well as civil,when a written document is relied on to snstain the prosecution or plaintiff's case, it must be set out either verbatim or in substance, and not a statement of the opinion of the pleader as to the effect it .was intended to or might produce. The information does. not undertake to give the substance of the document mentioned, but only its effect. I am of opinion that this is not sufficient, especially in' a criminal charge. Had section 5440, referred to, and the only one upon which the charge for conspiracy in the case can be maintained, not required to constitute the offense some overt act to be committed' by one of the conspirators, I am of opinion there is enough in the information to require the defendants to plead to it; but, when closely. examined, I do not find a sufficient averment of an act done by any one of the conspirators to effect and carry out the object and purpose of the alleged conspiracy, and for the want of which the motion to quash must be sustained, with leave to the district attorney to prefer one or more indictments before the grand jury now in session for any of the alleged wrongful acts stated in the information.
UNITED STATES V. MARTIN.
(District Court, D. Oregon., June 27, 1883.)
OFFICER OF TIIE UNITED STATES.
A deputy marshal is an off1cer of the United States, within the purview of section 5398 of the Hevisecl and so is the keeper of a state jail to whose custody a person is committed by legal process issued by a. United States court or judicial officer, with the con'Sent of tile state.
CmDIlSSIONER OF TIlE CmOUIT COURT·
.\ commissioner of the circuit court, when engaged under section 1014 of the Revi,ed Statutes in causing the arrest or imprisollment, or holding to bail for trial, any person ch:nged with the commission of a crime against the ljnited !.States, acts as a committing magistrate, and must proceed according to the law of the state in similar cases.
3. OI\OE1\ TO
Section ]030 of the Hevised Statutes does not apply to proceedings before' such commissioners acting under the authority of said section lOB; and it is; doubtful if a jailer haVing a prisoner in cu,tody for trial in the circuit or district court is obliged to bring or send him into court, or deliver him to the marshal for that purpose, without a written order to that effcct. 4. LEGAL PIWCESS UNDER SECTION 53\\8. Under the Oregon Code of Criminal Procedure, §§ 402, 403, and at common law, it is sufficient in a commitment to de3ignate the crime invoh'ed in killing a human being with malice aforethought, generally, as" murder;" and therefore a commitment issued by a commissioner of the circuit court, in and for said state, directed to the keeper of a couuty or town jail therein, and requiring him to receive and safely kcep a person therein named, and charged upon the' oath of another with the crime of "murder," until discharged by due course of law, is legal process, within the meaning of. that term as used in the 'latter clause of said section 5393; and resi,tance to the execution thereof, as by tak. ing snch person out of such jail or the custody of such jailer without his con·'sent, a vioL\tiu'l of such section. '
PHISONEH I:'>TO COURT.
UNITED STATES V. MAIlTIN.
Information for the Violation of section 53D8, RevoSt. James P. Watson, for the United States. TV. Lair Hill and TV. J. Thompson, for defendants. DEADY, J. On January 9, 1883, the district attorney, by Jenve of the court, filed an information herein, charging the defendant with a violation of section 53DS of the Revised Statutes, which provides that"E\'cry person who knowingly and willfnlly obstrncts, resists, or opposes any omcer of the United States in serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any mesne process or warrant, or any rule or order of any court of the Unitetl States, or any other legal or jUdicial writ or process, * * * shall be imprisoneu not more than twelve months and fined not less than $300."
