tainly, upon distinct subjects-matter; and the act, I take it, could and would be held valid, under the authorities cited, as to the territories, even though void as to the states and their citizens. They are easily segregated; then why cannot the Chinese residents as one subject-matter be separated from citizens as another, upon similar principles? The language of the court in U. S. v. Hnrris on this point should, doubtless, be considered with reference to the special facts of the case then in judgment. But still, it must be confessed that it is very broad, and the rule laid down may be intended to cover any <lase that can be brought within the terms of the statute. If so, of course the ruling is authoritative and controlling in this court; but like congress, in the language of section 5519, may not the court also have, inadvertently, used language broader than the exigencies of the case before it required? It is proper to observe that in the case of Reese there was a defect in the statute, and also in the indictment, in the omission of one constitutional element or ingredient necessary to constitute the offense. Under the fifteenth amendment, then in question, it was necessary that the discrimmation should be "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." This essential element was omitted in the act, and in the indictment, and the court could not perfect the statute or indictment by inserting it. It was with special reference to this omission that the court made the observations in respect to separating the constitutional from the unconstitutional part of a provision so manifestly indefinite, afterwards repeated in U. 8. v. Harris with reference to the thirteenth amendment. To the provisions and facts then under discussion the observations seem to me to be more appropriate than to the sections of the statutes, constitutional provisions, and the facts, as now presented. It must be remembered that section 5519 has thus far only been considered by the supreme court with reference to the authority conferred upon congress by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments relating to specific subjects-matter. It has never yet been considered with reference to the p::>wers conferred by the more general and comprehensive clauses cited iu this opinion from the constitution as originally adopted. The difference between the cases is very obvious, and the result arising upon the different conditions may, and it seems to me should, be entirely different. The only difficulty I have is in satisfactorily determining whether the rule indicated in U. S. v. Harris or that in Packet Co. v. Keokuk, relating to the segregation of the constitutional from the unconstitutional parts of the section, should be applied to the facts dis·dosed in the petition, writ, and return in this case. I can perceive no practical difficulty in applying the rule adopted in the latter case. If there is none, it should be applied. The specific question is one of vast consequence to the entire Chinese population of the United States, and of the utmost importance to the peace and good order of
IN BE BALDWIN.
society throughout the entire Pacific coast. It is of international consequence, involving the honor and good faith of the United States, and, possibly, the question of peace or war. If this section of the statute is valid as to Chinese subjects residing in the United States, and embraces the acts set out in the petition and return, then the acts of all the public meetings throughout the land looking to, and providing for, depriving Chinese subjects of the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions secured to them by our treaties with China, by means popula.rly known as "boycotting," or any other coercive means, no matter in what form, or through what channels applied, are criminal, and all those participating in them must be subject to the very severe penalties denounced by the statute. I can perceive no way of escaping this conclusion. The depriving of persons of any of the rights protected, by any means, either "di,·ectly or indirectly," is prohibited. Where one has a lawful right to do any given thing, it would seem that no body of other persons can, properly or lawfully, combine or conspire together to use coercive means, in any form, to prevent him from doing that thing. The two rights are inconsistent, and cannot properly co-exist. It can make no difference, in principle, whether the coercion is applied by direct force, or by combined and concerted action, to prevent him from exercising his right, by depriving him of the means of procuring a livelihood, and thereby inducing starvation, or even less serious consequences. If the statute in this pa.rticular is not valid, then there are no means now provided by congress of protecting Chinese subjects in the enjoyment of the rights secured to them by the treaties, through the criminal laws of the country, unless the acts are within the provisions of section 5508 or 5336, Rev. St.; and if there is no statute covering the case, then the government has not yet fulfilled its treaty obligations under article 3 of the treaty of 1880. I shall not stop tc discuss section 5508, and only remark that section 5336 provides that "if two or more persons, in any state or territory, conspire to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof; or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of tlle United States,· or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States, contrary to the authority thereof,each of them shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars, and not more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a period of not less than six months, nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." A "treaty," says the constitution, is a part of "the supreme law of the land." It has been insisted that the acts set forth in the petition constitute a conspiracy by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of the treaty stipulations, or obstruct their operation, which, v.27F.no.2-13
