223 US 234 Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance v. J William McCue
223 U.S. 234
32 S.Ct. 220
56 L.Ed. 57
56 L.Ed. 419
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE company, Petitioner,
J. WILLIAM MCCUE, Samuel O. McCue, Harry M. McCue, and Ruby G. McCue, Infants, by Marshall Dinwiddie, Their Next Friend, et al.
Argued December 20 and 21, 1911.
Decided February 19, 1912.
Messrs. William H. White, William H. White, Jr., George H. Noyes, and John R. Dyer for petitioner.
[Argument of Counsel from page 235 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Daniel Harmon, G. B. Sinclair, and H. W. Walsh for respondents.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 236-243 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:
The question in the case is whether death by the hand of the law in execution of a conviction and sentence for murder is covered by a policy of life insurance, though such manner of death is not excepted from the policy, there being no question of the justness of the sentence.
The case was in equity, and brought in the corporation court for the city of Charlottesville, state of Virginia, by respondents, children and sole heirs of James S. McCue, by Marshall Dinwiddie, their next friend, upon a policy of life insurance issued to McCue by petitioner, named herein as the insurance company.
The main defense of the insurance company was (there were some technical defenses with which we are not concerned) that McCue came to his death by hanging after conviction and sentence for the murder of his wife.
The suit was brought under the laws of the commonwealth of Virginia against the insurance company, the People's National Bank of Charlottesville, as garnishee, and the executors of McCue's estate.
The case was removed on the petition of the insurance company, on the ground of a separable controversy, to the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Virginia. In that court there was a demurrer filed to the bill which raised the question as to the proper arrangement of the parties, and whether the heirs or the executors were the parties to recover on the policy, assuming that the insurance company was liable. In the answer the same questions were again raised and all liability of the insurance company denied, principally on the ground of the manner by which McCue came to his death.
At the trial the technical defenses were waived, and by agreement of the parties the heirs of McCue and his executors were treated as parties plaintiff. The court, considering the cause as one at law, and a jury having been waived by the parties, adjudged on the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts, 'that the plaintiffs take nothing by their bill, and that said defendant go without day,' with costs, the latter to be paid by a deposit made in the registry of the court in refund of the premium paid by McCue, as far as it would go. The judgment was reversed by the court of appeals and a new trial ordered. This certiorari was then petitioned for and allowed.
The facts as agreed are these: The insurance company is a corporation duly organized under the laws of Wisconsin, and a citizen and resident thereof. It is a mutual insurance company, with the power and obligations given to and imposed upon it by certain acts of the legislature of Wisconsin, which acts constitute its charter.
The People's National Bank of Charlottesville was made a party solely as garnishee, it having certain sums of money belonging to the insurance company in its possession.
McCue made written application to the insurance company in his own handwriting for the policy in suit, in pursuance of which the policy was issued for the sum of $15,000 on his life. He paid premiums as follows: When the policy was delivered to him he gave his note for the sum of $427.50 for the premium to E. L. Carroll and L. Fitzgerald, payable to their order, six months after date, at the Jefferson National Bank, Charlottesville, Virginia. Carroll & Fitzgerald at the time were soliciting insurance for T. A. Cary, the general agent of the insurance company in Virginia. The note was indorsed by Carroll & Fitzgerald to Cary, with the following memorandum attached: '$427.50. Hold this note in Mr. Cary's office (don't use bank.) Notify Mr. McC. about thirty days before due, and send it to E. L. Carroll for collection.' Carroll & Fitzgerald gave their individual notes to Mr. Cary, amounting to $427.50, on which he advanced the money to the company and held the notes for collection, with McCue's note as collateral.
The company received, at its home office in Milwaukee, the amount of the premium in cash from Cary on May 2, 1904, but had no knowledge of the note arrangement between McCue, Carroll & Fitzgerald, and Cary. The note was paid by McCue by checks after he had been arrested, he protesting his innocence, 'which facts were known to Cary.' The note arrangement was a general custom among soliciting agents for the company. Other facts will be noted hereafter.
The main question in the case is, as we said, the liability of the company under the circumstances. Or, to put it more abstractly for the present purpose of our discussion, whether a policy of life insurance insures against death by a legal execution for crime.
The question was before this court in Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 362, 47 L. ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139. In the policy passed on, as in the policy in the case at bar, there was no provision excluding death by the law. It was decided, however, that such must be considered its effect, though the policy contained nothing covering such contingency. These direct questions were asked: 'Do insurance policies insure against crime? Is that a risk which enters into and becomes a part of the contract?' And answering, after discussion, we said: 'It cannot be that one of the risks covered by a contract of insurance is the crime of the insured. There is an implied obligation on his part to do nothing to wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy. Public policy forbids the insertion in a contract of a condition which would tend to induce crime, and as it forbids the introduction of such a stipulation, it also forbids the enforcement of a contract under circumstances which cannot be lawfully stipulated for.' Cases were cited, among others Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300. There it was held that a life insurance policy taken out by the insured for the benefit of his estate was avoided when one of sound mind intentionally took his life, irrespective of the question whether there was a stipulation in the policy or not. And the conclusion was based, among other considerations, upon public policy, the court saying that 'a contract, the tendency of which is to endanger the public interests or injuriously affect the public good, or which is subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court of justice, or be made the foundation of its judgment.'
