but does not allege that the defendant is using m::1Chines made during the term of the patent in infringement upon it, nor that the orator fears such use. Without these allegations the case is not within the decision in Crossley v. Derby Gas-Light Co. 4 Law Jour. N. S. Pt. 1 Chan. 25, and shows no ground for relief by injunction. The other cases in favor of the orator, in which similar motions have been made, stand in the same way, and are to follow this. Motion denied.
AlIIERICAN DIAMOND ROCK BORING
Co. v. and others.
(Circuit Court, D. Vermont.
PATENT-INFRINGEMENT ENJOINED DURING
May B, IBBO.)
TERM-NoT ENTITLED TO
party who, during the term of a. patent, has been enjoined from using a. machine infringing thereon, is not, upon the expiration of such patent, entitled to be relieved frum such injunction as to a. machine manufa.ctured during its existence.
DISCHA.RGE UPON EXPIRA.TION.-A
Charles F. Blake, for plaintiff. Edward J. Phelps, Walter C. Dunton and Aldace F. Walker,
for defendants. WHEELER, D. J. This is a motion to discharge the injunction on account of the expiration of the term of the patent. At the time of the expiration the defendants were using machines made during the term of the patent for use, in violation of the plaintiff's exclusive rights. It is argued for the defendants that to continue the restraint upon such machines after the expiration of the term of the patent is in effect to extend the term of the patent. The grant to the patentee was of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend to others to be used, the invention during the term. The right to exclude others from making, using and selling was the essential thing, and really all that was granted. He had the right to do all these himself, to any extent, without the grant. The exclusive right was
SECOMBE V. CAMPBELL.
his property. Any making for use during the term was taking from him what belonged to him. To permit any others to make or produce such machines during the term, and hold them till the expiration and then use them freely, as if made after, would be to permit them to make oj' with so much of his property that the law' had guaranteed to him. To restrain the use after the term, without his consent, gives nothing to him that he was not entitled to, and takes nothing from them that they had any right to. it gives him no right acquired beyond his term, and merely secures to him the full right he was entitled to during the term. The law would be open to reproach if it would not allow a court of equity, by its usual methods, in a case properly before it to accomplish a result so just. The argument upon this motion has confirmed rather than shaken the views expressed before upon this ·subject. Motion denied.
(Circuit Oourt, S. D. New York.
May 1, 1880.)
PATENT-PUBCHASER OF MAY RELY ON RECORD TITLE.-SO
long as he acts in good faith, the purchaser of a patent has a right to rely upon the apparent record title, the same as in the case of real estate. SAME-BoNA FIDE PURCHASER-INSUFFICIENT PLEA.-A plea by a defendant who claims the rights of a bonajlde purchaser of a patent, which alleges that he purchased for a "good and valuable consideration," ill insufficient, but the consideration should be set forth in amount, and in traversable form, 80 that plaintiff may traverse it if he choose, and tha court see that it was adequately valuable.
In Equity. David A. Secombe, for complainant. Geo. H. Williams and Marcu! P. Norton, for defendants. WHEELER, D. J. This bill is brought upon re-issued letters patent, division A, No. 4,143, to Helen M. Ingalls, assignee of Marcus P. Norton, dated October 4, 1870, for an improvement in post-office postmarking and postage cancelling stamps, and alleges that she assigned this, with other pat-