did own this land; and that was tried in that proceeding, and his discharge was set aside on that ground. Then immediately the new assignee was ordered to schedule this property, and did schedule, and did get a decree, and did sell it, and these plaintiffs, or the men from whom they purchased it, bought it at that public sale. Now, it is Illy opinion that the proceeding was binding upon Snyder, and it bound him just so far as it described the land it sold and no further; that whatever title was in Snyder at that time, if he varied the title between the time of his going into bankruptcy and the time of this judicial sale, nevertheless, it took all the interest which he had when the sale was made. I think he was still in the bankruptcy court; that he was still a party to the proceeding; that if he got any better or different title from the time that he went into bankruptcy to the time that this judicial sale was made, that that title inured to the benefit of the purchaser; that such legal title as was then in him on the records of the register's office was sold and bought by these parties, if covered by the description, and no more; that they took what they bought by that description in their. deed and in their sale, and they take such title as Snyder had to it at the date of the decree, and that there is no place for chancery to interfere about it. These parties, the present defendants, are purchasers subject to all of these transactions. They are all purchasers subsequent to the decree setting aside his discharge; they are all subsequent to the decree of sale; they are subsequent to the sale and making and recording of the deed; they are all purchasers with notice of what was done in the bankruptcy court; and as that bound Snyder that bonnd them, and as it did not bind Snyder it did not bind them. There is no issue for chancery to interfere about it. I dismiss the bill.
and others v.
(Circuit Court, N. D. Texas.
EQUITy-LACHEs-TrrLE UNDER FRAUDULEN'l' THANSFER OF LAND CERTIFICATE -Tllus'r.
The delay on the part of complainants in as.erting their alleged claim to the lands in contlOvcrsy in this case held fatal to their prayer for relief.
J. It appears from the pleadings and proof in this case that Finess Roberson (whose name is spelled with some variations, rendered immaterial by the proof) on the first of March, lS3S, obtained from the proper authority in Texas a certificate for one league and one labor of land; that on the fifth day of March, 1838, he conveyed this certificate, by transfer written on the back thereof,
to Warner L. Underwood. A separate instrument made same day limited Warner L. Underwood's title to a part, and made him trustee for others as to the other part, not material to the issues in this case. Soon after this transaction Roberson removed to Arkansas, and Underwood returned to Kentucky, and the next appearance of the certificate is in 1852-53, in the office of the district surveyor of Grayson county, in which county it appears to have been located, and tho location forfeited by failure to return the field-notes of the Slll'vey to the land-office by thirty-first August, 1853. On the twelfth May, 1855, Finess Roberson, in Sevier county, Arkansas, conveyed by separate writing said certificate to Dennis Trammel, and on the twenty-third of June, 1855, Dennis Trammel conveyed the certificate to S. W. March for valuable and adequate consideration. At that time the transfer to Underwood, which had been written on the back of the certificate, was completely covered and hidden by a piece of brown paper, just the size of the certificate, pasted on the back of the certificate; and the proof abundantly shows that S. W. March had no actual knowledge or notice of the transfer to Underwood. On the eighth of August, 1855, a patent issued to said March as the assignee of said certificate for the land in controversy. March claimed the land, paid taxes upon it, and about 1872 commenced placing tenants upon it under written leases, embracing specified parts of it, and a. few years later built a dwelling-hollse upon it for his own residence, but died on the twenty-ninth day of J nly, 1878, before he had removed his residence to this land. Before the institution of tbis suit much of the lan"d was in cultivation, and more of it inclosed for pasture, many wells dug and tenant houses erected on the land, and extensive and valuable improvements made thereon, rendering the tract very valuable. The defendants hold March's title. The complainants hold Underwood's title. Underwood died in February, 1872. This suit was filed June 13, 1881. 'fhe defendants, besides other pleas, urge that "the complainants' demand, if any they have, is stale, and in a court of equity ought not to be heard." This the bill attempts to avoid by charging fraud on the part of March in procuring the Roberson certificate and concealing the transfer to Underwood, but this charge finds no support in the proof, and is fully met by the answer and the defendants' proof. It is also set out in the bill, in explanation of the delay, that shortly after the purchase of the Roberson certificate by Underwood "said Underwood went from 1'exas with his family to the state of Kentucky, intending soon to return to Texas, but that business, ill-hea,lth, and other causes delayed and prevented his return; * * · that by reason of his long and unanticipated absence, the disturbed conditions of the country, his ill-health, and the bad faith and frauds of persons who found access to his papers, tlJey were misplaced, lost, abstracted, and destroyed." · The proof shows that soon after the purchase of said certificate by
