140 US 417 Quock Ting v. United States
140 U.S. 417
11 S.Ct. 733
35 L.Ed. 501
May 11, 1891.
[Statement of Case from pages 417-419 intentionally omitted]
J. J. Scrivner, for appellant.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Parker, for the United States.
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented is whether the evidencer before the court below was sufficient to show that the petitioner was a citizen of the United States. The testimony given by himself amounted to very little; indeed, it was of no force or weight whatever. The particularity and positiveness with which he stated the place of his birth in San Francisco was evidently the result of instruction for his examination on this proceeding, and not a statement of what he had learned from his parents in years past. And his failure to mention any particulars as to the city of San Francisco, which he certainly ought to have been able to do if he resided there during the first 10 years of his life, was surprising. A boy of any intelligence, ariv ing at that age, would remember, even after the lapse of six years, some words of the language of the country, some names of streets or places, or some circumstances that would satisfy one that he had been in the city before. But there was nothing whatever of this kind shown. He gave the name of no person he had seen; he described no locality or incident relating to his life in the city, nor did he repeat a single word of the language, which he must have heard during the greater part of several years, if he was there. The testimony of the father was also devoid of any incident or circumstance corroborative of his statement. The production of the so-called store-book, in which there was an entry of passage-money paid for the boy and his mother, does not strike us as at all conclusive. The accounts of a mere worker on a sewing-machine would not be likely to occupy much space; and the alleged entry could as easily have been made as the manufacture of the story repeated. If we could not believe the story in the absence of the book, we should hesitate to yield credence to it upon the exhibition of the entry. If the petitioner was really born in the United States, and had lived there during the first 10 years of his life, the fact must have been known to some of the father's neighbors, and incidents could readily have been given which would have placed the statement of it beyond all question. It is incredible that a father would allow the exclusion of his son from the country where he lived, when proof of his son's birth and residence there for years could have been easily shown, if such in truth had been the fact. Undoubtedly, as a general rule, positive testimony as to a particular fact, uncontradicted by any one, should control the decision of the court; but that rule admits of many exceptions. There may be such an inherent improbability in the statements of a witness as to induce the court or jury to disregard his evidence, even in the absence of any direct conflicting testimony. He may be contradicted by the facts he states as completely as by direct adverse testimony; and there may be so many omissions in his account of particular transactions, or of his own conduct, as to discredit his whole story. His manner, too, of testifying may give rise to doubts of his sincerity, and create the impression that he is giving a wrong coloring to material facts. All these things may properly be considered in determining the weight which should be given to his statements, although there be no adverse verbal testimony adduced. In Kavanagh v. Wilson, 70 N. Y. 177, where the action was by a real-estate broker against the personal representatives of a deceased customer to recover an alleged agreed compensation for effecting a sale, and the only witness as to the contract was the son of the plaintiff, whose own compensation depended upon the plaintiff's success, and the compensation alleged to have been agreed upon was more than double the usual compensation, it was held that the statement of the witness, under those circumstances, was not so entirely free from improbability as to justify a direction of the court to the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, although there was no direct contradictory testimony presented. The court said: 'It is undoubtedly a general rule that when a disinterested witness, who is in no way discredited, testifies to a fact within his own knowledge, which is not of itself improbable, or in conflict with other evidence, the witness is to be believed, and the fact is to be taken as legally established, so that it cannot be disregarded by court or jury. But this case is not fairly brought within this rule. Here the witness was not wholly disinterested. He was a son of the plaintiff, engaged in his business, and thus biased and interested in feeling. His compensation for drawing the contracts (and how large that was to be does not appear) depended, I infer from the evidence, upon his father's success in getting his compensation as the broker.' The court then wet o n to observe that the story told by the witness was not entirely free from some improbability, and that it did not appear why the broker was promised more than double the usual price for the sale of country property, nor why the compensation was never spoken of before or after, in the numerous conversations heard by witness, nor what could have induced the promise of the large sum, when the usual commission would seem to have been ample compensation for any service to be rendered, nor why the party made the unusual promise to pay the absolute sum in no way dependent upon the amount for which the property might be negotiated. These circumstances, the court thought, presented a sufficient case for the consideration of the jury, and it held that the court below erred in refusing to submit it to them. In Koehler v. Adler, 78 N. Y. 287, it was held that a court or jury was not bound to adopt the statements of a witness simply for the reason that no other witness had denied them, and that the character of the witness was not impeached; and that the witness might be contradicted by circumstances as well as by statements of others contrary to his own, or there might be such a degree of improbability in his statements as to deprive them of credit, however positively made. The case of Elwood v. Telegraph Co., 45 N. Y. 549, was cited in support of this position, where, in delivering the opinion of the court, the rule and its exceptions are stated by Judge RAPALLO with great clearness and precision; so also was the case of Kavanagh v. Wilson, above referred to. In Wait v. M'Neil, 7 Mass. 261, the supreme court of Massachusetts held that a verdict was not to be set aside, although it was given against the positive testimony of a witness, not impeached, where there were circumstances in evidence tending to lessen the probability that such testimony was true. Numerous other cases might be cited in support of the same general doctrine. For the considerations mentioned, and the fact that the court below had the witnesses before it, and could thus better judge of the credibilty to which they were entitled, we are not prepared to hold that its finding was not justified. Its judgment is therefore affirmed.