iETNA LIFE INS. UO.
(Otrc'Uie (Jourt, D. New Jersey. March 25, 1884.)
MOTION FOR A NEW TIUAL-JURORS JUDGES OF THE FACTS.
Amotion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, should not be granted if it appears that the verdict, though . unexpected, could by possibility have been given consistently with facts in the case and the court's instructions.
On Application for Rule to Show Cause. A. Q. Keasbey, for the motion. John Linn, contra. NIXON, J. This is an application for a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted upon the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. See ante, 482. It rarely happens that a court'is justified in setting aside the action of a jury on issues of fact, in the absence of proof of fraud or palpable mistake, where there is any evidence to sustain the verdict. A trial by jury is the constitutional right of the American citizen, and courts may not infringe upon this right by undertaking to nullify the acts of the jurors by setqng, aside their deliberate judgment in cases where the judges, under the evidence, would have reached a different conclusion. It is conceded that the verdict rendered in this case was not expected, but there is one view of the facts upon which it may probably be sustained. In construing the provisions of the policy of insurance on which the suit was brought, the court instructed the jury that they had the. right to hold that. proof of a single instance of the excessive use of alcoholic liquors, although it resulted in death, should not be regarded as the intemperance referred to in the policy, by which the health of the insured was impaired. The jury may have regarded the proof of the free use of brandy and gin on the night of the sickness which terminated in death as an exceptional case, growing out of the surrounding condition and circumstances, and may not have given as much importance to the testimony of drinking at other times as the defendants were disposed to do. We have carefully read the testimony, and do not perceive how any additional light can be shed on the case by granting the rule to show cause, and the application is therefore refused.
ABBOTT V. WORTHINGTON.
and others v.
(Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts.
()uSTOlllS DUTIE8.-SWEDI8H IRON
NAIL-RoDS. Swedish iron nail-rods should be classified as a description of rolled and hammered iron not otherwise provided for, and so subject to. a duty of one and one-fourth centa a pound.
Ghas. Levi Woodbury, for plaintiff. Geo. p. Sanger, U. S. Atty., for defendant. COLT, J. The collector assessed duty at the rate of ODe and onehalf cents per pound, on an importation of Swedish iron nail-rods, under Schedule E, § 2504, Rev. St., as bar iron, rolled or hammered. The plaintiffs claim that the article is only liable to a duty of one and .one-fourth cents per pound, either as a description of rolled and hammered iron not otherwise provided for, or as coming under the similitude clause of section 2499, Rev. St., as resembling scroll iron. The case was heard by the court, jury trial being waived. The evidence shows that the importation is known commercially as nail-rods, and iihat, in a commercial sense, nail-rods are not bar iron. The article is made I1nd used for a special purpose, and known in commerce by a distinct name. It further appears that in the act of 1842, and in some previous acts, nail-rods are specifically designated as such, 80 that congress in the tariff laws has recognized nail·rods as distinct from bar iron, or iron in bars. Nail-rods, having acquired a specific ·commercial designation among traders and importers, and having been designated by a specific name in previous tariff legislation, would not prop,?rly come under the general term bar iron in the Revised Statutes, but should be classified as a description of rolled and hammered iron not otherwise provided for, and so subject to a duty of one and one-fourth cents a pound. We think this case clearly within the rules laid down in Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U. S. 108, and Arthur v. Lahey, Id.112, and that judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs.