Trimble, Carutherl it Trimble, for plaintiff. H. E. J. Bourdman, for defendant. LOVE, D. J. The prinoiple laid down in the case of McCabe v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. 13 FED. REP. 827, is decisive of the present oase. The defendant is an Iowa oorporation, having its principal place of busi. ness at Marshalltown, in the oentral division of the district of Iowa. Prooess was served upon its agent, C. M. Miller, at the town of ·Albia, in the southern division, returnable at Keokuk. The late aot of con· gress, creating circuit court jurisdiction in the severaldivisions of the distriot of Iowa, provides, in substanoe, that suit shall be brought in the division in whioh the defendant has his residenoe. The defend. ant herein now moves to have the cause transferred to the oentral division on the ground that the residence of the defendant is at the principal place of business, which is in the central division. In addi. tion to what is shown in the Case of McCabe, supra, it may be said that the "principal place of business" is no test of residence, whether of a corporation or natural person. A natural person might reside in one state and have his principal, or, for that matter, his sole place of business in another state. I presume that thousands of persons reside in Jersey City and have their principal place of business in New York, and many no doubt reside beyond the limits of the state of New York and oarry on their sole business in the city of New York. : >The motion is denied.
(District Oourt, D. NelYraska.
November Term, 1882.
INDICTMENT-FALSE CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Any person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented, any false claim against the United States, knOWing the same to be false, or who, for the purpose of aiding another to obtain the payment of a false claim, by making or using, or causing to be made or used, any false bill, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to be false, may be. punished under the provisions of section 5438 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
2. SAME-8TATUTE CONSTRUED. The section above cited is not limited in its operation to false claims presented by the accused on his own behalf, but applies as well to such claims ].1resented by an .attorney, agent, officer, or other person presenting or aiding in the collection of a false claim, knowing it to be false.
"From the Colorado Law Reporter.
UNITED STATES V. HULL.
3. INDICTMENT-DuPLICITY. An indictment which chll:rgcs that the defendant made, and caused to be made, the false voucher, certificate, or claim, and that he U presented and caused to be presented," is not bad for duplicity because the statute employs the disjunctive" or" instead of "and."
Mr. Lamberton, U. S. Atty., and Mr. Webster, for the United States. Mr. Woodworth and Mr. Thurston, for defendant. MCCRARY, C. J., (orally.) We have considered the motion to quash the indictment in this case, and I am now ready to state the con-
clusions arrived at. The indictment in the case charges, in substance,-First, the making of false claims against the United States; and, second, aiding another person to obtain payment of false claims against the United States. There are a number of counts in the indictment, but I believe they are all conceded to be substantially alike, and therefore it will be sufficient to consider the first count. This, after certain allegations setting forth that defendant was custodian of the United States court-house and post-office ,at Lincoln, and certain other allegations rather introductory in their character, not necessary to be repeated, proceeds thereafter to say that "defendant did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make and cause to be made, and present and caused to be presented, to an officer of the treasury department of the United States of America, a certain false, fraudulent, and ficti·, tious claim and account against the United States of America for pay" ment and approval for 806 yards best quality Napier matting, at 80 cents per yard, alleged in said account to have been purchased from one Albert M. Davis for the use of said building, at a price of $644.80, which said claim was false, fictitious, and fraudulent, as said Dwight G. Hull well knew, and that said goods were never delivered by saId Albert M. Davis at the price named, or at the place named. Then follow allegations that the defendant, for the purpose of aiding to obtain payment of said claim, unlawfully and feloniolisly did make and use, and caused to be made and used, a certain false bill, voucher, receipt, certificate, or account, which is copied in the indictment, followed by the allegation that said voucher, receipt, bill, or certificate was and is false, fictitious, and fraudulent as to the cost or price of said matting, as the said Dwight G. Hull :well knew; and the grand jury aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, present that the said Albert M. Davis never received the sum of $644.80 for said matting from the United States or any other person."
, '. FEDERAL REPQRTll:R.
