with the knowledge of her said master, took from the papers of the vessel the said "captain's copy" of the bill of and delivered the same to the said William L. Carbin; the said Wenberg then knOWing that the said copy was the "captain's copy," and the said William L. Carbin, before the twenty-eighth of DecemiJer, 18tH, received under the said "captain's copy" the merchandise named therein, from the said vessel and the said master. None of the said bills of exchange have ever been paid, or any part thereof. The said agent, in New Yor-k, of the libelant learned on the twenty-ninth of December, 18t31, that said cargo had been delivered to William L. Carbin, and thereupon, by the first opportunity, communicated that information to the libelant at Paramaribo, where it was established, and where the transaction between it and H. J. Carbin took place; and on the receipt of an answer to suclr communication, the libel herein was filed on March 31, 1882, as soon as the vessel could be found. On that day, the bill of lading aforeilaid was presented to the master of the vessel by the agent of the libelant, and a demand was duly made for said cargo, which was refused. The bill of lading so kept by tire master as the "captain's copy," was indorsed in blank at the time by said R. .J. Carbin, but it did not, at that time, contain the words, "deliver to the order of William L. Carbin," or any of them, indorsed on the back thereof; nor were words, or any ofthem, written thereon at any time by said R. J. Carbin, or by his authority, or that of the libelant; but said words were written thereon by William L. Carbin after the delivery of said "captain's copy" to him at New York, as they now appear in said libelant's Exhibit A.
On the foregoing facts I find the following conclusions of law:
'fhe master was authorized to sign and deliver to R. J. Carbin the bills of lading; and, in any event, the delivery to William L. Carbin by Wenberg, the agent of the vessel, of the captain's copy of the bill of lading, was a ratification of the act of the master in delivering to R. J. Carbin the bills of lading which were delivered to him by the master. The copy of the bill of lading kept by the master was the captain's copy,-the vessel's bill of lading,-and merely for the information of the master and agent and owners of the vessel, and the dellvery thereof to William L. Carbin was a wrongfUl act as against the libelant, for which the vessel is liable to it. The libelant was guilty of 110 iaches. There should be a decree for the libelant of the same tenor as the decree in its favor in the district court, with its costs in this court to be taxed.
(Di8trict Court, /il. D. New York. September 22,1884.)
COLT,TSTON:-STEAM AND SAIL VESSEJ,s-ApPROACHING STEAMEU-ToRCH-LlGHTTUG AND Tow-LoOKOUT-LIGHTS.
Where a collision occurred on the ocean between a bark and a so.uooner which was in tow of a tug, and the tug's lights were seen by the bark some two miles off, but the bark's lights were not seen by the tug or the schooner till collision was inevitable, the night being dark, but a good night to see lights, and the v('s,e]s approached aach other on such courses that the bark passed within 100 feet of the tug, held, that the hark was in fauH for not showing a torch on her bow, and the collision must he held on that ground alone to have been caused by her fault; that, as the bark had her side placed on the mizzen rigging
l1leported by R. D. & Wyllys Benedict, Esqs., of the New York bar.
she was charged with the burden of showing clearly that the lights so placed would not he obstructed by the sails, and that the testimony failed to show that the tug was not in fault for h!wing the lookout in the pilot-house, with the man at the wheel, when it was only 15 feet from the pilot-house to the stem, and a lookout stationed on the deck between the pilot-house and the stem would be in danger of being swept off by the that the bark was liable for the damage arising from the collision.