it is said, is equivalent to obstructing its execution, and therefore of obstructing the execution of a law of the United States." If this be so, then the acts charged constitute an offense against the United States under this section as well as under section 5519. I am officially informed that 13 persons have just been indicted under this section in one of the districts of this circuit. But it seems to me that the acts are not so manifestly within the provisions of this section and section 5508 as within section 5519. The specific questions now presented are questions of too vast consequence to be finally determined by a subordinate court. The peace and good order of the Pacific coast, and the honor and good faith of the nation, are involved, and require that the question should be at once presented to and promptly decided by the supreme court of the United States. The supreme court, in U. S. v. Harris, supra, says: "Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government requires the courts of the United States to give effect to the presumption that congress will pass no act not within its constitutional powers. This presumption should prevail unless lack of constitutional authority to demonstrated." Page 635. If pass the act in question is there be any doubt, then, as to the constitutional authority of congress to pass section 5519, in its present comprehensive form, so far as it embra'3es the specific facts disclosed in this case, which have not yet been considered by the supreme court, or as to the applicability of the observations of the supreme c6urt, in relation to separating the constitutional from the unconstitutional parts of the act, to the specific facts now presented,-the only point upon which I entertain any doubt,-the doubt should be resolved, especially in this court, in favor of the validity of the statute in this particular, and the question be referred at once to the supreme court to be authoritatively determined. As there is doubt in my mind upon the point suggested, under the authorities as they now stand, I shall, for the present, and for the purposes of this caRe, rule against the petitioner, remand him to the custody of the marshal, and dismiss the writ. I do not desire, however, to be considered as finally determining the question in such sense that it will not be open for reconsideration, should the question be again presented in other cases before an authoritative decision can be had in the supreme court. My associate, though with doubt and hesitation, dissents from the rulings made, and a certificate of opposition of opinion will be made if either party desires it, and a writ of error to the supreme court allowed. In view of the circumstances, and of the doubts entertained, should a writ of error be taken the prisoner will be allowed to go at large on his own recognizance until the decision on appeal; and in case the writ is presHed to an early hearing, it is suggested that the government do not prosecute other similar cases arising under the
JEFFRIES tI. LAURIE.
Revised ,Statutes, especially such as have already arisen, until an authoritative decision can be had. Let the writ be dismissed, and the prisoner remanded to the eustody of the marshal.
'D. LAURIE. 1
(Circuit Oourt, E. D. MU8ot1A'i. March 81, 1886.)
ATTORNEY AT LAW-CoNTEMPT-FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER TO PAY OVER M.ONJllY COLLECTED.
An attorne, who disobeys an order to pay over to his client money collected in a suit instItuted in this court, may be disbarred and committed to jail for contempt. s
At Law. For a report of the opinion of the court upon motion for an order to compel Mr. Laurie to pay over the money collected for Mr. Jeffries, administrator, see 23 Fed. Rep. 786. T. B. W. Crews, for plaintiff. Joseph S. Laurie, pro se. BREWER, J., (orally.) A briefstatement of the preliminary facts in this case is important. The firm of Crews & Laurie were employed to prosecute a claim on a life insurance policy, which they did in this court, and in the supreme court of the United States", with protracted litigation. Before any decision was finally reached by the supreme court, Mr. Laurie, as one of the firm, compromised the claim of the insurance company, and received the sum of nine thousand and odd dollars. No part of that was paid to the plaintiff, but all retained by himself. He retained half of it on the claim that there was a con· tingent fee of one-half belonging to the firm. He retained the other half on the ground that there were unsettled partnership transactions between himself and his partner, and that his partner, upon a settlement, would be really owing him, and ought to pay this money to the plaintiff, who was his relative. On the twenty-fourth day of April, 1884, two years ago nearly, the administrator filed a petition in this court for a rule on defendant to pay over the entire sum of $9,000." On the third of Maya rule was issued against the defendant to show cause why he should not pay over this money as prayed, with leave to plaintiff on the incoming of the answer to move in reBpect thereto in 10 days. June 2, 1884, leave was given to the defendant until the next day to answer. On
iReported by Benj. F. Rex, Esq., of the St. Louis bar. 'See note at end of case.