The information contains two counts, and states that Ah Hate, Weet Soot, Capsula, and Petenus, Indians belonging to the Umatilla Indian reservation, being charged, before a commissioner of this · court, with the crime of murder, committed in the killing of one Charles Mulheren, were by said commissioner eommitted to custody pending their examination npon said charge,-the first-named two, to the custody of the keeper of the town jail of Pendleton, Oregon, and the last two to the custody of the defendant, as keeper of · the county jail of Umatilla county, Oregon; that the defendant after_wards knowingly and willfully took and rescued said Ah Hate and -'Veet Soot from t.he custody of the keeper of said town jail, and also · refused to deli'ver said -Petenus and Capsula to the United States 'mai.'bbal, although demanded hy. the latter, upon the order of said commissioner, to bring them before him fer further examination upon said clmrge, with force and violence prevented said marshal from executing said order. 1'he defendant demurred to the information on the ground that this court had no jurisdiction of the crime charged against the Indians. On February 5, 1883, the court cverrulecl the demurrer. 14 FED. TIEP. 817. Thereupon the defendant surrendered. the Indians to the marshal, and they were indicted by a grand jury of this court for- the murder of Mulheren. An Indian of the same reservation, named Tummllsk, was included in the indictment, ancl subsequently found and arrested by the marshal. Upon the trial, all of tbem, except Weet Soot, who was discharged from the indictment and allo'l\ed to become a witness for the gOY<3rnment, were found guilty of manslaughter, and on May 22,1883, sentenced to 10 years' i'mprisonmellt each in the penitentiary of Oregon. On February 16, 1883, this cause was submitted to the court for judgment Upon a stipulation to the effect that a statement of facts thenfilecl in the eonrt should be taken and considered to be the special yerclict of a jury in the case, subject, however, to objection for immateriality to all or any portion of such statement. From this special verdict it substantially appears as follows;
(1) That said fonr Indians all belong to said Indian reservation, anll are the charge ufan Indian .agent.
(2) That said Charles Mnlheren was a whitf\ man, and was killed by said Indians on said reservation on November 22, 1db2. (3) That the defendant is, and at and dnring all the times herein mentioned was, the sheriff of said Umatilla connty and the keeper of the jail thereof; that 111'. Frell. Page Tustin is, and at and dnring said times was, a (lnly-appointed commissioner of this conrt, with authority to examine, commit for trial, and admit bail" all persons committing otrenses agai nst the laws of the Unitecl8tates" in the (listrict of Oregon; that S. L. Morse is, and at and during said times was, a dnly-appointed and acting depnty marshal of the Unit ell States for said district; and that P. M. McDonald is, and at and dursaill times was, the keeper of the town jail in said tOWIl of Pendleton. (4) That said commissioner, on Novemher 28,1882, on a complaint dnly verified by the oath of saill on said date, charging Weet 800t with the crime of Il1unler in killing said Charles on ovember 22, 1882, in the county of Umatilla and district of Oregon, and on said Indian reserva· tion, issned a warrant for the arrest of said Weet Soot on said charge, upon which he was arrested uy said Morse on November 29,1882, and bronght IJefore said commissioner for examination on December 8th; that afterwards Ah Hote, Petenns, and Capsnla were arrested by said Morse on similar war!'ants issned by said commissioner for their respective arrests on similar complaints, veri lied by the oath of said McDonald, the complaints and warrrants in the cases of Ah Hote and Petenns being each dated December the 4th, and in thfl case of Capsnl,t on December 16th; that Ah HotI' was arrested on December 7th, and brought before the commissioner for examination Oll December 8th; and that, therenpon, said 800t and Ah Hate were each committed to the custody of the keeper of the tOWll flil aforesaid on a mittimus issued by said cdmmissioner, from which it appeared that the prisoners had been charged Oll oath with the crime of munIer committed in Umatilla county, Oregon, on Novemher 22,1882. and (,·xamined by said commissioner on said charge, antI reqllired "to render himself in appearance before him," and that said keeper was commanded in the nanle of tlte president of the Unite,l8tatei'l to receive the said Ah Hote and Soot, as prisoners of the United 8tates, into his custody in said town jail... there to rema.in until discharged by due conrse of law;" that sai,l Petenus and Capsnm were arrested on 16th, and bronght befm" said on the same day for examination, and were thereupon each committed to the cnstody of the defendant, as keeper of the county jail aforesaid, upon a mittim/Is issued by the commissioner, similar to tho3e issued to the keeper of the town jail in the casps of Ah Hote and "'eet Soot. (5) Tlmt Ah Hate and Weet SOlJt remained in the cnstody of thfl keeper of said town jail, under said commitments, until Decemuer 18,1882, when the defendant took them from said custody and jail without the consent of said keeper, Up'Hl a warrant from the eircnit conrt of the state for sai,l county, directed to him as sheriff thereof, and commanding him to arrest all of said 1ndi<ms as defendant!. in an indictment fonllll by the grallli jllry of said court on said day, cllarging them with the crime of munier, in killing s,lId (6) That on saill Decenlber 18th said commissioner made a. verbal order directing said to lJring- all of said lllliians uefore him for further examinatiollnpon the c!l;lrge aforesaill, which order he thpn allli thpre attempted to execute, and for that pnrpose demanded each of said I nllians from the defendant, who thell hwl t!lem all in h s cnsto:ty in said connty jail, and knew that said 1Iorse was then acting as depnty UniteJ States marshal, and made such demand as such depnty, alld in pnrsuance of said order of the cOIllmissioner; unt the deiendant rpfnsed to deliver allY of said Indians to saill deputy, or to permit him to take any of them from said connty jail, giving as a rea,.on therefor the limling of the i111lictment in the st.lte court, anJ the is:>uing of the warrant to him thereon, as aforesaid.
