sian of either of these precautions was at her own risk, and makes her answerable for the subsequent damages. The Eloina, 10 Ben. 458, 459; l'he Northampton, 1 Spink, Adm. 152. 2. No fault is proved on the part of the Svalen. When both were drifting together, it was plainly the duty of the Svalen, having reference to the vessels astern, to drop her starboard anchor as she did. Afterwards, when the ship got across her bows, and was trying to get clear by her sails, it was urged that the Svalen should have let go all her spare chain in order to ease the pressure. The evidence seems to show that she had still some chain not paid out; but the tide was acting very much more strongly upon the ship, which lay across the bark, than on tho Svalen herself. The suggestion that easing up on her cable would have enabled the ship to get clear is mere speculation and hyputhesis, and, in my judgment, improbable; and hence not a sufficient ground for holding her in fault. There is no probability that it would have done any good; certainly not, without letting it all go suddenly, and that would be a dangerous expedient, and an experiment only, which the Svalen was under no obligation to adopt for the Fraser's benefit, not being herself in fault. The other points urged against the Svalen seem to me without weight. The day was calm and fine. The officers of the Fraser probably thought they could avoid any damage without the trouble of letting go the starboard anchor, and would get clear by tripping the port anchor and going astern. Afterwards they were no doubt reluctant to slip their port cable, preferring to rely upon their chances of getting clear by means of their sails; but the wind was so light, and the pressure of the tide so strong, that this was impossible. The Svalen was not bound to slip her own cables, not being in fault. It was at the ship's risk that she delayed in taking efficient measures to check her drifting by dropping her starboard anchor in time. The damages must, therefore, be charged upon her. Decree for the libelants, with costs.
(DiBtrict OQurt, S. D. New York. February 22, 1886.)
CHARTER-PARTY - MEMORANDUM -CONSTRUCTION TENDED TO LoAD." .
SPECIFIED VOYAGES -
Respondents contracted by charter to ship, during the season, a specified number of cattle by each of the steamers of the Beaver Line. Accompanying the contract WillS a memorandum of the intended sailings. stating the vessels, the expected date of each voyage, and the number of cattle to bo shipped on each, in which memorandum these words also appeared: "This contract to
lReporteJl by Edward G. Benedict. Esq., of the Now· York bar.
CANADA SHIPPING 00. 11. ACER.
Include all steamers of the Beaver Line intended to load at New York thii.a season." The respondent shipped the full number of cattle upon each of the voyages specified in the memorandum. Shortly before the end of th& season, without the consent of respondents. another voyage was added by the agents of the line. who notified respondents that they would be expected to load this vessel also under the contract, which respondents refused to do. On suit brought against them for breach of contract, held, that the words "all steamers intended to load" meant "intended at the time when the contract was made;" that the extra. voyage was not then contemplated; and that the contract could not subsequentl; be enlarged beyond the scope of the memorandum. without the consent 0 respondents.
In Admiralty. UUo, Ruebsamen If Hubbe, for libelants. Wm. B. H. Dowse, for respondents. BROWN, J. The libelants are the owners of the line of steam-ships known as the "Beaver Line," running in summer between Montreal and Liverpool, and during the winter months between Liverpool and New York. On the tenth of February, 1888, Seager Bros., agents of the line in New York, made a contract with the respondents, com· posing the firm of C. M. Acer & Co., by means of a letter and an answer, the material parts of which are as follows: The libelants offered "to freight from the port of New York to the port of Liverpool, by steamers of Beaver Line intended to be dispatched about as per memorandum attached, [blank] head of cattle, at the rate of £4 sterling per head." Attached to this offer was the following memorandum:
"MEMO. OF INTENDED SAILINGS OF BEAVER LINE. Cattle. Lake Winnipeg, about third March, - 239 head. Lake Manitoba, about thirteenth March, 239 " Lake Champlain, about twenty-first March, 136 " Lake Huron, about third April, 136 " Lake Nepigon, about fourteenth April, - 136 " Lake Winnipeg, about twenty-fourth April, 239 " "This contract to include all steamers of Beaver Line intended to load at New York this season. LSd.] "SEAGER BROS., Agents. "We accept the above offer, and hereby agree and bind ourselves to ship the specitied number of animals, on the terms and conditions there stated. [Sd.] "C. M. ACER & Co."
