\', , The view that I take of these cases is that the substituted trustee has title under the deed of trust, and is therefore not to be regarded asattlereofficer of the chancery C0urt in Virginia. That court might have stopped short after appointing Glenn substituted trustee, and then there could have been no doubt about his right to maintain an action in any jurisdiction where it might be deemed necessary to protect his right. That the chancery court gave him required a bond, and him to account, the powers of a is a matter between him and the chancery court, and cannot be considered as impairing bis title under the deed of trust or assignment. See Holmes v. Sherwood, 3 McOrary, 405; S. O. 16 FED. REP. 725, and the authorities cited tlierein. ' I tbink there can be no dOll bt of the authority of the chancery court (on the failure of the board of'direotors) to make the call neoessary to enfprce the deed of trust, ,and necessary under the terms of subscription 'to oharge the subsoribers to stock with liability for the amounts of unpaid SUbscriptions., See ,Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 155; '. And'in an aotion at law for unpaid Bubsoription, such call or to be 'necessary. See Chandler v. Siddle, 8 Dill. 477., It be contended that all the stockholders were necesstt.ry patties to the proceedings before the court making the call. See 'Matyland case, and Sanger v. Upton,91 U. 8.56. Prescription did not begin to run until the call was made, for. until then the unpaid subscription was not exigible. Scovill v. Thayer, 8upra. In a case lika this I. thinK it well settled that an action at law will lie. The exceptions will be overruled. .
illti:t:re'd.) A. Goldthwaite, for 'plaintiff. ':J. O. Nirioil, Jr.; F. L. Richardson, H. E. Upton, and D. O. Labatt,
th'e saiil chancery conrt.
The defen<1anta8xoepted, (de-
'V. CITY OF WATERTOWlf.
(Ct'rcuit Oourt, W. D. Wisconsin.
STATUTE OF LrMtTATIONS·
. Courts cannot ingraft on IItatlItM of limitations exceptions, notcIearIy expressed : and wllere the of the' statute is perfectly clear, it is the duty of the court to enforce the Ia W as it DU<ls it.
At Law. , Finche8, Lynde tf Miller, for plaintiffs. Daniel Hall and Geo. W. Bird, for defendant. ' BUNN, J. This is an aotion brought upon three several bonds and interest coupons issued by the city of Watertown, June I, 1856, to
AMYV.CITY OF WATERTOWN.
the Milwaukee & Madison 'Railroad Com.pany. The bonds became due January. 1, 1877, and the.summons was issued onJune19, 1883. To avoid the plea of the statute of limitations, which would otherwise appear on the face oftha.complaint to have run upon the bop.d$ and coupons, the plaintiff Elets out at considerable lengtldacts whioh it will not be necessary to recite here in detail, but which are intended to show that the plaintiffs have been prevented from their action sooner by the fraudulent action of the officers of the defendant city, and espeoially of the mayor and common council in assembling together, after their election in each year and transacting essary business for the city in a secret pIMe, with closed doors, unknown to the plaintiffs, and the people at large, and with persons on watch to inform them of the approach of any person, and then filing their resignations, which, by law, took effect immediately. In brief, that the plaintiffs have used due diligence to obtain service of the summons, but have been prevented by the fraudulent acts of 'the officers of the defendant. city. Tbe defendant denies these allegations, and, as a separate defense, sets up the statute of limitations, to which plea the plaintiffs demur, and the question is whether these facts take the case out from the operation of the statute. The limitation applicable to the case is found in section 1, c. 53, Gen. Laws Wis. 1872, which is as follows:
"No action brought to recover any sum of money on any bond, coupon Interest warrant, agreement, or promise in writing, made or issued by any town, county, city, or village, or upon any installment of the principal or interest thereof, shall be maintained in any court unless such action shall be commenced within six years from the time when such sum of money has or shall become due. ... · ."