Here is a very distinct and sufficient allegation of the two offenses to which I have referred, namely: First, the making and presenting of a false claim; and, second, aiding another to obtain the payment 01' :t false claim. We are of the opiuion that these offenses, as here charged, come clearly within the provisions of section 5438 of the RevisedStattitesof the United States,which provides that "every person who makes or causes to be made,or presents or causes to be presented,for payment or approval to or by any: person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, any claim upon or against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing said claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding to obtain, the payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavi.t, or deposition,knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, shall be imprisoned," etc. lt is not contended by counsel for defendant that this section of the statute does not describe in general terms the offense charged in the indictment; but, as I understand the counsel, they do insist that the statute applies only to a party who presents a false claim on his own behalf, and does not apply to a person who presents a false certificate or voucher on behalf of some other person, or in, the name of some other person. We are unable to concur in this view of the statute. It appears on the face of the statute that it is intended to apply to a case where a person makes, or causes to be made, a false statement of this character, or where he obtains, or is guilty of aiding to obtain, the payment or approval of any such false claim. The use of this language clearly implies that the statute is intended to cover a. case where an attorney, agent,lofficer, or 'other person undertakes to get a claim which is false and fraudulent allowed in his own behalf, or in behalf of any other party; otherwise the language "aiding to obtain" would· have no meaning whatever. It is a matter of history that this legislation was intended mainly to put a stop to the practice which was said to prevail at the city of Washington and elsewhere, where claim agents and lobbyists, acting on behalf of others, were in the habit' of manufacturing false and fictitious testimony-pension agents, and other agents of that character. We are clearly of the opinion there is nothing in the point to which I have referred. It is argued that the indictment is bad for duplicity, because it alleges that the defendant "made, or caused to be made," this false voucher, certificate, or claim, and that "he presented, and caused to
be' pl'esented;"but the' authorities are abundant in Bnpport: of the prinelplethat it is no object\ion"to an indictment to say tha.t ,"defend· ant did, Ql caused to be dQl:fe, " a particular act whichispuniabable by criminal statute. The allegation is good in that form, although tlie statute may employ the disjunctive conjunction -instead of "and." The follow.ing are some of. the authorities upon this point: Com. v. Twitchell, 4 Cush. 74; v. Fletcher, 18 Mo. 426; Durham v. State, l' Blackt 88rState v. Meyer, 1 Speer, (S.C.) 805; State v. Kuns,5 BlaQkf. 314jStatev. MOl'ton,.27 Vt.310; 2 Archbold, Crim'. Law, 810:
See U.8. v.,eJorbin, II
2 LoW. 232.
(Circuit Oourt, N.J). Iowa, E. D. December 8,1882.)
PRIVILEGE OF WITNESS-EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE OF
CrvrL PROCESS. Defendant, while in attendance. as a party and witness upon the trial of a case in Howard county, Iowa, by telegram directed -and instructed the sherilf of Mower county, Minnesota, to seize by writ of attac,:hment tIle goods of plaintiff,-whereupon plaintiff immediately brought suit. for the wrongful taking thereof, and served defendant with.notice of the commencement of such suit. Hdd, that defendant could not protect himself from respondihg to the ac-tion.1'lronght against him by the aJIegedowner of the property, under thepriv. ilegeusuallyac()orded to witnesses and patties in attendance upon a trial of a cause in court.
Where' parties or witnesses, while in attendance upon the trial of a cause, in. cluding going to and returning from the place of trial, do no wrong or injm:y to third parties, they may claim exemption from serviceo! civil process; but where they lay aside the character of parties or witnesses, and for their own be. half and benefit give cause for the institution of actions against them by thitd parties, they cimnotinvoke this but must be deemed to have-waived the exemptiol\'._ 'fhe trial upon the party or witness is in attendance must be interfered with by such service.
Thisdaction was commenced in the circuit court of Howard county, 10*0.-: "The defendant'is, and was at the time of the be¢nning of the action, a/resident and citizen of Minnesota. Service of the original notice was had npon defendant 'at Cresco, Howard county, Iowa, on ,the fourteenthd'ay of April, 1882. The petition alleges that plaintiff is the owner ()f certain personal property; that the sameW8.s in his posseBsionj' that while he (the