as to secure their advances, and thereby obtained equity of interest with the lienholders, should pay him. They who are compelled to let third parties into an equality with themselves in the matter of security ought not to be compelled to pay counsel who brought about such equality. As happily said by counsel for appellant: 'This is taking the funds belonging to a prior mortgagee to pay counsel to devise a scheme by which the subsequent lender of money is preferred before him.'
The remaining matter is this: The Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Railway Company was a corporation made up by the cousolidation of the Louisville, New Albany & St. Louis Railroad Company and the Evansville, Rockport & Eastern Railway Company. At the time of the consolidation there was on the firstnamed property a deed of trust of $3,000,000 and on the latter one of $900,000. After consolidation a new deed of trust for $1,000,000 was executed on the entire property. Fearing that the trustee in the deed of trust on the Evansville, Rockport & Eastern Railway Company might take possession of that division, intervenor was employed to prevent such action, and he commenced suits to enjoin the trustee therefrom. He also successfully negodated with the bondholders, and thus preserved the unity of operation and control until the commencement of the proceedings in this suit, whereby the entire property was taken possession of and operated by a single receiver, and subsequently sold and passed into the new corporation. At the sale both divisions were sold. The Evansville division, being sold subject to the deed of trust of $900,000, brought only $20,000, to be applied on the second lien,—the one given by the consolidated company. The services thus rendered were at the instance of the railroad company; and it is not perceived how services rendered at its instance, to preserve control of that portion of its road not covered by the first lien, can be considered as services to the holders of bonds secured by that lien. The primary object of such services was the benefit of the railroad company. It was to enable it to retain the control and receive the earnings of as large an extent of the road as possible. As such services did not secure any additional interest to the lienholders,—in fact, they advanced the moneys due for interest on the Evansville first mortgage,—it seems inequitable that they should be held responsible, and be compelled to pay the party employed by the railroad company. It cannot be that security holders are liable, either in law or in equity, for the expenses incurred by their debtor in carrying into effect a scheme which the latter believes will enable it to pay its interest to them, but which, in fact, does not accomplish such result. It was the debtor's act, and, if it failed of accomplishing hoped-for results, the party employed must look to his employer alone for compensation, and cannot charge the bondholders therefor, on the theory that it was believed that it might inure tothe ir ultimate benefit. In this matter, also, the allowance to the intervenor, as against the security holders, represented by the appellant, was unwarranted. The decree, therefore will be reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to allow the intervenor $300. Costs in this court will be divided.