ord; and (8) by original bill charging .fraud or newly-discovered evi· dence. The petitioners chose to adopt the second method of contesting the decrees in question, and they are concluded by the ad. verse decision of the supreme court. It is, therefore, entirely clear that the petitioners have exhausted their remedy, so far as it was to be had by any form of proceeding in the original suits, and that if they have any remaining rights which a court of E::quity will enforce, they must seek relief by an independent and original proceeding, in which they must assert no right or claim in hostility to, or incoDsist.ent with, the adjudications already had. It is not necessary, at present, to determine whether, in an original procedure, the petitioners can show themselves entitled to relief without seeking a modification of the original decrees. What has been said disposes of tht, question now before us. The demurrer to the petition is sustained, and the petition will be dismissed. See Pacific R. R. v. Mis80uri Pac. By. Co. 2 McCrary, 227; [So C. 3 FED. REP. 772.]
BRIDGFORD tJ. CITY OF TUSOUMBIA.·
(Circuit Court, .lV. D. .t1laoama. 1881.\
The rights of creditors or of third persons cannot be prejudiced by the neglect of the council to keep proper minutes, against the corporation i what the council in fact did may be shown by evidence ciliunde the record kept by it. 2.
After the council of a municipal corporation had practically agreed to make purchase from the plaintiff, but deferred tinal action until the sense of the tax-payers could in some manner be taken upon the subject, the plaintiff agreed, in the presence of the council, to pay the mayor a small sum for circulating the petition among the tax-payers. Held, under the facts of the case, that this did not amount to lobbying or corruption so as to taint with illegnlity the contract of purchase SUbsequently ent.ered into.
This Buit is brought on three promissory notes to have been given by the city of Tuscumbia, and sigried by J. J.Davis, mayor. and J. H. Simpson, secretary, with the seal of the city attached; all dated August 28, 1877, each for $750, with 6 per cent. interest from date, payable, respectively, in 18, 30, and 42 months after date,
«Reported by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq., of thc New Orkans bar.
_ .' ·.
given. As appears by the minutes of the board on the fourteenth of August, 1877, the mayor and marshal were appointed a committee to have an engine-house and stable erected, and on the eighth of October following, the mayor's account for building the engine-house was allowed, and steps were taken towards selecting a fire company. The engine remained in the custody of the city authorities, occupying the engine-house so built, and was subsequently, at Christmas, 1877, and again in 1878, (date not fixed,) employed at fires, but at neither time did it render satisfactory service. The testimony of several experts, notably the chief of the Louisville fire department, has been given as to the value of such engines for the extinguishment of fires, and the defense has offered the opinions and experiences of several persons who are not experts on the same subject. No complaint appears to have been made by the city authorities of the inefficiency of the engine until payment was demanded of the notes; and the engine is now, and has been continuously since the purchase, in the possession and control of the city, without tender to plaintiff. Walker <f Shelby andL. B. Thornton, for plaintiff. Wm. Oooper and Ex-Gov. Lindsey, for defendant. PARDEE, J. The argument in this case has taken a wide range, -much wider than 'is necessary for the decision of this case. There can be no doubt at all, under the facts in this case, that the mayor and board of aldermen of the city of Tuscumbia purchased the engine, and incurred the several obligations to pay the same, for and on account of the city of Tuscumbia. They had the authority to make the purchase. Mayor, etc., of Birmin:lham v. Rumsey, 63 Ala. 353; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 93, 94, pp. 210, 211. See Charter, Acts Ala. Sess. 1865-6, p. 191. As they had the authority to make the purchase, they, of course, had the authority to obtain terms and enter into the necessary contracts, provided they not restricted in that behalf by their charter, which is not claimed in this case . . See Trustees v. Moody, 62 Ala. 389. The burden of proof is on the defense to show the want of ,consideration pleaded. This has not been shown; on the contrary, from the weight of evidence in the case, I am satisfied that the engine in controversy, when taken care of and handled by a capable person or persons, is a valuable machine, and can be of great assistance in the extinguishment of fires. These conclusions would seem to dispose of the case, but the counsel for the defense have strenuously and learnedly urged two propositions to defeat the plaintiff's demand
BRIDGFORD V. CITY OF TUSOUMBIA.
that I have no in passing upon. It is said that the acceptance of the contract by the mayor and board of aldermen cannot be shown save by the minutes in writing of the meeting at which the acceptance was ordered, and as such record shows no meeting, none can be proved. In Dill. Mun. Corp. it is said:
"But a distjl}ction has sometimes been drawn between evidence to contradict facts stated on the recOl'd and evidence to show facts omitted to be stated upon the record. Parol evidence of the latter kind is receivable unless the law expressly and imperatively requires all matter to appear of record, and makes the record the only evidence." See 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 237; Bank, etc., v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64. "The rights of creditors or of third persons cannot be prejudiced by the neglect of .the council to keep proper minutes, against the corporation. What the council in fact did may be shown by evidence aliunde the record kept by it." Bigelow v. Perth Amboy, 1 Dutch. 297; San Antonio v. Lewis, 9 Tex. 69; Trustees v. Cagger, 6 Barb. 576.
The case of Perryman v. Greenville, 51 Ala. 507, does not conflict with these propositions. The in that case proved, by its record of proceedings, that a certain allowance claimed by the defendant, one of its officers, was not made by the council, and the supreme court held the records or minutes admissible, saying that they were the best and only evidence of the fact that such an allowance had or had not been made. My attention has been called to no Alabama case supporting the defendant's pretensions in this regard. The other proposition argued is that as Fitch, agent, paid the mayor $25 for circulating the petition for the purchase of an engine among the tax-payers, that it amounted to lobbying and corruption, so as to taint with illegality the contract of purchase; relying on Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441. A sufficient answer to this fs that no such defense is pleaded in the case; but I deem it proper to say that the evidence shows that the agreement to pay the mayor for circulating the petition was after agreed upon by the board of alderthe purchase had been men, and no intention to corrupt anyone, and no actual corruption, appears or can be fairly inferred from all the facts in the case. On the whole case I am satisfied that plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the amount of notes sued on, principal and interest, and as a jury has been waived and the case submitted to the court, such judgment will be entered, with costs. v.16,no.9-58
(Circuit Court, N. D. Alabama. 1883.)
An execution delivered to the sheriff of one county, and by him Bcted under, is invalid in the hands of the sheriff of any other county. It is the imperative duty of the first sheriff to return it into court, and it ceases to have force or effect.
A sheriff's deed cannot be impeached collaterally.
PARDEE, J. In this case the jury was waived and the cause was tried by the court. The plaintiff olaims under a sheriff's deed reciting two judgments, two executions, a levy, and a sale to plaintiff's vendor, and a conveyance from the grantee in the sheriff's deed to plaintiff. The only question raised is as to the life and validity at the time of the sale of one of the executions,by reason of its first having been <lelivered to the sheriff of Franklin county, who l'epresents he levied on property in Colbert county, and then the execution was not returned to the court, but was handed over to the sheriff of Colbert .county, who proceeded to aellthe property. That the sheriff of Colbert county made another levy before selling is recited in his deed, hut not returned on the execution. The authorities cited in 7 and 9 Ala. go far towards holding that an execution delivered to the sheriff of one county and by him acted under, is invalid in the hands of the sheriff of any other county. It is the imJ:'erative duty of the first sheriff to return it into COUl·t, and it ceases to have force and effect. On the other hand, it is clear that a sheriff's deed cannot be impeached collaterally. None of these matters do I find it necessary to pass upon. The other judgment, execution, levy, and sale appear to be unimpeached, and. are sufficient to make out plaintiff's title, which is anterior to, and better than, defendant's title. The suit was commenced February 12, 1879; the rents due, therefore, commence from twelfth February, 1878. The evidence shows the rents to be worth from $7.50 to $8 per month, or $90 to $96 per year. Let a judgment be entered for the plaintiff for the property, and for rents at $90 per year from February 1:d, 1878.
*Reported by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar.