I FEDERAL REPORTER.
'valuation. Since the forfeiture, Thomas Henderson and others, owners of the steamer, have presented a petition to me, pursuant to the provisions of sections 17 and 18 of the act of June 22, 1874, praying .for an allowance of freight from the proceeds of the sale, and one Joseph Wells has also petitioned to be reimbursed for certain advances of money made by him on the purchase of the property without knowledge of the vinlations of the re,enue laws by the importer. Under the provisions of the eighteenth section I directed the summary investigation, provided for by the act, to be made by William Muirheid, Esq., one of the United States commissioners for the district, ordering him to state and annex to the petition the facts appearing from the evidence, together with a certified copy of the evidence, in order that the same might be transmitted to the honorable secretary of the treasury for adjudication. The commissioner has made his report, finding the facts which he was ordered to do, and also finding the law, which was not within the reference. The counsel for the petitioners, Henderson and others, have filed exceptions to the report of the commissioner, and asking that numerous changes should be made by the judge. I think the fair construction of the act is that ;these exceptions should go with the report to the secretary of the treasury, and should be considered by him in making up his judgment in the case. I have accordingly declined to pass upon them. I should direct all expressions of opinion by the commissioner, as to the law of the case, to be stricken from the report, as not coming within the reference, if I supposed they would tend to prejudice the judgment of the secretary of the treasury.
ACCOUNTS OF THE SHIPPING CO:lDlISSIONER OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK.
(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.
June 8, 1883.)
OF PORT OF NEW YORK- S.U,ARlES OF DEPUTIES-
'Vhile, on the facts beforc the court, it cannot as,llme that the salaries of $3,648, paidl1y the shipping commis,ioller of the port of New York to his three sons, whom he has appointed as his deputies, are excessh-e and should not be allowed, it is orderl'd that the accounts be refelTed to the master to take proof and report explicit'-Ilpon the reasonableness of thc sabries paid hy the shipping commissioner to 'his deputies, upon notice to the Unitc,l States attorney, and with leave to thc United States attorney to introduce te,stimony.
Objections to Master's Report. .' ". H. E. ,Duncan; on part of shipping commissioner. Elihn Root, U. S. Atty., COI/tret. " WALLACE, J; , Upon the presentation of the report of the master, to whom it was referred to examine theaunual account of Mr.
tN BE ACCOUNTS OF THE
COM'n OF TIlE PORT OF N. Y.
Duncan as shipping commissioner, and report to the court, the United States attorney appeared,- and .objected that the salaries paid by the shipping commissioner to the clerks in his office, and included in such account, are excessive. ,.The objection is, particularly addressed to the salaries paid by the shipl;ing commissioner to his three sons, each of whom is a "deputy commissioner," by the appointment r of his father, 'andeach of whom was paid for the year 1882 the sum of $3,648. In view of the testimony of Mr. Duncan before the mastel' as to the nature of the duties which are discharged by these deputies, and the compensation which they earn, the court, in the absence of any controverting testimony, cannot assnme that the salaries paid are exorbitant.' 'rhe objection now ma.de has been urged. on former occasions, when the accounts of the shipping commissioner were presented to this court for approval, and has been overruled by each of my predecessors,-Judges WOODRUFF, JomIsoN and BLATCIlFORD, each of whom has sanctioned the payment of larger salaries to these same deputies for the same services than were paid to them Sllipp'[! Com'r, 16 Blatchf. 92. respectively in 1882. In re Account Nevertheless, the objection has been nniformly made by the United States attorney when these accounts have been. presented; not perfunctorily, but because he has deemed it his duty to urge it in the proper discharge of a responsibility imposed upon him by the court under its order ma'de in 11>76. While it is not just to indulge a presumption against the honesty and propriety of the action of the, shipping commissioner merely because these salaries are paid to. his sons, who were made deputies by his own appointment, still,. the shipping commissionermllst concede himself that the circumstance that these salarie8 are adjusted npon a flexible scale, which increases or decreases them so that; in connection with the other expenses of the 'office, they always absorb the entire receipts, is well calculated to excite unfavorable criticism. It is not strange, therefore, notwithstanding the action of this court on former occasions, that, the propriety of paying these sal::tries should he tioned again. I think it is due to the court whose officer Mr. Duncan is, to the United, States attorney, and to Mr. Duncan himself, that there should be a thorough iuvestigationof the whole matter, in order that if any abuses exist they may be effectually suppressed, and if none are found to exist tliat the shipping commissioner may be exonerated henceforth from unjust suspicions. . , It is 'ordered'that the accounts be referred back to the master to tl1ke proof and report explicitly upon the reasonableness of the salaries paid by the shipping commissioner to his deputies, upon notice to the'Unitea States attorney, and with leave to the United States ll:ttorney t<;> ipproducetestim.ony.,,, . . " .. ,., c' , ",
FEDERAL REPORTER. and others v. ApPELL.
