bodily inJury, and that such injury was effected through external, violent, and accidental means, and was one of which there was an external and visible sign, and that the injury was the pl'oximate or sole cause of death, then the plaintiff should have a verdict in her favor. If, on the contrary, you find either that the injury was not sustained, or that, if it was sustained, it was not effected through external, violent, and accidental means, or was an injury of which there was no external or visible sign, or that it was not the proximate or sale cause of death, .then your verdict should be for the defendant.
NOTE.-The cases cited by cOllnse,l. and considered by the court on the trial of this case, were Whitehouse v il'avelers' Ins. Co. 7 Ins. Law J. 23; Southard v. Railway Pass. Assnr. Co. 34 Conn. 574; N. A. Life & Ace. Ins. 00. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. St. 43; and MeCal"thy v. Travelers' Ins. 00.8 Ins. Law J.208.
GENTRY and others v. SUPREME LODGE, KNIGHTS OF HONOR.
Court, D. Indiana. April 7, 1885.)
'LIFE INsunANCE- KNIGHTS OF HONOR-CHANGING ApPOINTMENT OF BENEFICIARY.
, A party to whom a benefit certificate has been by the order of the Kni!-(hts of Honor may revoke the appointment of t h" beneficiary named therein, and appoint a new beneficiary, to whom the benefit will be payable on his death, " in good standing."
At Law. J. E. Willia,ms, for plaintiffs. James O. Pierce, for defendant. WOODS, J. The plaintiffs sue upon a benefit certificate issued by the order of the Knights of Honor, in 1877, to Jobn P. Gentry, in which it was stipulated that the sum of $2,000 should, upon his death, in good standing, be paid to "such person or persons as he might direct," and upon the margin of which certificate he directed that said sum should be paid to his wife and children, who are the present plaintiffs. Defendants' answer sets up the charter of the defendant corporation, granted by the legislature of Kentucky, and the constitutions and by-laws adopted by the order, and shows that the privilege was reserved to Gentry, not only to nominate a beneficiary, but to revoke said nomination and change the beneficiary at pleasure; that previous to his death, in 1881, he exercised this privilege, surrendered the benefit certificate now sued on, and applied for a new one, which was issued to him, and in which he directed that his benefit be paid to Mrs. Minnie L. Jones, a creditor and not a relative; and that upon the death of said Gentry, the defendant paid the said sum of $2,000 to said Jones. 'l'he demurrer filed by plaintiffs to this answer l'aises the question of the sufficiency of this
SUPREMl!l LODGE,KNIGHTS OF HONOR.
Plaintiffs' counsel relies upon the grant of power in defendant's charter to establish a widows' and orphans' benefit fund, from which, in case of the death of a member who has complIed with all its lawful requirements, "a sum not exceeding $5,000 shall be paid to his family, or as he may direct." It is insisted that this clause of the charter establishes the family of the member, who at his death may fall in the category of "wido.ws and orphans," as a class to which the member is limited in designating his beneficiary. The question has been several times decided by other courts, under this and similar charters or constitutions, and it has been held that the words "or as he may direct," or others of similar import, confer upon the member a general power of designating as beneficiary any person or persons whom he may choose. In the opinion of the court, this must be regarded as the correct rule for the present case. The defendant's charter was so construed in thtl following-named cases, in which certificates of membership were involved, in terms substantially the same as the one now before the court: Highland v. Highland, 16 Chi. Leg. News, (Ill.) 272; Tennessee Lodge v. Ladd, 5 Lea, 716; Supreme Lodge v. Martin, 12 Ins. Law J. 628. For cases in which the unlimited right to change the beneficiary has been conceded to the members of other mutual benefit societies, . see Durian v. Centra.l Verein, 7 Daly, 168; v. Conductors' Ass'n 96 Ill. 309; Splawn v. Chew, 60 Tex. 532; Hellenberg v. 1. O. B. B. 94 N. Y. 580; Relief Ass'n v. McAuley, 2 Mackey, 70. It is urged that the courts of Kentucky, in which state the defendant was incorporated, have taken a different view of the question. It appears, however, that there is no real conflict of authority. The Kentucky cases in which it has been held that the member's power of appointment is limited to his family, or to some portion thereof, as a class, are cases in which such a limitation was found in the charter. Masonic Ins. Co. v. Miller's Adm'r, 13 Bush, 489; Weisert v. Muehl, 5 Ky. Law Rep. Hallan v. Gardner, Id. 857. But the court of appeals of Kentucky, while so deciding, recognizes the principle- that in these mutual benefit societies, the member may have as broad a range of choice in selecting his beneficiary as the organic law of his society gives him. Van Bibber's Adm'r v. Van Bibber, 14 Ins. Law J. 290; Duvall v. Goodson, 79 Ky. 224. It results that the appointment of the plaintiffs as beneficiaries under the original certificate issued to Gentry was subject to revocation by him, and that the appointment of a new beneficiary and the payment of the fund to her did not violate any right of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs electing to offer no reply to the defendant's answer, defendant is entitled to a. judgment in its favor on the answer.
CLEVELAND ROLLING-MILL CO. tJ. TEXAS
& ST. L. RY. CO.'
(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. Missouri. April 27, 1885.)
PRACTICE-ORDER TO FURNISH LIST OF STOCKHOLDERS-REV. ST. 'Vhere a creditor of 8 corporation has obtained judgment and
had execution issued against it, and the execution has been returned nulla bona. without any demand having' been made upon the officer in charge of the company's books, for a list of the names. places of residence, etc., of the stockholders liable for unpaid balances upon their stock, this court will not make a peremptory order on such officer to furnish such list.
Mo. § 737.
At Law. Fisher dRowell and Ira O. Tet'ry, for plaintiff. Phillips Stewart, for defendant. Dyer, Lee Elles, Broadhead dHae1t8sler, and Boyle, Adam' <t MeKeighan, for stockholders. TREAT, J. On application of plaintiff for peremptory order on J. W. Paramore and A. C. Stewart, respectively president and secretary of defendant company, to furnish a list of the names, etc., of stockholders. It appears from the records in the case that no demand had been made by the marshal, holding the execution, for such list. There is a recital to that effect in the application of February 13th, last, for a rule on the respondents, but there is no return on record thereof. Since the argument on this motion and evidence submitted, a return of the execution nulla bona has been filed. The "argument before the court proceeded to a large extent as if no such return had been made. It now appears that execution was duly issued; and indorsed thereon is a return of nulla bona, January 12th, last, not filed, however, until the twenty-fourth inst. By the statutes, it was necessary, as preliminary to the summary proceedings contemplated against stockholders, that execution should have issued, and an order of court had against the stockholders, respectively, etc. Section 737, Rev. St. Mo., requires "the clerk or other officer having charge of the books of any corporation, on demand of any officer holding any execution against the same, shall furnish the officer with the names," etc. From the record, the officer holding the execution in this case never made the demand authorized upon either of the respondents. This proceeding is based upon the fact of such demand and refusal to comply therewith. As no such demand is shown, the rule must be discharged. The evidence sufficiently discloses that, under the requirements of law, custody of the stock-book is subject to the control and in charge, lawfully, of the respondents. Hence, if the demand had been made by the marshal when holding the execution, and they had failed or refused to comply therewith, a peremptory order against them would be granted.
by Benj. F. Rex, Esq., of the St. Louis bar.