TIeE V. SCHOOL-DIST. NO. 18.
, this case would end, leaving every question is dispute between the parties where it stood when this case was begun. This would be proceeding by imersion. ,The method has too much the air of that pro,ceeding by which a man is first hung and tried afterwards to find favor in a court of equity. , Let an order be entered dissolving the injunction and discharging the property from the custody of the receiver, and requiring him to 'return the same to the officer or person from whom he received it, and to pass his accounts in the master's office without delay. "ee City of Chicago v. Hntchinson, 15 FED. REr. 129; Glover v. Shepperd, rd. 833: Plurnix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Walrath, 16 FED. REP. 161; 1'1tblic Grain & Stud. Exuhan:;e v. Western Union Tel. Co. rd. 2SU.--[ED.
ADAMS CJUNTY, NEDRASKA.
(Circuit Court, D. Nebras 7 .a.
CmcuIT COUIlT-CIIAKCERY JUln"DICTIOK-STATE STATun:-NEw THlALS.
The statnte of Nebraska, regnlating the practice of the state court in determining applications for new trials, is not binding upon the circnit court of the United States when exercising its chancery juriscEction; llnd the limitation in the state statutc which forbids the stare cO:lrts to grant trials after one year, so far from being a limitation upon the circuit court, sitting in chancery, may be the very ground of its jurisdiction; especially whe:'e the facts which make it proper that the judgment should be set asiue have been fraudulently secreted until the year has SA)[E-JUI:I£,DICTJOK, now COKFERHED. The chancery jurisdiction of the circuit court is confer,cd by the constitution of the United States and the acts of congress, and is not derived from or limited by stale laws, The rules governin!! its exercise are the same in all the state", and are according to the practice of courts ofcquity in England, as contradistinguished from eourts of law.
SA)[E-STATE STATUTES OF LnlITATIOxS.
Federal courts of equity usually follow by'analogy state statutcs 01 limitations, but they will not do so when the effect of such a statute in any case is to limit their general chancery jurisdiction; and altbough a state statute of limitations may make 110 exc"ptioll in favor of it part)" who is prcvented from suing hy rea,on of a concealed fraurl, they will cnforce such an exception because it i, a p'lrt of the ch:l11eery law us admiuistereJ in those courts, whieh tllA cannot ch::lnge.
TmA1,-POWElt OF ClIAXCEI:Y CounT TO DECHEE.
It is a general principle of law that a court of chancery may decree a new
trial after the courts of law are barred by lapse of time from so doing.
On Rehearing. 1 Bill in equity brought to set aside a juogment at law in this court, and for a new trial upon the gr.ound of surprise at the trial, and newlydiscO\-ered eyidence. The original suit "as brought hy the plaintiff to recO\-er judgment upon certain bonds alleged to ha,e been issued
l:3Ce.S. C. 14
by the defendant school-district for the purpose of building and fura pnblic school-house. The district interposed the defense that the bonds were never issned by it by a vote of the district, and that no money was ever received by the district for the same. The plaintiff was a purchaser of the bonds in the market, and had no personal knowledge of the facts. Upon applying to the officers of the district for information, he was informed by them that they had no knowledge of the issuance of said bonds, or of the receipt of any money thereon by the district. On the trial of the case one Alexander, who was then the treasurer of said distriet, testified that he was liliewise f\Uch treasurer at the time the bonds were issued, and that he had no knowledge or recollection of the execution or is·manne of the same, or of the receipt of any money by the district therefor, and the other ollicers of the district testified to substantially the same effect. The residents of the district and its officers seem to have combined and conspired together to keep plaintiff from obtaining any evidence to establish tbe fact that the bonds were issued and tbe money thereof received by tbe district and used to erect a schoolhouse. Nevertheless, such now appears to be the fact. In this case Alexander testifies that he now remembers that tlle bonds were sold for cash, and that the callh was used in the erection of a school-house. These facts, however, were not discovered until more than one yAar from the date of the judgment. The statute of Nebraska provides that "where the gronnds for a new trial could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before, but are discovered after, the term at which the verdict, report of referee, or decision was .nade, the application may be made by petition, filed as in other C3ses, on which a summons shall issue," etc.; bnt "no such petition shall be filed more than one year after the final judgment was rendered." The district judge held, on final hearing, that this statute was controlling, and that, therefore, the bill was filed too late, but granted a rehearing, and requested the circuit judge to hear alid delermine tlte question. Hal'lcood & Ames, for complainant. O. B. Hewett, for defendant. MCCRARY, J. After much consilieration, I have reached the conclusion that the statute of Nebraska, regulating the practice of the state courts in determining applications for new trials, is not binding upon this court when exercising its chancery Our jurisdiction in clluncery is not derived from or limited by state laws. The rules governing its exercise are the same in all the states, and are according to the practice of courts of equity in the parent country, as contradistinguished from courts of law. It is a jurisdiction conferred by the constitution of the United States and the acts of congress, and if it coald be controlled or varied by state legislation, it could be extinguished by the same authority. This proposition was strongly stated by the supreme court of the United States in the early case of
Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 218, and has been since repeatedly recognized by that court. It is true that the federal courts of equity usually follow by analogy state statutes of limitations; but they will not do so if the effect of such a statute in any case is to limit their general chancery jurisdiction. This, although a state statute of limitations may make no exception in favor of a party who is prevented from suing by reason of a concealed fraud. Yet federal courts of equity will enforce such an exception because it is a part of the chancery law as administered in those courts, and which tile state cllnnot change. Johnson v. Roe, 1 McCrary, 162; [So C. 1 FED. REP. G92.] The present case might, perhaps, be decided upon this doctrine, for it is clearly established by tlJe proof that the defendant, by its ollicars and agents, fraudulently suppressed the fact that the bonds in questinn had been regularly issued, sold for cash by defendant, and the proceeds used by the defendant to build a school-bouse, and they concealed these facts until they supposed it was too late for plaintiff to get relief; after which they disclosed them, and one of them bas now sworn to them. However this may be, I think the statute above mentioned, if construed to mean that a bill in chancery cannot be filed in a federal court to set aside a judgment at law, upon any ground, after one year from its rendition, would be an encroachment upon the equity jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. Anciently, appeall:l to the courts of chancery for relief against unconscionable judgments at law were frequent; but in modern times courts of law are themselves authorized to grant new trials upon liberal terms, and this mode of relief is, in general, ample, so that the equ:ty jurisdiction in such cases is seldom invoked. It ne\'ertheless exists, and it is a mistake to say that it is simply co-extensive with the powers granted by statute to courts of law. It more frequently begins precisely where the power of the law courts ends. The jurisdiction often depends upon the fact that the court rendering the judgment is powerless to aITord a remedy. I hold, therefore, that the limitation in the state statute which forbids the state conrts to grant new trials after one year, so far from being a limitation upon this court, sitting in chancery, may be the very ground of our jurisdiction, especially where the facts which make it proper that the judgment be set aside have been fraudulently secreted until the year has passed. It appears that even the state courts of Nebraska, when sitting in chancery, disregard the limitation of one year. Thus, in the case of Horn v. Queen, 4 Neb. 108, the supreme court of that state, construing this very statute, held that where it would be proper for a court of law to grant a new trial, if the aJlplication had been made while that court had thc pou"cr, it is equally proper for a court of equity to do so if the application be made when the court of law has no means of granting such trial. Certainly, if this be a sound rule fc.r the government of the state court whose jurisdiction, both at law and in
quity, is deriyed from state law, it is, a jortiol'i, the sound rule here. That it is a general principle of equity law that a court of chancery may decree a new trial after the courts of law are barred from so doing, is abundantly established by authority. Hil. N. T. 588, note (a); Hoskins v. Hattenback, lol Iowa, 314; Story, Eq. JUl'. § 81;7; Pletchcr v. Warren, 18 Vt. 45; CiJZ,/cr'v. Langford's Adm'rs, 1 A. Ie. Marsh. 237; Ballance v. LOOliliss, 22 Ill. 82. The order dismissinG the bill must Le'set aside; and it is so ordered.
MorWAN r:. TOWN OFWALD\YICK and others.
(C;j'cuit Court, W. D. lVisconsin,
June 26, 1883.)
Towx8 OF 'YAJ,DWICK AXD Moocow, 'VISCONSIK-LUnILJTY FOR H.ULROAD AID Bmms-DIvrSIOK OF OLD TOWN. As the evidence in this case iiOhows conClusively that the people of both of the present towns of 'VaIdwick and :Moscow, formed by the division of the old town of 'Vahlwick,in Iowl\county, Wisconsin, considered and believed, at the time of the division of the old town of Waldwick, that each town was liable for its just proportion of :he aiel voted to the Mincrnl Point HaiJroad Company, representcd by the bonus of the old town of Waldwick, for aid voted thereto, and the elivisiim was voted on that understanding, and would not have been voted except. for such unllerstanding, and the construction of the order of the supervisors of the original town making the division, anel the liability of ],oth towns for their I espeet iVl' portions of the elebt, have been repeatedly reeogni7ed by the people ami otl1eers of said towns, and acted upon accordingly for a period of 20 years 01' more, although the order of tl,e board of supervisors was somewhut cqllh'iwal, it is Iud that the town of ::IIoscow should be held liahle for thc proportion of said deht 111"n aOSlImed it, althongh there may be douht as to tlw legal effcct of the actioll diviuing the two and .that the town of 'Vald"'lek should pay the Lalan,e.
In Equity. E. Marriner, for complainant. Vilas (6 Bryant, for defendants. BlJNN, J. In the towa of Waldwick, in Iowa county, Wisconsin, issued its bonds to the amount of $10,000, with interest at S per cent., to the Mineral Point Railroad Company, to aid in the construction of said road. These bonds were negotiated, and the larger portion of them came into the hands of thb plaintiff for value. At the time of the issuing of the bonds, the town of Waldwick was composed territorially of two to'ivnships of land running east and west, through both of which the road, as built by the said company, ran. In 1859 the people of the town of Waldwick petitione'd the county board of snpervisors of Iowa county to divide the town on the townShip line running north and south,throngh the middle. A . vote was taken on the question, and it was carried by a large . maJonty,and on the hventy-ninth of NoYember, 1859, the county board of said county,. ha ving ample po,Yer bJ statute to make new towns, to