YICK WO V. CROWI.EY.
Now, this right to enter and locate 80 acres was a thing of value,something which enlarged the estate of the minors,-was property. It was personal property, going with them where they went; could be exercised and enjoyed anywhere; did not descend to tile heir; was not attached to any particular tract of land; was therefore neither per. manent, fixed, nor immovable. It was a mere right of selection and taking. Like all property, it was the subject of sale. The right to sell property need not in terms be granted; it exist.s if it is not in terms withheld. To preserve the Indian's title an express restriction is in. serted in the patent. The same or something equivalent is always necessary to stay the power of disposal which attends the ownership of property. When this right has been exercised, the location and entry made, who would doubt the right to sell the land? Yet why should the right to sell exist after entry and not before? Congress has placed no restriction,-who may? It must be borne in mind that this is not a case in which there is to be future consideration or future duty. It is personal, in that only they of a certain class can avail themselves of the gift. It is not personal in the sense that fu. ture services or future conditions are imposed. Services already reno dered during the war are the consideration. The homestead duty of occupation or improvement has already been performed. It amounts simply to this: In view of what has been done Congress makes this gift. It places no restrictions on the donee, but leaves him to use the gift as he sees fit. Why may he not sell it? . . I see no satisfactory reason to the contrary. Hence I answer th" two questions in the affirmative. Decree will be entered in favor 01 the complainant.
Wo v. CROWLEY.
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Oalifornia. January 20, 1886.)
INJUNCTIONS-REV. ST. § 72o-PnEVENTING BY STATE OFFICERS 'FOR VIOLATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CITY ORDINANCES.
The circuit court cannot issue an injunction to prevent a. police officer .of a. city from serving warrants of arrest Issued by a state court for violation of city ordinances claimed to be in contravention of the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution and the treaty with China.
in Equity. lIall McAllister, D. L. Smoot, and L. H. Van Schaicl', for com· plainant. Alfred Clarke, for respondent. SAWYER, J., In the bill the complainant alleges that Pat· rick CrOWley, respondent, is chief of police of the city and county of San Francisco, and that he has certain warrants, by virtue of which he is about to arrest complainant, a. citizen of China, and a large
number of. other Chinese subjects, upon the charge of violating certain ordinances adopted by the board of supervisors of said city and county, which he alleges to have been passed in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the national constitution, and of the stipulations of the treaty between the United States and the empire of China. Complainant sues on behalf of himself, and 150 others, and prays "that the said Patrick Crowley, chief of police, as aforesaid, may be. enjoined and restrained from enforcing, by arrest or otherwise, the aforesaid ordinances, to-wit, section 10f order 1559, section 1 of order 1569, and sections 67 and 68 of order 1587." . Section 720 of the Revised Statutes is as follows: "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state, except in cases where suell injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." This urovision was carried into the Revised Statutes from the statute of March 2, 1793, expressly prohibiting any interference on the part of a national court with proceedings in the courts of a state. That statute has been construed a great many times by the supreme court. As early as 1807 the case of Diggs v. Wolcott, 4: Cranch, 179, arose, in which an action was brought in a state court upon a certain instrument in writing. The defendants afterwards brought suit in chancery in the state court to cancel the instrument and enjoin the proceedings in the ca'se. The chancery suit was removed to the United States circuit court, where a decree was entered enjoining the proceedings in the state court. On the appeal the court says: "The case was argued upon its merits by C. Lee and Swann, for the appellants, and by P. B. Key, for the appellee; but the court, being of opinion that a circuit court of the United States had no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a state court, reversed the decree." That decision has since been followed in a great many cages, arising under a great variety of circumstances; as in U. S. v. Collins, 4: Blatch£. 156; Pisk v. Union Pac. R. Co., 6 BIatch£. 399; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 195; Ortonv.Smith, 18 How. 265,266; Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. 298; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; Peck v. Jenness, 7How. 625; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 257; and many others in the circuit and supreme courts. There are other cases, however, not necessary to notice here, limiting the provision and rule to proceedings first commenced in the state court; and where a United States court has first obtained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, holding that it is entitled to proceed to the conclusion and execution of its judgment, unaffected by any subsequent proceedings in a state court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and that, to enable it to give effect to its proceedings in such cases, it may even enjoin adverse proceedings in a state court. In the bill this court is asked to restrain the execution of process issued by a state court, and placed in the hands of the chief of
YICE: WO fl. CROWLEY.