These cases must be accepted as expressing the views of this court as to the public policy which must determine the validity of insurance policies, and which they cannot transcend even by explicit declaration, much less be held to transcend by omissions or implications, and we pass by, therefore, the very interesting argument of counsel for respondents as to the indefinite and variable notions which may be entertained of such policy according to times and places and the temperaments of courts, and the danger of permitting its uncertain conceptions to control or supersede the freedom of parties to make and to be bound by contracts deliberately made. We come, therefore, immediately to the special contention of respondents, that the contract in controversy is a Wisconsin contract, and is not offensive to the public policy of that state or to its laws, but was indeed, as it is contended, made in conformity to the laws of that state, and carries all of their obligations.
The obligation of a contract undoubtedly depends upon the law under which it is made. In which state, then, Virginia or Wisconsin, was the policy made? In Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements (Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Pettus), 140 U. S. 226, 35 L. ed. 497, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822, the question arose whether the contract of insurance sued on was made in New York or Missouri. The assured was a resident of Missouri, and the application for the policy was signed in Missouri. The policy, executed at the office of the company, provided that the contract between the parties was completely set forth in the policy and the application therefor, taken together. The application declared that the contract should not take effect until the first premium should have been actually paid during the life of the person proposed for assurance. Two annual premiums were paid in Missouri, and the policy, at the request of the assured, was transmitted to him in Missouri, and there delivered to him. The court said: 'Upon this record the conclusion is inevitable that the policy never became a completed contract, binding either party to it, until the delivery of the policy and the payment of the first premium in Missouri; and consequently that the policy is a Missouri contract, and governed by the laws of Missouri.'
In Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262, 45 L. ed. 181, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106, the insurance policy contained a stipulation that it should not be binding until the first premium had been paid and the policy delivered. The premium was paid and the policy delivered in Montana. It was held that 'under these circumstances, under the general rule, the contract was a Montana contract, and governed by the laws of that state.' Citing Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements, supra.
The same conditions existed in Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, 48 L. ed. 788, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 538, and it was decided, the two cases above mentioned being cited, that the policy of insurance involved was a Washington contract, not a New York contract.
In the case at bar the application was made by McCue at Charlottesville, Virginia, February 25, 1904, and the policy was delivered to him there on March 15, 1904, when he gave his note for the premium which was payable at that place and subsequently paid there. And it is provided in the policy that it should not take effect until the first premium should be actually paid. Following that provision is this: 'In witness whereof the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, at its office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has by its president and secretary signed and delivered this contract, this 15th day of March, 1904.' But manifestly this was not intended to affect the preceding provision, fixing the time when the policy should go into effect, nor the legal consequences which followed from it. In Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements the policy was executed at the company's office in New York. The exact conditions, therefore, existed which made, in the cases cited, the policies involved therein not New York contracts, but, respectively, Missouri, Montana, and Washington contracts. The policy, therefore, in the case at bar, must be held to be a Virginia, and not a Wisconsin, contract.
Respondents, however, contend that 'the right asserted is a property right, vested by the special statute of incorporation, which is not devested by crime;' and that 'the charter controls the rights of members irrespective of the place where such rights may have been acquired.' To support the contention that the right asserted is a property right, respondents adduce §§ 1, 4, 7, and 20 of the charter. Their argument is brief and direct, and we may quote it. It is as follows: 'Under the charter of the company, McCue occupied the relation of a member of the company. This was a valuable property right. Upon his death this membership passed to his executors.' And further: 'The charter of the company, § 1, provided that certain persons named 'and all other persons who may hereafter associate with them in the manner hereinafter prescribed shall be, and are, declared a body politic and corporate. Section 4 prescribes that persons who shall hereafter insure with the company 'shall thereby become members thereof.' And § 7 prescribes the manner in which this membership is to be perfected. 