herita.ble estate, descended to her heirs-to her lineal descendants first, a.ndindefault of these, to her collateral heirs. These two sections,-the fourth and fifth,-although parts of one act, and containing some provisions in common, are in essentials different and independent grants. They are made upon different motives and considerations, for different quantities of land, and to a different class of persons. The first had its motive in the past and the second in the future. The one was made a8 a reward for immiaccomplished, and the other was gration and settlement offered as an inducement for future ,immigration and se,ttlement. Silver v. Ladd" supra, 22,7; Ch(l,mbers v.Chambers, supm, 155. In Barney v. Dolph, supra, 654, Mr. Chief Justice WAITE, who has towards a lucid and comprehensive exposition of this done so donation act, says,: "Section 4 was evidently intend,ed for the benefit is, the early settlers who at, the passage of the act were,occupying under the, land law of the provisional government; and that the provision ,in that section concerning tha disposition of the donation to' married persons in case of the death of one of the:q:l, after compliance with the, act and before the issue of a patent, is, "the language used, evidently" confined "in its effect to the married perso;n me;n.tioned" therein. The demurrer is sustained.
by his .Next I' nend, v.
B. &Q. Ry. Co.-
(Circuit Court. S. D. Iowa. .January, 1883.)
RAILROAD-NEGLIGENCE-INJURY To PASSENGERS-PLEADING.
The plaintUf in !l;suitagainst a railroad company to recover damages for In· juries wllile traveling as a passenger on the defepdant's cars through the defendant's negligence" is not bound to state in his declaration the particular factsedrlstittJ.'tingthc'negligence: It is sufficient to slate generally ,hat 'the injury was the result of the(defcndant1s negligence.
'. Action to recover damages pers90al tion: to make declaration ,more specific. 'Hagerman, McOrary et Hagerman, for plaintiff. $. H.Trirnble, for defendant. ,,' The opinion of the, court was orally by judge) who, discussed the requisites of a declaration in. sucll a. case
Colorado Law neporter.
UNITED STATES V. MURPHY.
with respect to the allegation of negligence.· He said in substance: The question is one of pleading, and not necessarily one ofevidence. The plaintiff, who was injured while traveling as a passenger on board the defendant's cars, alleges that he was injured by the derailment of the train on which he was traveling, and that the injury resulted from negligence on the part of the defendant, but he does not state in what the negligence consisted. If this were a suit by an employe it might, perhaps, be necessary to specify in the complaint the facts conl'>tituting the negligence; but there is a material difference between' a suit by an employe and a suit by a passenger for personal injury. The latter has, as a general thing, no means of knowing what has caused the accident or injury. He has nothing to do with the operation of the road. He may be only one of a thousand passengers occupying many coaches. He may be so' seriously injured as to beu.nable to inquire into, the causes of the accident. He may be killed·, and suit may be brought by his representatives. Many reasons selves at once why. it would' be a' harsh rule to require, whosuesfor injury to specify the acts of negligence, or tile facts acshowing want of care, on the part of the railroad company. cordingly settled, we think, by reason and authority, that jt is cient to state in the declaration generl;l.lly that theinjnry ,the result of defendant's negligence. When it. comes to the trial the burden is upon the plaintiff to show a prima facie case. Whether he does so by showing simply that' the car ran off the track, and that he was injured in consequence, is..a qllestjon which may the trial, but which is not now befOre us. He must. show'enough to raise a presumption of negligence on the part of .· th,e defendant; but how far he must go in order to do this Wl;l need not now (ieter,mine. This view is supported by the, authority Thompson"g'wor.k on Carriers of Passengers, p. 547, § 9, and by the cases
' . '.
UNiTED STATES 1'. +dURPHY. ,
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Indiana.
Oll' PmORITY IN PAY· .
BANKRUl'TCy-CLAIM OF THE UNlTED loIENT";-PERSONAL LIABILITY OF TRtrBTEll:.
By the Revised Statutes the;right of priority: in payment of debts Elue the United States is established, inter alia, in cases where an act of bankruPtcy.has been committed, and every person, who pays debts py tIle person or estate from whom or for which he acts before he discharged