(7) That the defenrlant acted in good faith in the premil;e3, believing it to his duty as sheriff to take and detain said Indians.
The defendant contends that judgment cannot be given against him on this verdict for a violation of said section 5398 of the Revised Statutes, because it does not appear therefrom that he obstructed or resisted an officer of the United States h the execution or attempt to execute a legal order or process of the United States, or any court thereof, in that it does not appear from the facts found that it was stated or alleged, in any of the proceedings before the commissioner for the arrest, examination, or commitment of said Indians, that Mulheren was a white man, and therefore it does not appear that th commissioner had jurisdiction to issue a warrant for the arrest of said Indians for the killing of said 1\1ulhcren, or to make any order concerning the same. There is no question but that was "an officer of the States" within the purview of the statute, (U. S. v. Tinklepaugh, 3 Blatchf. 428,) and that a commissioner of this court might, in a proper case, issue "legal process," within the meaning of tlle latter clause of said section 531)8, (ll. S. v. Lukins, 3 Wash. C. C. 337,) even if it should be held that he is not a "court of the United States" within the meaning thereof. And for the purpose of this case, sinco the decision on the demurrer, it must be assumed that Commissioner Page had jurisdiction and authority to issue any process, or make any order for tile arrest, examination, and commitment of said Indians for trial in this court upon the charge of having killed a white man Upon the Indian reservation. Snch was the decision of the court Upon the demurrer to the information; and, upon a consultation with the circuit judge at the beginning of the April term of the circuit court, he concurred in the conclusion, having already made the same ruling in effect. U. S. v. Leathers, tj Sawy. 17; U. S. v. Sturgeon, Id. 29. m tlle case of Ah Hote and Weet Soot it is alleged that the defendant took and rescued them from the custody of McDonald, and the special verdict finds, in eUeet, that he took them from the jail and custodv of the latter without his consent,-tbe fact being that McDonalZl was made to understand that it would be no use for him to resist the defendant, and best for him not to do so. By this act the defendant certainly obstructed McDonald in the execution of the commitments from the commissioner, directing him to keep those two Indians in his custody until discharged therefrom by due of law-that is, the law of the United States. McDonald, whIle Ah Hote and Weot Soot were in his custody under these commitments, was so far "an officer of the United States" within the meaning of this statute. By the resolution of September 23, 1789, congress recolllmended to the lecrislatures of the several states "to pass laws o . making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their jails to re.ce1'·e and safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the authonty of the United States, until they shall be discharged by the due course
of the laws thereof, under the like penalties as in the case of persons committed under the authority of such states respectively." By section !.lS7 of the COlle 0; Criminal Procedure, this state, in pursuance of this resolution, gave tlle United States the use of its jails, and in section provided that "a sheriff or jailer to whose custody a prisoner is committed, as provided in the last section! [987,J is answerable for his safe-keeping, in the courts of the Umted States, according to the laws thereof." In Ralldolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch, 85, which was an action against the marshal for an escape of a debtor committed by him under said resolution to a Virginia jail, with the consent of the state, the question arose as to the custody of the prisoner under such commitment. The court held that the jailer was not the deputy of the marshal, and that the latter had nothing to do with the prisoner while in the custody of the former. In delivering the opinion of the court 11r. Justice STOr,Y said:
"When a prisoner is regnlarly committed to a state jail by the marshal, he is no longer in the cllstodyof the marshal, nor controllable by him. The marshal has no authority to command or direct the keeper in respect to the natnre of the imprisonment. The keeper becomes responsible for his own acts, and may expose himself by misconduct to the' pains and penalties' of the law. For certain purposes and to certain intents the state jail, lawfUlly used by the Gnited States, may be deemed to be the jail of the United States, and that keeper to be the keeper of the United States,"
As to the case of Petenus and Capsula, it is found by the flpecial verdict that the defendant y !used to deliver tllem to Morse when de-. manded by the latter in pursuance of the order of the commissioner, on account, as he said, of the state warra.nt which he had in the mean time receind for their arrest to answer the indictment then found in the state court against them. The defendant was then in tlle situation of an officer receiving different and independent ,vrits against the same l)erson or thing. In such case, assuming tbat each is b wful, it is the duty of the officer to execute them according to the priority of right, which ordinarily depends upon tlle time of their receipt by him. Freeman, Ex. §§ 120135,251. On this occasion the defendant held Petenus and Capsula upon United States process, as a United States officer or jailer, and the process from the state court was directed to him as a sheriff or. state officer. .\ part from any question of tlle paramount authority of o:<1e of these processes, arising from the exclusive jurisdiction of the "Cnited States over the subject-matter, it is plain that the state 1'>rocess was under the circumstances subordinated and postponed to that of tlle unitecl States, and could not be executed until the latter was (1lIlelliS Officio. The United States process was received bv the au'd he "as holtling the prisoners uncler it, before the ·state process was even issued, or the indictment found upon which it was based. \Yhen he reariyed tlle state process the Indians "ere in ClIS-.
UNITED STATES. V. MARTIN.
. todia legis; under the United States process, and the defendant could . not execute the former, or even attempt to do so, without obstructing the execution of the latter and thereby committing a cI'ime against the United States, as well as a contempt of the authority of the commissioner. The order of the commissioner to 1\1orse, directing him to bring the prisoners before him for fmthcr examination, was also an orelei' to the defendant, in his character as Uni.ted States jailer, to tleliver Petenns and Capsula to the deputy marshal for that purpose. The only objection now made to the validity of the commitments giving tlle custody of Ah Hote and Weet Soot to 1\1cDonald, and the order to the defendant to deliver Petenus and Capsula to the deputy marshal, is that it does not appear from such commitments or order, or the prior proceedings before the commissioner, that 1\1ulheren was a white man. It is not pretended but that the defendant knew that 11ulheren was a white man, and that the homicide occurred on the reservation; in other words, that as a matter of fact he knew, when he obstl'ucted the process and disobeyed the order, of the existence of every fact that gave the commissioner jurisdiction and authority over the case, and that, notwithstanding such knowledge, he willfully obstmctecl the ollicer in the execution of such process, and resisted such order. 'I.' he order to bring up Petenus and Capsula was, so far as appears, a verbal one, and in this respect may be presumed to have followed ·hhe cOlllmitments. 'Yhether such an order must not be in writing before it can be resisted, within the meaning of the statute, is a question. Section 1030 of tIle Revised Statutes is cited as showing that no "\uit" is necessary to lJring a prisoner into "court" or remand. him to cllstody, "but the same shall be done on the order of the court or district attorney." It lilay be the practice under this section in the ·circuit and district courts to bring in and remand a prisoner on the verbal o1\ler of the district attorney. Bnt if the jailer should insist on written evidence .of the order of such officer to let a priso);@r be taken out of his custody, it is not apparent on what ground he could be charged with resistance thereto. But this section does not appear to be applicable to a proceeding .before a commissioner. Section 10 l± of the Revisell Statutes is the authoritv under a · commissioner of the circuit comG .acts when engaged in a proceeding for the arrest, commitment, or bail of a person charged with a crime · against the United States, and such section provides that he shall procecll therein "agreeably to the usual mode of process" against offenders in sllch state. . A commissioner acting under this statute is simply a committing magistrate. The ambiguous phrase "mode of process" is inter· preted to mean" mOlle of proceeding," and this proceeding is accord· · lllg to the law of the state in similar cases. U. S. v. HI/Ildlett, 2 · Curt. 42; In re .1Iartin, 5 matchf. 307; U. S. Y. Case, S matchf. 250.