whose duty it is to execute that process. The service of process is a But in Riggs v. Johnson Co., supra, the court says: "State courts are exempt from all interference by the federal tribnnals, but they are destitute of all power to restrain either the process or proceedings in the national courts. Circuit courts and state courts act separately and independently of each other, and, in their respective spheres of action, the process issued by the one is as far out of the reach of the other as if the line of division between them was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." In the case of U. S. v. Collins, supra, it is held that no process of a state court, preliminary to the final determination of the case, can be stayed by injunction issued out of a United States court. The court says: "The fifth section of the act of March 2, 1793, prohibits the courts of the United States from granting an injunction to stay proceedings in any court of a state. This term ·proceedings' may properly, and I think must neces· sarily, include all steps taken by the court, or by its officers under its process, from the institution,of the suit, until the close of the final process of execution which may issue therein." The supreme court has likewise held that a national court not only cannot directly restrain a state court, but cannot restrain its proceedings even by an inj unction issued against the parties to a suit in the state court. In Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 625, the court says: _ "The fact, therefore, that an injunction issues only to the parties before the court, and not to the court, is no evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another and independent forum. The act of congrel:ls of the second of March, 1793, declares that a writ of injunction shall not be granted · to stay proceedings in any court of a state.' In the case of Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Oranch, 179, the decree of the circuit court had enjoined the defendant from proceeding in a suit pending in a state court, and this court reversed the decree because it has no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a state court."
proceeding in the court.
As recently as the case of Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 257, the same doctrine was announced in the following language: "In the first place, the great Qbject of the suit is to enjoin and stop litigation in the state courts, and to bring all the litigated quelltions before the circuit court. This is one of the things which the federal courts are expressly prohibited from doing. By the act of March 2, 1793, it was declared that a writ of injunction shall not be granted to stay proceedings in a state court. 'l'his prohibition is repeated in section 720 of the Revised Statutes, and extends to all cases except where otherwise provided by the bankrupt law. This objection alone is sufficient ground for sustaining the demurrer to the bill." In that case it was attempted to restrain the state court through an injunction against the parties, and the supreme court holds that this cannot be done. The same doctrine was repeated in Dial v. Reg.
nold, 96 U. S. 340.
The proceedings which are here sought to be restrained are proceedings in a state court, in which warrants have been issued against the complainant and many others, and placed in the hands of the executive officer of the court for service. It is sought to enjoin the service of process, which would be to stay the proceedings, and prevent the court from acting in the case. This is clearly within the prohibition of the statute, as repeatedly construed by the courts; and this court has no authority to restrain those proceedings. Within the last 15 years a great many applications, under a great variety of circumstances, have been made to this court for preliminary injunctions to restrain proceedings in the state courts in civil causes, and they have invariably been denied. This court has no authority to restrain proceedingsjirst commenced in a state court, nor has a state court authority to restrain proceedings in this court. The court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in this bill. Let the order to show cause be discharged, and the application for an injunction denied. The demurrer to the bill is also su.stained for want of authority to grant the relief sought, and the bill dismil:lsed.
and another v. REES and others.
(Oitrcuit Court, E. D. Tenne88ee, S. D. January 4, 1886.)
No fraud, deceit, or mutual mistake justifying a rescission of the sought to be avoided being shown. the bill is dismissed.
OP STOCK-RESCISSION OF CONTRACT--FRAUD-MISTAKE-EvIDENClll.
In Equity. R. L. Bright and De Witt rl Shepherd, for complainants. Key, Richmond &; Clark and Wheeler &; Marshall, for respondents. KEY, J. The bill in this case was filed by complainants in the chancery court of the state of 'I'ennessee, in February, 1883. The cause was removed by respondents into this court. The bill alleges that respondent Rees, and his agent, respondent Wilder, sold them onehalf the stock in the Roane Mountain Steel & Iron Company, a corporation created by the state of North Carolina, for the price of $71,500. This company had stock to the amount of $143,000. Complainants aver that, in making the trade, they relied upon the representations of Rees and Wilder as to the quantity of land belonging to the company, its character, cost, and value, the nature and quality of the title by which it was held, and all the general facts and ingredients which entered into their consideration in estimating the value of the stock. Complainants say that since the contract was executed they have discovered that they have been imposed upon, and that respondents' representations were false, or exaggerated to such an ex-