'Every person who shall become a member of this association, by effecting insurance therein, shall, the first time he effects insurance, pay the rates fixed by the trustees,' etc. There can be no doubt, then, that McCue was a member of this corporation. He insured with the company, and thereby he became a member. His interest in the company was fixed by the amount of his insurance. This membership constituted a vested property right. He was eligible as an officer, and entitled to vote in the management of the company (§ 20); entitled to the dividends on the surplus and profits (§ 2, § 13); and was a joint owner of the assets of the company.' But this is assuming what is to be proved. It may be true that a person who insures with the company becomes a member thereof, and that his interest is fixed at the amount of his insurance. But what constitutes his title or right? Necessarily his policy. What entitles him to a realization of the benefits of his membership? Necessarily, again, his policy, if the manner of his death be not a violation of it. We need not follow counsel, therefore, through their argument as to the rights of property and the rules of its devolution, which, it is contended, must obtain, whatever be the act or guilt of the person producing it. The question before us, and the only question, is: What rights did McCue's estate and children get by his policy? And we are brought back to the simple dispute as to whether the policy covers death by the hand of the law. This court has pronounced on that dispute, and its ruling must prevail in the Federal courts of Virginia, in which state the contract was made. And it is consonant with the ruling in the state courts. In Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, I. O. H. 105 Va. 643, 55 S. E. 9, a certificate of membership in the Conclave, which was issued to one Charles W. Plunkett, his wife being beneficiary, was considered. One of the conditions was that Plunkett comply with the laws, rules, and regulations then governing the Conclave, or that might in the future be enacted. There was no provision against suicide in the laws, rules, or regulations when the certificate was issued. Such a provision was subsequently enacted. Plunkett committed suicide, and the Order refused to pay benefits. Plunkett's wife brought suit to recover them, and asserted a vested interest in the benefits under the certificate. The contention was rejected. The trial court held that the forfeiture of the rights under the certificate, if the insured while sane committed suicide, was valid, because (1) it involved no vested right of the insured, and (2) because it was a fundamental, though unexpressed, part of the original contract that the insured should not intentionally cause his own death. And the court added: 'Inasmuch as the original contract and by-laws were silent upon the subject of suicide by the insured while sane, the new by-law is valid, because there can be no such thing as a vested right for a sane man to commit suicide, and for the further reason that it is nothing more than the written expression of the provision which the law had read into the contract at its inception.'
The supreme court of appeals affirmed the judgment, quoting the reasoning of the trial court, and added to it the considerations of public policy expressed in the Burt Case and Ritter Case, supra, and other cases. If the public policy of Virginia were the same as, it is contended, that of Wisconsin is, whether this court should have to yield it, we are not called upon to decide.
Being of opinion that McCue's policy was a Virginia contract, it may be unnecessary to review the cases relied on by the respondents, which they contend declare the public policy of the state of Wisconsin. It may, however, be said that the cases are not absolutely definite.
Two cases only are cited, McCoy v. Northwestern Mut. Relief Asso. 92 Wis. 577, 47 L.R.A. 681, 66 N. W. 697, and Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. L. Ins. Co. 100 Wis. 118, 42 L.R.A. 253, 69 Am. St. Rep. 899, 75 N. W. 980. We will not consider the facts in the first case. It is enough to say that the court, following a ruling that it had pronounced in other cases, said: 'If a contract for life insurance does not provide against death by suicide or self-destruction, then such cause of death does not constitute a defense,' citing four cases. The second also presented one of suicide, the insured being sane. It was contended that the policy did not cover such a risk, because (1) an incontestable clause (there being one) in the contract did not cover such a death; (2) if it could be held so in terms, it would be void, as against public policy; (3) suicide was a crime, and hence within a stipulation against death in violation of law.
The reliance of the insurance company to support its contentions was upon the Ritter Case, supra. The court, however, reiterated its former ruling as to death by suicide, though it recognized the cogency of the reasoning of the Ritter Case, that the insured should do nothing to accelerate the contingency of the policy, saying (page 122): 'Were the question a new one in the law, the argument would be well nigh irresistible; especially where, as in the Ritter Case, the policy runs in favor of the estate of the insured, and the proceeds will go to the enrichment of such estate, instead of to other beneficiaries.'
There were other beneficiaries in the case, the policy having been assigned, with the consent of the company, to the children of the insured. Commenting further on that fact, the court said it brought the case within the principle of certain cases, which were cited, but added, 'nor would the application of that principle to this case necessarily conflict with the Ritter Case, where the policy was in favor of the estate of the insured. It may well be in such a case that the intentional suicide of the insured while sane would prevent a recovery by his personal representatives, and yet not prevent a recovery in case of a policy in favor of beneficiaries who had a subsisting vested interest in the policy at the time of the suicide, and who could not, if they would, prevent the act of the insured.' McCue's policy was in favor of his estate, and comes within the concession made by the supreme court to the reasoning of the Ritter Case.
The court did not discuss considerations of public policy, but we may assume it found nothing offensive to such policy in a contract of insurance which covered death by suicide, and it may be supposed that the court would find nothing repugnant to public policy in a contract which did not except death for crime. However, we need not speculate, as the Wisconsin law does not control the policy in suit.
One other contention of respondents remains to be noticed. It is contended that if the McCue estate cannot recover, the innocent parties, his children, will be admitted as claimants. To this contenton we repeat what we have said above,—the policy is the measure of the rights of everybody under it, and as it does not cover death by the law, there cannot be recovery either by McCue's estate or by his children.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Circuit Court is affirmed.