In the last case the question was also considered whether overdue and unpaid coupons for interest, attached to a municipal bond which had several years to run, rendered the bond and the subsequently maturing coupons dishonored paper, so as to subject them in the hands of a purchaser for value to defenses good against the original holder. The court held that their presence had no such eff8ct, asserting that "the simple fact that an installment of interest is overdue and unpaid, disconnected from other facts, is not sufficient to affect the position of one taking the bonds and subsequent coupons, before their maturity, for value as a bonafide purchaser." In Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434:, the payment of the bonds of a railway company in Louisiana was in controversy. The bonds had never been issued by the company, but had been seized and carried away during the late rebellion. They were drawn payable to bearer either in London, New York, or New Orleans, and the president of the company was authorized to fix the place of payment. by his indorsement thereon. When stolen, they contained no such indorsement. They were offered for sale and were sold for a very small consideration inthe market of New York, with due and unpaid coupons for several years attached to them. The court held that the absence of th.e required indorsement was It defect which deprived the of the character of negoti l,bility, and that the purchaser was affected with notice of their ·invalidity. Mr. Justice BRADLEY, speaking for the court, asserted "that the presence of the part due and unpaid coupons was itself an evidence of dishonOl;, sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry." But in the subsequent case of By. Co. v. Sprague, .103 U. S. 756, this expression of the learned justice is commented on, qualified, and restricted, and it was again held, and may now be accepted as the law, that overdue and unpaid interest coupons attached to municipal bonds are not in themselves sufficient to put the purchaser ppon inquiry. Let judgment be entered for the plaintiff.
((Jircuit (Jow-e, S. D. Neil! yurko
November 23, 1883.)
HABEAS CORPUS-COMMITMENT BY UNITED STA'I'ES COMMISSIONER-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
Where there is evidence tending to show that a party who has been committed by a United States commissioner. for an pfi'ense against the laws of tIle United States is guilty, the sufficiency of such evidence is not open to review on proceeding by halJea,Q r.orpu8; and while the relator is. held accQrding to his judgment upon any competent eVidence, he is not held iu custody contrary to law.
C. S. Spencer, for relator. Benjamin B. Foster, Asst. U. S. Atty., for United States. WHEELER, J. The relator is held in custody by the marshal, on a commitment by a commissioner of this court, awaiting the order of the judge of this district for his removal to the district of Connecticut, under section 1014, Rev. St., for breaking Of attempting to break into the post-office at Birmingham, in the district of Connecticut, contrary to the provision of section 5478, Rev. St., and is brought before this court on habeas corpus, which is accompanied by a writ of certiorari, on which the proceedings before the commissioner have been certified tv tLis court. There is no question but that the proceedings are ill acccrdance with the provisions of section 1014. The only questions made are whether the offense charged is in law an offense under any valid law of Congress; and, if it is, whether there is any sufficient proof of the commission of such an offense by the relator to warrant his detention by these proceedings. The statute breaking or attempting to break (section 5478) makes the into any post.office, or any building used in whole or in part as a post-office, with intent, etc., an offense. It is objected that the United States is not alleged nor shown to have title to this post-office; and that it is in a block, the rest and a large part of which is used for other purposes, so that there is no wrongful act shown against any 'property of the United States, and none but what would be,an offense against the state and not against the United States. It is not contended but that under the authority conferred-by the constitution upon congress to establish post-offices and post.roads, is included the power to make depredations or attempts at depredation upon post-offices '. criminal offenses; but it is claimed that no power is given to make that an offense against the laws of congress which does not affect the government property or post-office at all, although While it might be that there would be a Jack of audone near to thorityas to an offense against mere private property, although near to the g<fvernment, office, that defect would not be available here, for the testimony of the postmaster shQws clearly an attack by some perpost.office itself. This testimony of the postmaster supson on plies fully the want of evidence of the corpus delicti claimed in argument to be' wholly lacking. There remains nothing but the claim that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant holding the relator for this offense. There is some evidence tending to show that he is the person who committed it. The .sufficiency' of this evidence is not open to review on this proceeding. In re Stupp, 12 Blatchf. 501. The commissioner is to judge of the sufficiency of the evidence, and while the relator is held according to his judgment upon any competent evi' :lence he is not held jn custody contrary to The relatqi- is remanded to the custody of the marshal, and tile writ of ce1·tio1'i:u'i dismissed.
December 18, 1883.)
(District Court, 8. D. New York.
COLU81ON-BuRDEN OF PROOF-TUG AND Tow.
Where two steam-tugs, each with tows, have exchanged mutual assenting signals as to the mode in which they will pass eRch other, and a collision afterwards ensues, the libelant's tug having the other on her own starboard hand, the burden of proof is upon the libelant to show by a reasonable preponderance of evidence that the respondent's tug was in fault, and, failing to do this, the libel should be dismissed.
Where the tug E. H. W., as she was leaving her slip in Brooklyn to go down the East river, sighted the tug 1\1., and each gave two whistles to the other, and the M. had the W. on her own starboard hand, and the question in dispute being whether the E. H. W. went beyond a reasonable distance away from the shore, near which by her signal she was bound to pass, held, on conflicting evidence, that it was not shown that the E. H. W. had gone Ollt in the stream further than was reasonable. or so as to be in the way of the M., and the libel was Ulerefore dismissed. The tow not having sued her own tug, the question of the latter's fault not further considered.
Edward D. McCarthy, for libelant. Beebe, Wilcox rf; Hobhs, for claimants.
BROWN, J. The libel in this case was filed to recover damages for injuries to the schooner Deep River, on the twentieth of September, 1880, by a collision in the East river off North Fifth street, Brooklyn, with the tow of the steam-tug Edwin H. Webster. The schooner was in tow of the steam-tug Merkle, and lashed upon her starboard side, and another schooner was lashed on the tug's port side. The Merkle, with her tow, was going up the East river at about 7: 30 P. M., with a strong flood.tide. The Webster had in tow two scows, 160 feet long, one lashed upon each side, and was upon one of her regular trips from North Fifth street, Brooklyn, to the Erie Railroad docks, Jersey City. The Webster had backed slowly out of the slip at North Fifth street, and swung around against the end of the tipper pier as the flood-tide strnck the stern of the scows. About the time she was thus straightened down the river, and close to the pier, the Merkle and her tow were seeD coming upriver a little above Grand street. The Webster signaled by two blasts of het whistle that she would pass to the left, 01' on the Brooklyn side, and received from the Merkle two assenting whistles in reply. In swinging up with the tide the Webster went mostly above the North-Fifth-street pier, and as soon as her bows had swung out somewhat from the pier het engines were started ahead under a slow bell only, so that she made against the strong flood-tide, according to the testimony of all her witnesses, not over half a length down by the pier, before she commenced backing on account of the near approach of the· Merkle. As her bows were headed out somewhat, and the tide was running about four knots against her, she had' worked gradually out into the river, though ma,3.mg scarcely any head-