the saddle, B, substantially &s and for the purposes herein set forth." The defendants deny infringement, and deny the validity of complainant's patent for want of novelty. The defendant's device, which is constructed under a patent issued to one Raymond, consists of a seat, or saddle, suspended in a frame formed by a bifurcated or double wire or rod, curved substantially in the same manner as the single rod in the Spooner device; and it seems to me that it substantially embodies the principle and mode of operation shown in the Spooner patent. The saddle differs slightly from that shown by Spooner, but only to such an extent as to be allowed as a mechanical change, while the curvature or rearward bend of the suspending rod shown by Spooner is exactly imitated in the double suspending rod of the defendant. Upon the question of novelty reference is made to a large number of prior devices, but an examination of them fails to disclose any device embodying in principle the backward-curved suspension rod of the Spooner patent; and, from the proof, I feel compelled to say that Spooner seems to have been the first to adopt this mode of suspending the device for seating the child. 'l'hat the defendant's device, under the Raymond patent, is more ornate than the simple and plain device shown in the complainant's patent, is probably true, and possibly the Raymond device might have been entitled to a patent as an improvement upon that of complainant; but it manifestly appropriates the essential feature and elements of the complainant's patent. I must therefore find for the complainants, and direct a reference to a master to take an account of damages.
RUBEL v. TUCKER and others.
(Oircuit COU1·t, S.
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS - INTEUFERENCE OFFICE-REV. St. § 4918.
EFFECT OF DECISION OF PATENT-
In a suit between interfering patentees under Rev. St. § 4918, the decision of the 'patent-office in favor of one of the parties is not res adjudicata upon the question of priority of invention between them, and a bar to further litigation in the circuit court.
In Equity. G. Willis Betts, for complainant. J. P. Fitch, for defendants. WALLACE, J. The complainant, as owner of letters patent No. 275,092, issued to him as assignee of Taylor, April 3, 1883, files his bill alleging interference between his patent and a patent issued to William A. Tucker, No. 305,336, September 30, 1884. The prayer for relief is that the latter patent he declared void because of the a1-
legedpriority of invention of complainant's assignor. The defend. ants, by a plea, set up as a defense that the Tucker patent was issued by the patent-office after a decision in interference proceedings between the two patents in favor of and insist upon that decision as a bar to the suit. The plea has been set down for argument, and the single question is whether in a suit between interfering patentees, under section 4918 of the Revised Statutes, the decision of the patentoffice in favor of one of the parties is res addudicata upon the question of priority of invention between them, and a bar to further litigation in this court. The language of that section is so explioit that it would seem to be unnecessary to resort to other provisions of the patent law in order to ascertain its meaning. As is said by LOWELL, J., in Union Paper-bag Machine Co. v. Crane, 1 Ban. & A. 494: "It is not. ambiguous, but gives a court of equity power to decide between interfering patents without any exception or limitation." It saves the rights of any person interested in either of the interfering patents, as well as those of any person interested in the working of the invention claimed under either of them, to obtain relief against the interfering patent by a suit in equity against the owner. As no patent oan come into existence under section 4904, if, in the opinion of the commissioner, it interferes with one already granted, the section in question plainly contemplates, either that his decision upon an interference may be reviewed, ,or that it it is only to be reviewed by a court of equity when he has overlooked the existence of the prior patent. That it is not intended to be confined to cases in which he has not passed upon the question of priority of invention is apparent from the provisions of section 4915, by which the rights of the defeated party in an interference proceeding are carefully saved by allowing him to appeal. to the supreme court of the District of Columbia, or to resort to a remedy by a bill in equity. 'l'he provisions of this section denote incontestably that the decision of the commissioner is not to be conclusive if the defeated party choose to contest his decision by a direct attack upon the interfering patent in a court of equity. It may very well be held that where the defeated party does not adopt the statutory mode of contesting the decision of the patent-office upon the question of priority of invention, the decision should be held conclusive. The decisions in Peck v. Lindsay, 2 FED. REP. 688; Holliday v. Pickhardt, 22 O. G. 420; S. C. 12 FED. REP. 147; Hanford v. Westcott, 16 O. G. 1181; Shuter v. Davis, 24: O. G. 303; S. C. 16 FED. REP. 564,-are to this effect. They do not throw any light upon the present question, because this is purely one of statutory construction. The cases of Wire Book-sewing 11Jachine Co. v. Stevenson, 11 FED. REP. 155. and Peck v. Collins, 70 N. Y. 376, are authorities in support of the conclusions thus reached. The plea is therefore overruled.
(District Oourt, S. D. New York. July g, 1885.)
COLLISION - HARBOR REGULATIONS OBVIOUS DANGER. IMPROPER ANCHORAGE RUNNING INTO
Where the schooner C. H. V. anchored nearer the Jersey City shore than the harbor regulations permitted, and in a situation that involvcd clear and obvious danger of collision upon the backing out of the steamer W.in the strong ebbtide, and the schooner, being notified in time and requested to drop astern, neglected to do so, though she might have done so without difficulty, and the steamer thereupon backed out, and a collision ensued, held, that both were in fault, and the'damage and costs were divided; the schooner, for not astern after seasonable notice; the steamer, for running out into an obvious danger, instead of first. procuring the harbor master to enforce the regulations, or offering to assist the schooner astern.
In Admiralty. JaB. K. Hill, Wing rt Shoudy, for libelant Curtis and the schooner C. H. Valentine. Biddle &; Ward, for Randle and the steam-ship Westernland. BROWN, J. The above are cross-libels brought in behalf of the respective owners of the schooner Valentine, and of the Belgian steamship Westernland, to recover the damages sustained by each, arising from a collision which occurred in the North river in the afternoon of December 13.1884, about opposite Morris street, Jersey City, some '200 yards from the shore. The schooner was at anchor, and the steam-ship, in backing out with the aid of tugs in the ebb-tide, was carried down against the schooner, so that the bows of the latter struck the port quarter of the steamer, doing some injury to both. My conclusions of fact are as follows: 1. The schooner was at anchor at considerably less than the required distance of 300 yards from the Jersey shore; probably less than 200 yards. 2. The tide was strong ebb j there had been a freshet in the river, and the current ran down all day. 3. The mate of the schooner, who was on board, received several timely warnings of the necessity of dropping down the stream, in or· del' to make room for the steamer to come out at her appointed time. There was no difficulty in the schooner's dropping far enough astern to be out of danger, had the mate been disposed to do so. Measures for this purpose were not taken until some time after the steamer hadstarted, and the collision was seen to be impending. The schooner had plenty of spare cable; and had attention been given to the steamer, even when she started, there was still time to have dropped astern, out of the way of danger. The schooner must therefore be held liable for anchoring inside of the prohibited limits, and in a place of danger;