Underwood, said Underwood's father died in Kentucky leaving a large estate somewha;t involved in complications; that Underwood was a good lawyer and business man, and was engrossed with the business of said estate. It is probably within the judicial knowledge of the court that public affairs and public land matters were in an unsettled condition in Texas for nearly 10 years after 1838; and, again from the twenty-eighth of Jan.uary, 1861, to the thirtieth day of March, 1870, were so disturbed as to prevent the running of statutes of limitation. It is further shown by the proof that for several years, at least two or three years, before his death said Underwood's mental condition was such as disabled him from giving due care to his business affairs. The bill admits that in May, 1860, Underwood received information as to the condition of the certificate and the issuance of the patent, and the proof shows that his agent in Texas had ascertained the facts the previous winter. While the condition of the country was disturbed as above stated, yet from 1838 to the institution of this suit, a period of 43 years, the general land-office of the state and courts of the state were constantly open. Thousands of toiling honest citizens were in good faith acquiring titles to land, and redeeming them from their savage state, and expelling the savage occupiers. More than 25 years before the institution of this suit, March paid $1,000 in gold for this certificate, without any notice of the transfer to Underwood, and had the certificate located on good land, and followed up his location and procured the patent to himself on the chain of transfer submitted to the proper public officer, who decided that he was entitled to so receive it as assignee of Roberson. The proof in this case shows the transfer to Trammel to be genuine, and the transfer from Trammel to March is not questioned; and if Trammel was guilty of any fraud in connection with it, the proof not only does not implicate March in it, but strongly negatives such an implication. Now, when Boberson and Underwood and Trammel and March are all dead, and the transactions of 1838 faded from the memories of the few who may survive, more than 25 years since March acquired in good faith and for full value the legal title to the land, of which Underwood might have obtained knowledge then, and of which he did have actual knowledge more than 20 years befoxe the bringing of this suit, during all of which years Underwood and the complainants have been resting quietly, and letting March and the defendants put their money and labor and skill into this land, the complainants come and pray "that the patent to S. W. March be declared to have been issued to said W. March and held by him, and all the defendants herein holding under him or through him, in trust for . complainants." In my opinion the complainants have waited too long, and their prayer in a court of equity cannot be granted, and the bill should be dismissed at complainants' costs; and it will be so ordered.
DENOYER V. BYAN.
(Oireuit Oourt, D. Minnesota. June Term, 1885, \
After a full consideration of the evidence in this case, held, that complAinant has not proved himself to be the son and sole heir at law of the (leceased owner of the real estate in controversy. and that the bill must be dismissed.
Action to Settle Adverse Claim. S. L. Pierce, for complainant. R. B. Galusha and Young If Lightner, for defendant. NELSON, J. This action is brought under the statute of Minnesota, (Rev. St. c. 75, § 2,) bj' a citizen of the state of Nebraska against a citizen of the state of Minnesota, to settle an adverse claim to certain real estate in the county of Ramsey, in this district, described in the bill of complaint as follows:
"Lot numbered one (1) of section numbered five, (5.) in township numbered twenty-eight, (28,) of range numbered twenty-three, (23,) containing fifty-two and fifty-six one-hundredths acres (52 56-100) of land. also the west half (W. !) of the south-east quarter (S, Eo t) of section numbered thirty-two. of range numbered twenty(32,) in township numbered twenty-nine, three, (23,) containing eighty acreS; also the north-east quarter (N. E. t) of the south-west quarter (S. W.!) of section numbered thirty-t,wo, (32,) in township numbered twenty-nine, (29,) of range numbered twenty-three, (23.) containing forty acres; also lot num bered one. (1.) in section numbered thirtytwo, (32,) township numbered twenty-nine. (29,) of range numbered twentythree, (23,) containing twenty-nine and seventy hundredths acres, (2970-100;) also lot numbered two. (2,) in section thirty-two. (32,) in township numbered twenty-nine, (29,) of range numbered twenty-three, (23,) containing thirtyof one and 20-100th acres, (01 20-100;) also the south-west quarter (S. the'north-west quarter (N. W i) of section numbered thirty-two. (32.) in township numbered twenty-nine, (29,) of range numbered twenty-three, (23,) containing forty (40) acres; also the west half (W. t) of the south-east quarter (S. E. i) of the north-west quarter (N. W. t) of section numbered thirty-two. (32,) in township numbered twenty-nine. (29,) of range numbered twentythree, (23.) containing twenty acres; also the north half (N. t) of the southwest quarter (S. W. t) of section numbered one, (I,) in township numbered twenty-nine, (29,) of range numbered twenty-three, (23,) containing eighty acres; all of said real estate situate in Ramsey county and state of Minnesota; also the west sixty (60) feet of lot four, (4,) and the south third (1) of lot numbered three, (3,) in block numbered six. (6,) of Rondo's addition to the city of St. Paul, in said county of Ramsey; also a strip of land north of Pearl street, west of Joel Whitney's addition to the city of St. Paul, continued northerly to a point to intersect at Jackson street, and east of said Jackson street, in the city of St. Paul, in said county of Ramsey; also lots numbered twelve, (12,) thirteen. (13,) fourteen, (14,) and fifteen, (15,) Prince & Denoyer's rearrangement in the city of St. PaUl, in said county of Ramsey. All of which said real estate is of the value of seventy-five thousand dollars."
The complainant claims to be the owner in fee, and sole heir at law of Stephen Denoyer, who died intestate, December 3, 1877, possessed of the real estate in controversy, which was distributed by the probate court of the county among his brothers and sisters and