injunction on the oldest patent, or even to have rea.ched a final decree on the merits before the expiration of the patent. An answer was due at the first rule-day after the filing of the bill, and, for aught the court can say, the case might have been brought to a hearing upon the bill and answer, and decree rendered before the expiration of the earlier patents. There was certainly time to have given notice and argued the application for an injunction, which, the court must assume from the language of Vice-chancellor JAMES, there was not time to do in the case decided by him. It seems to me, therefore, that the case made by this bill is exceptional to those which have been cited in support of the demurrer. The motion to dismiss as to the patent of June, 1867, is overruled.
(District Oourt, W. D. Pennsylvanza. October Term, 1884.)
ADMIRALTY PRACTICE-.JURY TRIAL-REV. ST. §
Section 566 of the Revised Statutes does not give a trial hy jury in a caulle of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which concerns a vessel employed in commerce and navigation upun the rivers Monongahela and Ohio.
In Admiralty. Sur rule to show cause why that portion of the respondent's answer demanding a jury trial should not Le stricken out, etc. Knox If Reed, for libelant. Barton et Son, for respondent. ACHESON, J. The respondent claims a trial by jury under section 566 of the Revised Statutes. But the right to such trial in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, by the express terms of that section, is not general, but restricted to causes arising where the vessel is "at the time employed in the business of commerce and navigation between places in different states and territories upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the lakes." Gillet v. Pierce, 1 Brown, Adm. 553 ; The Erie Belle, 20 E'ED. REP. 63. In this case, at the time the cause of action arose, the vessel was employed in the rivers Monongahela and Ohio. Now it is very clear that these rivers come not within the terms "lakes and navigable waters connecting the lakes." The Hine v. Trevor,4 Wall. 555, '566. Moreover, the vessel here was not employed in commerce and navigation between places in different states, but was plying alto. gether within the Western district of Pennsylvania. The request for a jury trial must be denied, and the rule to show cause made absolute; and it is so ordered.
(Oircuit Gourt, E. D. Michigan.
EQUITY JURISDICTION OF OnWUIT COURT-JUDGMENT AT LAW.
In Equity. This was a demurrer to a petition of defendant Canfield to set aside an execution and levy for a deficiency arising out of the sale of mortgaged premises upon foreclosure, to restrain the plaintiff and the marshal from further proceedings to sell the defendant's lands; and also to open the final decree in the cause, and modify the same, so far as it the payment of the mortgaged debt by the petitioner. The bill, which was filed September 19, 1881, charged that defendant was a subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged premises, and alleged that he had assumed payment of the mortgaged debt. A 8uhpcena was taken out and personally served upon all the defendants, September 21st. The ordinary decree pro confesso, for want of an appearance, was entered December 17, 1881, and a final decree for the sale of the property, upon the order pro cunfesso and testimony, was made October 3, 1882. The decree was enrolled November 15th. This decree provided "that upon the coming in and confirmation of said report" (master's report of the sale of the mortgaged premises) "said defendants James Wilson and Lucius H. Canfield, who are personally liable for the debt secured by the said mortgage, pay to complainant the amount of such deficienoy, with interest thereon as aforesaid from the date of suoh report, and the complainant have execution therefor." The mortgaged premises were regularly sold under this decree by the master on the twenty-sixth day of January, 1883, report of sale filed, and, in due oourse, an order of court taken confirming it. By this order of oonfirmation an execution was again ordered to issue, pursuant to general equity rule 92, as it· haJ before been ordered by the final decree. This Ql'der was made in November, 1883. The petition filed by defendant Canfield stated that he was not a party to the mortgage and notes sought to be foreclosed, and that his only connection with the mortgaged premises was this: That the defendant Wilson came to him and stated that he owed the mortgage to one Hathaway, who then held it; that he had not been able to agree with him upon the amount due; that the amount actually due was about $2,000, and he thereupon requested petitioner to let him have the money to pay Hathaway, and that petitioner should see Hathaway and endeavor to agree upon the amount due, and pay him, if they could agree; that petitioner found, on seeing Hathaway, that the amount due was largely in excess of $2,000, v.21F,no.14-56