The validity of the process and order in question must, then, be determined by reference io the law of Oregon for the arrest, examination, and commitment of persons charged with the commission of crime against the laws of the state. 1'be statute law of the state upon t.he subject is found in chapters 33, 34, 35, amI 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (Or. Laws, 385, 3U3.) Briefly stated, this requires that a warrant for the arreRt of anyone shall nat issue except upon a statement on oath to the effect tha t the person S0l1g 1lt to be arrested is guilty of some "designated crime." The Wllrrant for the arrest must "state a crime in respect to which the magistrnte has authority to issue a warrant." When arrested the accused. tnrty bail to answer, bnt if he does not he must be taken before a magistrate for exnminntion, which may be adjourned from day to day for not more than six: days v,itllOut the QOUBent of the defendant, in which case the accuseJ may be committeel for examination or ebscharged on bail pening the same. The commitment for an exltmination may be made by an indorsement to that effect on the wan-ant. If the accused is held to answer, the must make an order in his docket to tbat effect, "designating" therein "generally" the crime for which he is held, and then make and sign a commitment, "designatin,g" also tlwrein, "generally," the "charge," and deliver the same with the prisoner to the sheriff, who must recei\"e tt:e furmer iRto his "custody and detain him discharged." The temporary cVillmitments in this case were not made by indorsements on the warrants, but by sepa.xate writs. But this is only a matter of form, of which the dcknrLmt c\lnnot compbin. The crime or charge against each prisoner was designated in the commitments generally as "murder." 'rhis is of tile crime which results from tile unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, both at COlUmon law and in the statute. 4 Dlack, 195; sections 2145, 214G, 53;)!:), Rev. St. This desiguation of tile crime wonld be sufficient in a final commitment by a magistrate in a state case, when the prisoner was charged with a felonious homicide. The particulars constituting a crime are not to be stated in a commitment as in an indictment. If the cause of the commitment or speci.es of crime charged against the prisoner be stated in tIle commitment with convenient certainty, that is sutIicieut. 4: Black, 300; Bouv. Law Dict. "Commitment;" Ex parte Bnrford, 3 Cranch, 448. And if the offense charged has a specific name, by which it is known in the law, as larceny, arson, burglary, or murder, a designation of it by that name in tlle commitment is sufficiently certain. Upon a habeas corpus to inquire into the validity of the commitment nothing more would be requu:ed on this point. Does the fact that the commission of the crime in this case involved the circumstance that the person killed was "white," make it to state the same in the commitment? I think not. What-
ever killing the law makes murder is murder and nothing more, and is sufficiently designated by the use of that term in a commitmeut for trial or further hearing. A commissioner of this court has authority, under the laws of the United States and upon proof of probable cause, to commit persons for trial on the charge of murder, either committed on the high seas, in Alaska, in a place in the state within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or, in certain cases, upon an Indian reservation, within the state. But when he does commit a person upon such a charge it is not necessary, either under the Code or at common law, to set forth the evidence or circumstances that in the particular case constitute the crime, or demonstrate the jurisdiction of the officer beyond a peradventure. Under the law of the state (Code Crim. Proc. § 5(6) a perf'on who kills another in the attempt to commit any or certain felonies, although such killing is accidental, is gmlty of murder. But, in a commitment in SUCll case, it would only be necessary to designate the crime as "murder," without mentioning the circumstance which alone made a homicide, otherwise innocent, amount to murder. These commitments, then, are valid upon their face, and are prima facie legal process. Therefore, when the defendant obstructed the execution of the two directed to McDonald by taking Ah Hate and Weet 800t out of his custody, he was guilty of a violation of section 5398 of the Revised Statutes, unless it should turn out that they were void for want of authority or juriodiction in the commissioner who executed them. But, in the judgment of this court, he had such authority and jurisdiction, and in this respect they are legal process of the United States. The defendant, with a full knowledge of all the facts, willfully interfered with the execution of this process, and but for the considerate conduct of McDonald might have caused an unseemly and serious contlict between the national and state courts. For this misconduct he had not even the excuse that the state had by its diligence first discovered the criminals, and acquired or attempted to acquire jurisdiction in the premises. As to the verbal order to the defendant to deliver Petenus and Capsula to the deputy marshal, the case in its legal aspect is not so clear. He is charged in the information with obstructing the deputy in the execution of these orders. But he was then claiming to hold the prisoners as sheriff under the state process, so that, in fact and law, he obstructed the execution of the commitments issued to himself as United States jailer by taking the prisoners out of his custody as such jailer upon the state process issued to himself as sheriff. But this is not the charge in the infOlmation. These commitments, being for further examination, should have been made from day to day, unless marle for a definite longer period, with the consent of the prisoners. But this is an error which does not concern the defendant. It was his duty to receive and keep safely Petenus and Cap-
,sulaunder these commitments, asa jailer of the United States, until " they were discharged by the law of the United States, and, in the mean time, to return the state warrant "not executed," because the · persons named therein were already in the custody 01 the United · States upou a criminal charge. But my impression is that the elefem1nnt was not bound to recognize a verbal order delivered to him by the deputy niarshal as legal · process issued by the commissioner, and tlmt he had a right to insist upon a writing to that eilect. If the commitments had been made for a day or other fixed period, there would be less difficulty in hold, ing the yerbal order sufficient, as the mittimus itself would in that case limit the time elm-ing which the prisoners should remain in tbe . defendant's custody. And even then it seems to me that the jailer , might demand the "Titten evidence of the official character of such , order before he could be compelled to obey it. And although the defendant dOd not refuse to deliver Petenus and Capsula on any s,lch · ground as this, but claimed to hold them as sheriff under the warrant of the state court, I do not think that this helps the case. If such verbal order was not legal process, no guilt was incurred by the refusal to obey it, whatever the reason may have been for such refusal. The judgment of the court upon the special verdict is that the defendant is guilty as charged in the first count of the information, and not guilty as charged in the second one. Notwithstanding the admission in the verdict that the defendant acted in good faith, the case is one meet for exemplary punishment. But considenttion will be given · to the fact that the defendant, as soon a:=; the decision on the demurrer to the information was announced, quietly surrendered the pris· oners to the deputy marshal, ,,"hen they were duly committed for trial in this court. The judgment of the court is that the defendant pay a fine of $100 and be imprisoned one day, and stand committed until the fine is paid.
E. P. GLEASON MANUF'a CO.
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. Ncw York. June 21, 1883.)
PATENTS "FOn INVENTIONS-REISSUED PATENT INVALID.
Reissllcrl letters patent No. 7,286, granted to J. 'Yhite, August 29, 187(;, for a are invalid. Gleasun lJanuj'o Co. v. White, 8 FED. REP. 917, affirmed.
SAME-OFFICE OF DrSCLABfER.
A disclaimer can add nothing to a patent. It can take away from tllnt which Lns been descriLed as the invention and claimed as such, so as to Le covercl1 bV the grant of the patent, but it has no office to make the patent cover anything. however clearly shown in the patent, not descrilJed and claimed as a part of the invention.
M. Daniel Connolly, for orator. Joseph C. Clayton, for defendant. WHEELER, J. This suit is brought upon reissued letters patent No. 7,286, granted to the orator upon the surrender of original letters No. 162,731, dated April 27,1875, for an improvement in globe. holders. It has been before heard, and upon that hearing it was de· cided that the patent was invalid for want of novelty. White v. son Manuf'g Co. 8 FED. REP. 917; 19 O. G.1494. Since then the orator has filed a disclaimer, the cause has beeu opeued, and the disclaimer, with some other proof, received in evidence, and a rehearing has been had upon the case so made up. The disclaimer could add nothing to the patent. It could take away from what was described as the invention and claimed as such, so as to be coyered by the grant of the patent, but it had no office to make the patent cover anything, however clearly shown in the patent, not so described and claimed as a part of the invention. The patent was for an improvement in globe-holders, not for a globe-holder as a new tbing. The improvement consisted in elastic arms, with hooks or catches at the ends for receiving and holding the lower edge of the globe. The patentee, in bis specification, said:
in,ention consists broadly of a glohe or gas shado-holder or support.
formed with spring or elastic arms, terminating in hooks or catches, for embracing the lower edge or t1ange around the neck or lower opening of the globe or gas shade. These arms are to be fastened to a burner in any suitable manner, as by riveting throu::rh a disk having a central aperture, throu:;rh u'hich said burner passes."
There were two claims; the first was for a globe-holder having such arms, and the second was for a globe-holder having a disk or center, with an aperture for the burner and such arms. It is obvious that he did not think he had invented anything but these armH, and did lJ'Ot intend to, and did not, in fact, describe and claim anything but globe-holders "ith snch arms as bis. He did not intend to, and diq