mon, pleas of Cambria county, Pennsylvania, (scire faciM to revive, No.4, March term, 1876,") and thatthe assignee execute flo deed to the purchaser, at the costs and expense of the latter, in accordance with the foregoing amendment.
March 31, 1880.)
(Di8trict Oourt, D. Rhode I8land.
Chas. A. Wilson, Chas. Bradley and A. Payne, for complainant. B. B. Hammond, for defendant. KNOWLES, J. This is a suit in equity in which the complainant, as trustee of the estate of Frederic W. Whipple, prays that two mortgages made by said Frederic to his mother, Almira Whipple, April 27 and April 28, 1876, be set aside as invalid under the provisions of the bankrupt act. The first of these mortgages was of the Gaza mill estate, in Burrillville, comprising real and personal estate and property; the second, of a mansion house 8uitate in Elmwood, in or near the city of Providenoe. But as the Elmwood estate has proved insufficient to satisfy the claim of a prior mortgage, and of no avail to the defendant, the validity of that mortgage is not now a matter of controversy between the parties. Among the facts agreed are these: First. The mortgage of the Gaza mill property was made and executed April 27, 1876. Second,' A oreditor's petition in bankruptcy against said Frederic Whipple was filed June 26, 1876, to which the respondent filed a denial of the act or acts of bankruptcy oharged, and also a denial of the sufficiency in number and amount of creditors, and that it was referred to a register to inquire and report upon the question of suffioiency.
SOUTHWICK V. WHIPPLE.
Third. That before any report from the register ':ras madethat is, sometime prior to February 3, 1877-said Frederic W. Whipple withdrew his denials aforesaid, and assented to a decree of against him, which was entered on said third of February: 1877. Fourth. That said Southwick was duly appointed trustee on the fourteenth of April, 1817. Fifth. That said Almira Whipple advertised the Burrillville property for sale under her mortgage, to be sold at auction on the seventeenth of May, 1877, and the Elmwood estate on the twenty-fourth of May, 1877. Sixth. That the complainant's bill was filed May 7, 1877, the defendant's answer May 28, 1877, and complainant's replication June 11, 1877. Of the bill, with its amendments of May 18 and October 18, 1877, it seems sufficient here to say that it embodies all essential and usual allegations and charges; and of the answer, that it admits some of those allegations, denies others, and sets up and avers readiness to prove a certain parol agreement, in view of which it was asserted said mortgages should and must be held unimpeachable by the trustee, even were it conceded or shown that but for this agreement the complainant would be entitled to the decree prayed in his bill. And here it seems proper to state that after the testimony, taken by the complainant and the defendant respectively, had been printed, preparatory to a hearing of the cause, the defendant prayed leave to file a supplemental answer, "setting forth the facts in said cause more precisely. and as explanatory of his answer already filed in the cause, and for the reasons. set forth in his affidavit filed." This motion the complainant resisted, but the court, by a pro forma ruling, 8ustainell it, and a supplemental answer was filed February 13, 1879. The charge or charges in the bill as first amended, which the complainant assumed the burden of substantiating, were that on the twenty-seventh of April, 1876, the said Frederic W. Whipple, being insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency, made said conveyance or mortgage, with a view to give a preference to said Almira Whipple, and that said Almira
received the same having reasonable cause to believe said Frederic was insolvent, and knowing that said conveyance was in fraud of the of the bankrupt act, and the amendments thereto. And, by the second amendment, to these was added the charge that said conveyance is void and of no effect in equity and at common law, being an instrument which, in effect, hinders and delays the creditors of said Whipple in the collection of their just debts against him, and is void, also, under the provisions of chapter 162 of the General Statutes of Rhode Island. But inasmuch as these points, though stated in defendant's brief, were not pressed by the complainant in the close, I dismiss them from consideration as not sustained. Not so, however, as to the charges in the bill as first amended. The several averments as to the insolvency of the grantor, the belief of the grantee as to the grantor's insolvency, the intent of the grantor, and the knowledge of the grantee that the conveyance was in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt act, were the subjects of prolonged and exhaustive discussion by the learned counsel of the parties, who, agreeing substantially as to the principles of law involved, differed widely and irreconcilably as to the weight and materiality of the facts claimed to be established by the testimony, bearing upon the relations, and dealings, and correspondence of the mother and son. In view of these facts, and especially of the legitimate presumptions which they warrant and necessitate, I am constrained to adjudge that the complainant, by his testimony anq argument, establishes satisfactorily the several allegations upon which his claim for a decree is grounded and pressed. As this evidence is set forth in exten.so in the printed record, it seems not necessary in this connection to state it in detail, or to indulge in comment upon any of it. Neither does it seem necessary in this connection to state in explicit terms what portion of the testimony submitted I have been constrained to disregard as either incompetent, irrelevant, incredible or mendacious. It seems sufficient to say that, upon the issues presented at the hearing,
upon which the burden of proof rested on the complainant, I find for him and against the defendant. This leaves for consideration only the special matter of defence set up in the defendant's answer, and referred to in her supplemental answer, and in the testimony of her son. This was, in substance, that she, early in 1874, began to indorse the paper of her son, under a promise and assurance that he would secure her against loss or damage, and that tho conveyance of April 27, 1876, was made in fulfilment of that promise, and was therefore unimpeachable by the complainant. And in support of this view the testimony of the son, a recital in the deed of April 27th, and this defendant's allegations, in her general and supplemental answers, were referred to and made a subject of exhaustive argument. But on behalf of the complainant it was argued and insisted that the evidence failed to show that any sufficient agreement to give security was satisfactorily proven; the fact being, as contended, that this defence was purely an afterthought on the part of the defendant and her son, and his or her advisers; or, if anything more than a pretence; it had no other foundation than some mention of security, in which no specific property was named or pledged; and in support of this view the testimony of two witnesses, to the effect that the mother, shortly after the making of the deed, admitted that she had' never heard anything of a mortgage to her until about the date·of the mortgage, was cited, as also certain passages in letters from her to her son. And, corroboratory of this view, too, it was argued, were the serious discrepancies and inconsistencies in the statements of the alleged promise and agreement, by the son, in his testimony as a witness, and his mother, the defendant, in her answer and supple::nental answer. Her neglect, or rather refusal, to appear as a witness in the cause, and support, by her oath, as a party witness, the answer she had signed, and to contradict the testimony of the witnesses to her admission as above stated, was also referred to as a fact not to be ignored or undervalued. Upon the defendant is the burden of substantiating this
defence. This, in my judgment, she fails to do. The weight of evidence-that which convinces the mind-and of argument, too, is against her. A decree for the complainant must be entered.
THE EAGLETON MANUFACTURING Co. v. THE WEST, BRADLEY & CARY MANUFAOTURING Co. and another.
8. D. New York. June 9, 1880.)
PATENT-DATE OF INVENTION-BuRDEN OF PROOF.-When the applies.cation fails to take the date of the invention Lack of the date of the patent, and the defendant makes out prior knowledge and use by others, beyond any fair or reasonable doubt, as the law requires, the burden is shifted on to the plaintiff to show invention or discovery by the patentee still prior to that time. SAME-AMENDMENT OF APPLICATION-AuTHORITY OF ATTORNEys.-The former attorneys of a deceased inventor have no authority to amend an application for letters patent, unsupported by the oath of the pel'sonal representative of the decedent. SAME-SAME-SAME-PLEADING,-Such obj ection need not be specifically set forth in the answer, in the aUlSence of a statutory requirement.
In Equity. F. H. Betts and Wm. D. Shipman, for plaintiffs. Wm. G. Witter and Geo. Gifford, for defendants. WHEELER, D. J. This bill is brought upon letters patent No. 122,001, dated December 19, 1811, issued to J. Joseph Eagleton, Sarah N. Eagleton, administratrix, assignor to Eagleton Manufacturing Company, for an improvement in japanned furniture springs. The defences set up in the answer are that Eagleton was not the original and first inventor of the improvement; that the specification is not sufficiently full, clear and exact to enable persons skilled in the art to practice the invention; that the specification does not contain the whole truth relating to the invention; and that the defendants do not infringe. The springs, which are the subject of the patent, are coiled helical or hour-glass springs, so-called, made of steel wire,