There are several exceptions to the operation of the statute con.. tained in the laws of Wisconsin; as, (1) the defendant is out of the state; (2) when defendant is an. alien subject or a citizen of a country at war with the United States; (3) when the person entitled to bring the action is qnder age, or insane, or imprisoned on a criminal charge; (4) where the commencement of an action has been stayed by an injunction or statutory prohibition. It is also provided that, where the action is for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. It is .not claimed that the exception to the statute relied upon by the plaintiff in this case is found in the statute itself, and the question is whether' there are any exceptions not provided in the statute that can be rec:, ognized by the court. In examining a great many adjudged cases upon similar statutes, I find the pi'evailing ruling to pe that, the language of the statute being' general, it must receive a general copstruction. Perhaps it would be more logical to say that, of the statute being perfectly clear, it is wholly unnecessary to call in the aid of construction to ascertain ita meaning; and that it is
the'ddtyofthe court to enforce the law as it finds it, and not to undertake to ingraft upon it exceptions and conditions that the legislaturehas rtot Stlen fit to put into it. The law is olear and intelligible, and by' its terms applies to all cases not falling within one of the excepted cases. It should, therefore, be faithfullyapplied"bj;thecourts, so as to make the statute, which is one of repose, uilifotmarid certain in its operation, and not made to depend upon the decision of'some complicated issue offact or of fraud, created by ,the'pleadihgs, foreign to the purposes of the law. If the court can p'U't dne exception into the statute Mt found there, it oan more; and no litigant'could know with any certainty whether his case would fall within the statute or not. And the duty of the court is rendered all the more certain, if that were necessary, by the fact that certain express exceptions are contained in the statute, which is a clear im· plication against any other exceptions being made. 'The inquiry under a plea of the statute of limitations is always properly limited to a few simple topics; as, (1) ·When did the cause of action arise? Manifestly, in a case like this, when the bond or coupon fell dcre and was not paid, though it is claimed py the plaintiffs that it did not a;rise so long as the plaintiffs were prevented by the action ofthedefendant'sofficers from getting service on the mayor. By the same contention, if the maker of a note should conceal himself for a week .afterhis note fell due, so that summons could not be served upon him,the cause of action would not arise until he should come out from his hiding-place so that servioe could be had. Nobody is capa· such a proposition.. (2) How long a period has elapsed from the time the cause of action arose to the time when suit was commenced? By limiting the inquiry to these simple questions; wl1icll' was no doubt the intention of the legislature, the application aIfcloperation of the statute is made certain and uniform, and its salutary. See the following cases: Dupleix v. De Raven, 2 Hallv. Wybourn, 2 Salk. 420; Beckfordv. Wade,17Ves. 87fHwiterv. Gibbons, lHur!' & 459; Brown v. Howard, 4 Moore, 508; lmperihlGas-light 0: Coke Co. v. London Gas-light Co. 18 J ur. 497; C; 2 C. L. Rep. 1230; McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. 25; Bank of the State of Alabama, v. Dalton, 9 How. 522; Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How. 189; Kendall v. U. S. 107 U. S. 123; 8. C. 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. 8.135; National Bank v. Carpenter, ,Td. 567 ; Andreae v. Redfield, 98 U. 8. 225; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 'Blick, 599; Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. 8. 395; 8. C. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Fisherv. Harnden, 1 Paine, C. C. 61; U. S. v. Maillard, 4 Ben. 459; U. S. v. Muhlenbrink, 1 Woods, 569; Cocke v. McGinnis, Mart. & Y. 861 ; York v. Bright, 4 Humph.· 312; Milesv. Berry, 1 Hill, (S. C.) 296; Howell v. Hair, 15 Ala. 194; Arrowsmith v. Durell; 21 La. Ann. 295; Yale v. Randle, 23 La. Ann. 579; Somerset C().v.Veghle,44 N. J. Law. 509; Coleman v. Willi, 46 Mo. 236; Callis 1'. Waddy, 2 Munf. 511; Conner v. Goodman, 104 Ill. 365;