would sustain such a patent. The opinion further states, and I ought to have added, that an old result may be sufficient, when it is produced by the combination in a cheaper or otherwise more advantageous manner. I think the complainant's mechanism does this, and hence a reargument on the queBtion of novelty would subserve no useful purpose. application is therefore denied.
Ross v. HELLYER and another. 1
(Oircuit Court, 8. D. I01JJa, O.
HOMESTEAD-ABANDONMEKT-REMOVING INTO AND VOTING IN ANOTHER COUNTY.
Removal of the owner of a homestead to another county, and repeatedly voting at elections held in such county, is sufficient evidence to establish an abandonment of the homestead.
In Equity. This is a suit in equity to subject the homestead of the defendants, at Des Moines, Iowa, to the payment of a judgment recovered by the assignor of the complainant in this court, May 22,1879, for $4,438.93. The homestead in question was purchased and paid for partly with the proceeds of a former homestead .owned by the defendant Hellyer, at Nevada, Story county, Iowa, when the debt on which the judgment was recovered was contracted. It is claimed by the complainant-First, that, notwithstanding Hellyer continued to be the owner of the Nevada homestead at that time, it was for the time being abandoned as such, as against this complainant, who, during the abandonment, became his surety in an indemnifying bond. P. F. Bartle and S. F. Balliet, for complainant. Gatch, Connor <i Weaver, for defendants. LOVE, J. The evidence in this case is convincing to my mind that Robert Hellyer, the defendant, changed his residence from Nevada to Boone without any definite intention of returning to the former place. That he made an actual change of abode from the one place to the other there is no doubt. With what intent or purpose did hemake the change? Was it his purpose in going to Boone to make that place his domicile?' If it was not, then why did he commit the offense of voting at elections in Boone? The reasoning of counsel for the defendant on this fact is, to my mind, entirely unsatisfactory. Counsel say: "First· .As to the conceded fact of Hellyer haVing voted while liVing at Boone, it signified one of three thtngs: either that he was a citizen by actual change of domicile, and therefore had the right to vote, or that he errOlliOl.
Reported by Robertson Howard, Esq., of the St. Paul bar.
Qusly snpposed he had the right to vote without such change, or that he knew his voting to be illegal and criminal. Either the second or third having been the fact would be consistent with the defendants' present claim. Hellyer's own testimony is that, while he did not remember having voted, he did so, if at all, because he supposed actual residence alone gave him the right to vote." Again, it is said that he may have erroneously supposed he had a right to vote without a change of residence. The court cannot accept this argument as sound. It is manifestly untenable. Ignorance of the law in any man of ordinary intelligence cannot be presumed or assumed. Any man in Iowa must be densely ignorant hot to know that he cannot reside in one county and vote in another without committing a public offense. .To say nothing of the legal presumption that every man knows the law, it is a matter of common knowledge with our people that the right of suffrage must be exercised in the county in which the citizen has his residence. If Hellyer went to Boone with no intent to make it his residence, but for some mere temporary purpose, regarding Story county at the same time as his place of residence, it seems to me most unreasonable that he could have been ignorant of the fact that in voting in Boone county he was committing a grave public offense. But counsel say: "Why may we not, if necessary, assume that HellYE'T knowingly violated the law in voting at Boone, rather than that both himself and wife falsely testified that their residence there was only temporary?" As to Hellyer, if we assume that he knowingly committed a crime against the law in voting at Boone, we discredit him as a witness. If he knowingly committed one crime, what warrant have we to say that he would scruple to commit another crime, when his interest would be promoted by the second offense? It would argue almost total oblivion, in the court, of the lessons of common experience, to attach any great importance to the testimony of witnesses given in their own pecuniary interest, in the very teeth of facts and circumstances wholly inconsistent with their testimony. I greatly prefer the evidence of facts to the testimony of parties to the record as to their own intentions, when such testimony is given to put money in their own pockets. Now, if we conclude that it was Hellyer's intention to become a citizen of Boone by actual change of domicile, and therefore that he had a right to vote in Boone county, we ascribe to him conduct consistent with his duty as a citizen. But if we reach the opposite conclusion, namely, that he did not intend to fix his residence in Boone, but to continue it in Story county, and that he ·therefore had no right to vote in Boone connty, we then impute to him a crime of very serious character. Should the court impute to Hellyer a purpose implying guilt rather than innocence? Why should the presumption of a guilty intention prevail against that of an innocent and lawful purpose? Is it a just method of reasoning upon human conduct, to impute to a party unlawful and criminal in-
LEHIGH VALLEY COAL CO. V. CITY OF CHICAGO.
tentions, when a lawful and innocent purpose is more consistent with his conduct? The law presumes innocence. If Hellyer were on trial for illegal voting, would it not be deemed a harsh and erroneous judgment to reverse the legal presumption, and, in the words of counsel, "assume that Hellyer knowingly violated the law in voting at Boone?" In this case there was an actual changtl of residence for about three years from one county to another. In connection with this fact, we have the further fact conceded that the party voted repeatedly in the county to which the change was made. If this cannot be taken as sufficient evidence of an actual change of domicile, and of a pnrpose to make the last-named county the residence of the party, it is difficult to see what evidence would be sufficient to warrant that conclusion.
LEHIGH VALLEY COAL Co.
CITY OF CmOAGO.
«(]ircuit Oourt, N.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-STREET IMPROVEMENTS-LIABILITY OF CITY FOR DAMAGES.
In Illinois where the construction of a public improvement has caused some direct physical disturbance of a right WhICh a party enjoys in connection with his property, which gives it an additional value, and by reason of such disturbance he has sustained a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally, he has a right of action to recover damages for the injury sustained dependent upon the nature and character of the improvement, and upon the question whether the property of the complaining party has been materially damaged in fact. In determining what has been the effect of the improvement, the property alleged to be injured must be considered as an entirety. If a part be benefited or not injured, and a part be injured, damages cannot be awarded for injury to the part as disconnected from the remainder.
SAME-WHAT CONSIDERED BY JURY.
SAME-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
In such a case the amount of damages to which the owner is entitled is the difference between the market value of the property before the improvement was made and its market value after the construction of the improvement.
The value of opinions given by experts depends upon the experience and knowl"dge which they have and evince concerning the matters about which they testify.
SAME-VIEW BY JURY.
In arriving at a verdict the jury have the right to use and act upon the knowledge they may have acquired from a view permitted by the court of the locus in quo.
It'rederick Ullman, for plaintiff. E. J. Harkness, for the City. DYER, J., (chargi1lgjury.) The merits of this case, gentlemen, lie
within rather narrow compass; but, to enable you to arrive at a correct conclusion, the testimony adduced in support of the respective