(Circuit Ouurt, D. Uolorado.
June 23, lS83.)
STATUTES OF LnHTATTONS.
S alUle; of Ii'llltatlon, are statutes of repose, and are enacted upon the pre'4 sump' ion that one ha-l,ng a wpll-founc1ed claim wdl not delay enforcing it beyon:i a reasonable time If he has the power to sue. Such reasonable tune is, therefore, dedned and allowed. But the basis of the presumption is gone Whenever the ability to reA,)!·t to the court has been tak ..n away, and in such a case the cre litor ha; not th· time within wh,ch to lJrtng his suit that thc statute contemplated he shonld have.
SAMr;-BANK1UPTCY -DEL \Y IN ApPLYING FOR DrSCIIARGE.
ngs in lla'lkru )ley amonnt to an injnnction against any proeccdings agamAt the b to his contracts III the courts, but if he delays for aJ.1 unreason,allle ti'lle to apply for his discharge, the right of action against hIm upon IllS contraets or d""ts. which was su'pe,ded by the commencement of proceed ngs in h rnluupV,y, revIve'. and durin,g the time that the right of acwas sllspl'll'le.i I'y the lJankrup.cy the statute of limitations will not run in IllS favur.
MCCRARY, J., (nral1,y.) This is an action at law upon certain promnotes, and also, I b.:llieve, upon an open account. There is a demurrer to the complaint, which raise8 the qnestion whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations of this state. The defendant, Appell, was adjudlCatetl bankrupt in the state of Pennsylvania some years AgO, and the proceedings in bankruptcy were continued for some years, and are probably still pending; but Appell has never been discharged. The theory of th;s suit is that, having delayed for an nnreasonable time to apply fill' his discharge, tile right of action against him npon these neuts, which \Va" snspelJiled by the commenl'ement of proceedings in bankruptcy, has revivell; aud the question here is whether, during the time that the right of action was suspended by the bankruptcy proceedings, the statute of limitations of the state of Colorado continued to run in favor of the bankrupt; or, in other words. does the bankruptcy of the dehtor SU8iJeud the running of the statute of limitations in his f,tvor? That it sllspend:> the right to sue, by the very tenns of the bankrupt act, i:l not disputed. After the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy ag Lilht the deb;or, and afLer an adjudication in bankt-uptcy, no suit. can be br,mght against him in any court; certainly, not without the consent of tue bani;:ruptcy court. It amounts, in other word:>, to an any proceedings against the bankrupt to enforce 11:8 CtHltrlCts in the courts of the conntry. If he is not discharge.!, th'JIl thJ action revive" after the proceedings in bankruptcy are ende.!. The old rule up:1ll this snhject was very strict. and many authorities have been cited wilicll cle.Ldy hold that if the statute of limitations hegins to run. will stop its running except something that is express'y pl'on.btl in .the statute itself; and it was formerly