In Admiralty. Owen &: Gray, for the bark. Jas. K. Hill, rVing &: Shoudy, for the schooner. E'. G. Davis; for the tug. BENEDICT, J. These actions arise out of a collision that occurred on the night of August 15, 1884, on the ocean, about three miles to the southward of tile Scotland light-ship, between the bark Caro and the schooner Josephine, at the time in tow of the steam-tug George H. Dentz. The Dentz was bound to New York, steering for the Scot. land light. She had the schooner Josephine in tow upon a hawser some 75 fathoms long. The bark Caro was olltward bound, and was sailing close-hauled upon the starboard tack; The tug was seen by the bark at the distance of some two miles, but the bark was not discovered by any person on the tug or on the schooner until collision between the bark and the schooner was inevitable. It is proved that the bark had her side lights set and burning, and that the tug had also the proper lights set, including the vertical lights required to indicatA that she had a vessel in tow. The proof shows plainly that the sale cause of the collision was the failure of the tug to see the bark in time. It is also plain that the night, although dark, was a gooel night to see lights. In the pilot-house of the tug were two persons; one engaged in steering, the other in looking out. This pilot. house was only 15 feet from the stem. A lookout stationed on the deck between the pilot-house and the stem would have been in danger of being swept off by the sea. Under these circumstances it was not negligence to station the lookout in the pilot.houso of the tug. The negligence on the part of the tug, if she was negligent, was not in placing her lookout in the pilot-honse, but in the want of diligence in the man who was there placed. If the bark displayed the proper lights, the failure of those on the tug to see the bark in proper time must be attributed to a want of a diligent lookout. If the proper lights were not displayed by the bark, then the failure of those on the tug to see the bark in time must be attributed to the negligence of those on the bark in respect to their lights. One omission on the part of the bark in re8pect to her lights is conceded: she did not display a torch. In her behalf the contention is that the sta,tute did not require her to exhibit a torch to the tug, because the tug was not approaching any point or quarter of the bark. The testimony shows that the tug was approaching the bark upon such a course that she passed the tug within less than 100 feet. Un·
der such circumstances the tug was an approaching steamer, within the meaning of the statute, and the statute made it the duty of the bark, when she saw the tug so approaching, to show a lighted torch upon her bow. The burden is upon the bark to show that this omission did not contribute to cause the collision that ensued, and she has failed to do this. Upon this ground alone the collision must be held to have been caused by fault of the bark. There is in addition considerable foundation for the belief that the location of the bark's side lights was such as to render them ineffect· ual to warn vessels approaching at a certain angle. These lights were placed upon the mizzen rigging, and of course aft the fore and main sail. The bark was sailing close-hauled, and the testimony leaves it in doubt whether the clew of the sails set forward of the light would not shut off the light to a vessel ahead. I am aware that many vessels carry their lights aft, and that reasons are given for preferring that location; but when on any vessel the side lights are placed aft th El sails" I consider the vessel charged with the burden of showing clearly that the light so placed would not be obstructed by the sails when set. The testimony in this case has not satisfied me that the side light of the bark would not be obstructed by the clew of her sail when olosehauled, owing to her side light being placed upon her mizzen rigging. An obscuration of the bark's side light by the clew of this sail would account for the fact proved, that not only did the two men on the tug fail to discover the bark's light until she was upon them, but the men on the schooner in tow of the tug also failed to see the bark's light until she was close at hand. The tug's lights were seen from the bark at a distance of two miles, and if the bark's lights were unob· structed, it is difficult to understand why neither of two men on the none of several men on the schooner in tow, saw them until tng, the bark was close by, although, as they say, all were looking forward for lighte. An obstruction of the bark's light by the clew of ber sail would account for this; and, as before remarked, I am not satisfied that such was not the case, owing to the light's being placed in the mizzen rigging. Upon these grounds, therefore, the libel of the owner of the bark Caro against the George H. Dentz must be dismissed, and the libel of the owner of the schooner Josephine must be sustained as against the bark Caro, and dismissed as against the tug Dentz.
(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. Mi88ouri. May 26,1885.)
BILL TO QUIET TITLE-LIFE-TENANT AND HEMAINDER-MAN.
A remainder-man cannot maintain a bill against a life-tenant to prevent his denying the former's interest in the estate, and from making leases extending beyond the term of his natural life.
In Equity. Henry Hitchcock, for complainant. John Wickham and Given Campbell, for defendant. TREAT, J. The bill alleges that the defendant is a tenant for life, and the plaintiff remainder-man in fee, expectant on certain impossible conditions to the contrary. It charges that she has made, and is about to make, leases extending beyond the term of her natural life; and also is asserting that the defendant has no title or interest in the estate. The court is prayed to enjoin said defendant from making such leases, and from asserting that defendant has no title or interest in the estate. The proposition is somewhat novel. Without undertaking to review the many cases cited as to bills of peace, or quia timet, whether parties are in or out of possession, it must suffice that none goes so far as to uphold a bill against a tenant for life, in possession, to restrain him from making leases which might by possibility extend in terms longer than his natural life. It ie obvious that if defendant is only tenant for life, no lease by her made could extend legally beyond her life. Hence there is no occasion for the interposition of equity to restrain one from doing a legal impossibility. It may be that the purpose of this proceeding was to obtain a judicial decision as to the title in the plaintiff, if any, subsequent to the death of the defendant. Why should she, during her life-time, be made a party to controversies which can arise only between others after her death? It mayor may not be that the claim of the plaintiff is ill-grounded, and that she and the other children of William Christy are entitled to said estate. The court cannot pass upon that question on the present demurrer. Demurrer sustained.
by Benj. F. Rex, Esq., of the St. Lonls bar.