When this contract was made, the respondents, referring to the memora,ndum .of the steamers and number of animals, inquired of Seager Bros., "Is that all?" to which the answer was given, "It is,'l The respondents thereafter furnished the cattle for all of the steamers named in the above memorandum to the full number specified, and paid for them according to the contract. After four or five of said steamers had been loaded and dispatched, and some time prior to the sixteenth of April, 1883, another voyage of the steam-Ship Mll.nitoba was added by Seager Bros. to the above list, without the assent of the respondents, and the latter were notified by Seager Bros. that
Manitoba would sail on the twenty-third of April, and that the respondents would be expected to load her under the contract. This would be on the day previous to the last specified voyage of the Winnipeg. The respondents immediately notified Seager Bros. that they should not load the ]'4:anitoba for the twenty-third of April, claiming that it was not within the contract, and they did not load her. This libel was filed to recover damages for this refusal. The case turns upon the construction of the written contract, and the right of the libelants to add another voyage to the trips specified in the memorandum. The memorandum, being referred to in the contract, is as much a part of it as though it were inserted in the body of the contract itself. The libelants rest upon the final clause of the memorandum: "1'his contract to include all steamers of Beaver Line intended to load at New York this season." They claim that the effect of this is to bind the respondents to load all such steamers as the libelants might choose to dispatch to Liverpool during the season. If that is the effect of the contract, the respondents are liable. But, upon the other facts above stated, I um of the opinion that this is not the legal meaning or effect of the contract. Even the literal meaning of the clause just quoted fails to sustain the libelants' con· tention. At most, it includes only the steamers of the Beaver Line intended to load at New York. The word "intended" must mean "intended at the time the contract was delivered." It cannot reasonably be supposed that the intention of the part.ies was that the contract could be materially enlarged or restricted by the indefinite future changes of intention by one party, without the other's assent, at any time up to the close of the season. The list furnished is expressed to be a "memorandum of intended sailings;" and it specifcs the vessels, the dates, and the head of cattle required on each voyage; and that memorandum, with the statement that "this is all," fixes positively just what was intended at that time. It was incompetent, therefore, for the libelants to insert, some two months afterwards, an additional voyage, and thus enlarge the obligations of the contract without the respondents' assent. That voyage was clearly not among those intended when the contract was signed. Again, the agreement signed by the respondents is expressly to ship a "specified number of animals." The number of animals was exactly specified in the memorandum attached to the contract, and the respondents have exactly fulfilled it. To add another vessel to the list is a material enlargement of the specific number, and, as it seems to me, altogether beyond the intent of the writing to give the contract definiteness and precision. Had the clause relied on by the libelants been a,ctually designed to give them the right to add to the list of voyages, and to increase the number of cattle required to be fllrnished, the language of the clause would naturally have been quite different from what it is, and would have stated more clearly such an intention. The clause as it stands,
conpled with the verbal statement and the list of voyages, is in effect a representation that the contract as made, and the list attached, do include "all the steamers intended to load" during the season. The .statement was correot. The Manitoba was one of the steamers intended to be loaded. She had made one voyage on Maroh 13th, for whioh the respondents had furnished the stipulated head of oattle. The olause referred to, so far as respects the Manitoba, was fulfilled literally. The libelants undertook to make with that steamer an additional voyage not included in the li13t, and thereby to extend the numbel' of animals to be shipped beyond that specified, although the steamer had already made the voyage specified, and had been BUpplied with the number of animals agreed on. This, in my judgment, was outside of the contract, as well as contrary to the intention of the parties; and the libel must therefore be dismissed, with costs.
(District (Jourt, D. Oregon. March 25. 1886.)
PILOTAGE ON COLUMBIA RIVER-RIGHT OF MASTER TO CHOOSE PILOT.
The Columbia river is the boundary between two states. (Oregon and Washington,) within the purpose and spirit of section 4236 of the Revised Statutes, and therefore the state of Oregon cannot require a vessel bound in or out of said river to take an Oregon pilot, or pay him half or any pilotage, if the master thereof prefers to and does take a Washington pilot.
In Admiralty. Raleigh Stott, for libelant. Henry Ach, for respondent. DEADY, J. This suit was oommenced on Decemher 26,1885, to re(lover the sum of $176 for half pilotage. It was heard on February 15th, on an exception to the answer, and the deoision has since been delayed to suit the oonvenienoe of oounsel. It is alleged in the libel that the libelant, J. E. Campbell, is, and sinoe prior to October 19, 1885, has been, a duly-licensed pilot, under the law of Oregon and the United States, for the Columbia river bar, attached to the pilot-boat Gov,ernor Moody; and that on or about said October 19th he piloted the British bark Aberoorn from the sea over the bar to Astoria; that .afterwards, and before the oommencement of this suit, said vessel was lying at Astoria, drawing 20 feet of water, and bound out to sea, when the libelant offered his services to the master to pilot her over the bar, which offer was refused, and said vessel is going to sea with a pilot other than one belonging to said boat, wherefore the libelant is entitled to reoover the value of the servioes so tendered and refused, namely, the sum of $176. The answer of James Laidlaw, the agent