the'ddtyofthe court to enforce the law as it finds it, and not to undertake to ingraft upon it exceptions and conditions that the legislaturehas rtot Stlen fit to put into it. The law is olear and intelligible, and by' its terms applies to all cases not falling within one of the excepted cases. It should, therefore, be faithfullyapplied"bj;thecourts, so as to make the statute, which is one of repose, uilifotmarid certain in its operation, and not made to depend upon the decision of'some complicated issue offact or of fraud, created by ,the'pleadihgs, foreign to the purposes of the law. If the court can p'U't dne exception into the statute Mt found there, it oan more; and no litigant'could know with any certainty whether his case would fall within the statute or not. And the duty of the court is rendered all the more certain, if that were necessary, by the fact that certain express exceptions are contained in the statute, which is a clear im· plication against any other exceptions being made. 'The inquiry under a plea of the statute of limitations is always properly limited to a few simple topics; as, (1) ·When did the cause of action arise? Manifestly, in a case like this, when the bond or coupon fell dcre and was not paid, though it is claimed py the plaintiffs that it did not a;rise so long as the plaintiffs were prevented by the action ofthedefendant'sofficers from getting service on the mayor. By the same contention, if the maker of a note should conceal himself for a week .afterhis note fell due, so that summons could not be served upon him,the cause of action would not arise until he should come out from his hiding-place so that servioe could be had. Nobody is capa· such a proposition.. (2) How long a period has elapsed from the time the cause of action arose to the time when suit was commenced? By limiting the inquiry to these simple questions; wl1icll' was no doubt the intention of the legislature, the application aIfcloperation of the statute is made certain and uniform, and its salutary. See the following cases: Dupleix v. De Raven, 2 Hallv. Wybourn, 2 Salk. 420; Beckfordv. Wade,17Ves. 87fHwiterv. Gibbons, lHur!' & 459; Brown v. Howard, 4 Moore, 508; lmperihlGas-light 0: Coke Co. v. London Gas-light Co. 18 J ur. 497; C; 2 C. L. Rep. 1230; McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. 25; Bank of the State of Alabama, v. Dalton, 9 How. 522; Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How. 189; Kendall v. U. S. 107 U. S. 123; 8. C. 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. 8.135; National Bank v. Carpenter, ,Td. 567 ; Andreae v. Redfield, 98 U. 8. 225; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 'Blick, 599; Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. 8. 395; 8. C. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Fisherv. Harnden, 1 Paine, C. C. 61; U. S. v. Maillard, 4 Ben. 459; U. S. v. Muhlenbrink, 1 Woods, 569; Cocke v. McGinnis, Mart. & Y. 861 ; York v. Bright, 4 Humph.· 312; Milesv. Berry, 1 Hill, (S. C.) 296; Howell v. Hair, 15 Ala. 194; Arrowsmith v. Durell; 21 La. Ann. 295; Yale v. Randle, 23 La. Ann. 579; Somerset C().v.Veghle,44 N. J. Law. 509; Coleman v. Willi, 46 Mo. 236; Callis 1'. Waddy, 2 Munf. 511; Conner v. Goodman, 104 Ill. 365;
LAIr.D V. CITY OF DE·BOTO.
State Bank v. Morris, 13 Ark; 291; Fee v. Fee, 10 Ohio, 4:69; vorite v. Bookher's Adm'r, 17 Ohio St. 548; Smith v. Bishop, 9 Vt. 110; Peoria M. ff F. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 12 Mich. 202; Troup v. Ex'r, oj Smith, 20 Johns. 33; Leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 80; Demarest v. Wynkoop,3 Johns. Ch. 129; Sacia v. De Graaj, 1 Cow. 856; Bucklin v. Ford, 5 Barb. 393; Woodbury v. Shackelford, 19 Wis. 55; Lindsay v. Fa.g, 28 Wis. 177; Encking v. Simmons, Id. 212. The plea of the statute of limitations is held good, and the demurrer to it overruled. The plaintiffs will be allowed 20 days in which to file such new or further pleading as they may be advised is proper, or in default thereof judgment will go for the defendant.
((Jircuit UOUl't, E.
MUNICTPAL CORPORATIONS-IN·VALID REORGANIZATION
An invalid reorganization of an incorporated town as a city cannot affect its corporate existence. Where an incorporated town is reorganized as a city, the latter becomes liable for the former's debts.
2. SAME-LIABILI'rY OF SUCCESSOR.
Bondholders of a city are not bound by I)uowarranto proceedings against it" unless parties thereto.
Motion for a New Trial. Mills ff Flitcraft, for plaintiff. Joseph A. Williams, for defendant. MILLER, Justice. This case was submitted to the court without a jury on the petition and amended answer. The defense relied on is that when the bonds were issued by the trustees of the town of De Soto no such corporation was. in existence. The plea set out that in August, 1812, such steps were taken that the county court of Jefferson county made an order declaring Ii. certain boundary of land and its people a corporation by the name and style of the "Inhabitants of the Town of De Soto," and appointing trustees for its government. On the first day of October, 1872, these trustees issued the bonds to which were attached the coupons now sued on. The plea, after stating these facts, proceeds to aver that afterwards, in the year 1877, the residents of this town took proceedings to have it declared a city of the fourth class, and the county court made the necessary order to that effect. After this city government, with its mayor and. aldermen, had continued for five· in 1882, some of the citizens instituted
Reported by Benj. F. B<Jx, Esq., of the St. Louis bar.