plaintiff again complained that he had received no statement of errors in the account, and on the 20th the plaintiff telegraphed defendants to send statements of any objections they have to the account. It appears from the evidence that communication by mail could be had between Augusta and New York in two days. See Wiggins v. Burkham, 10 Wall. 129. An account rendered, and not objected to within a reasonable time, is to be regarded as admitted by the party charged as prima facie correct. principle which lies at the foundation of evidence of this kind is that the silence of the party to whom the account is sent warrants the inference of an admission of its correctness. The inference is more or less strong, according to the circumstances of the case. It may be repelled by showing facts which are inconsistent with it; as that the party was absent from home suffering from illness, or expected shortly to see the other party, and intended and preferred to make his objections in person. Other circumstances of !It like character may be readily imagined. It will not do, however, for a commission merchant to say that his business prevents him from looking over an account contracted in the course of that business; nor is it the custom of merchants who intend to pay' an account to say: "We will look over it in a few days, and then give you our views on it." Unless objected to within a reasonable time, (and what constitutes such reasonable time is a question of law,) an account rendered becomes an account stated, and cannot be impeached, except for fraud or mistake. Oil 00. v. Van Etten, 107 U. S. 334; S. C. 1 Snp. Ct. Rep. 178; 1 Story, Eq. § 526; Lockwood v. Thome, 11 N. Y.173; S. C. 18 N. Y. 288-290; Stenton v· ·Jerome, 54 N. Y. 484. The supreme court of the United States, on this general subject, have held that the failure of a party receiving a letter to reply within a reasonable time after he received it was to raise a presumption that he approved of what had heen done, so far as the letter informed bim; and, in the absence of anything to rebut that presumption, he was to he regarded as having consented thereto. Feild v. Farrington, 10 Wall. 141. The supreme court of Georgia have adopted this ruling, (McLendon v. Wilson, 52 Ga. 48,) and reaffirmed it, (Bray v. Gunn, 53 Ga. 148.) A stated account, however, is not conclusive; but when it is ad. mitted in evidence the burden of showing its incorrectness is thrown on the other party. He may prove fraud, omission, and mistake, and in tbese respects he is in nowise concluded by the admissions implied from his silence after it was rendered. Wiggins v. Burkham, 10 Wall. 132; Perkins v. Hart, 11 Wheat. 256. It follows, therefore, that the auditor was justified in giving to the account stated the weight of evidence prima facie. He was also justified in correcting an error. Bray v. Gunn, 53 Ga. 144. I am of the opinion, there· fore, that the auditor bad the evidence before him to support his find. ing; nor do I think that his reductions of the plaintiff's demand im-
proper; nor tha.t the defendant can justly complain of the plaintiff'8 refusal to hold his cotton to warrant him in making sales for future delivery. The plaintiff furnished the money with which to buy the cotton, and while, ordinarily, factors are generally bound to obey all orders of their principal, yet when they have made large advances, or incurred expenses on account of consignments, the principal can· not, by any !,!ubsequent orders, control their right to sell at such a time as, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and in accordance with the usage of trade, they may deem best to secure indemnity to themselves, and to promote the interest of the consignor; they acting, of course, in good faith, and with reasonable skill. Feild v. Farrington, 10 Wall. HI. It is true that a factor or other agent who is guilty of fraud or gross negligence in the conduct of his principal's business, forfeits all claims to commissions or other compensation for his services, (For'. dyce v. Peper, 16 Fed. Rep. 516;) and, ordinarily, a factor who takes commissions from his principal, who employs him to sell, would violate his contract, should he also take commissions from the person to whom he sells, (Dos Passos, Brok. 224; Ba·ston v. Glijfo1'd, 18 Amer. Rep. 549; Raisin v. Glark, 20 Amer. Rep. 66; Lynch v. Fallon, 23 Amer. Rep. 458; Scribner v. Collar, 29 Amer. Rep. 541;) nor could an agent employed to sell be himself the purchaser, (Code Ga. § 2186.) Here, however, the plaintiff was not strictly a factor. It is very clear from the evidence that he was a general commission merchant; that his principal dealings were in dry goods; that he dealt largely with spinning mills and spinners, supplying them with cotton, which he frequently sold to them on time. He was neither a cotton factor, a cotton broker, nor a member of the cotton exchange in New York city; and it was clearly understood by the defendants that because of the peculiar facilities that the plaintiff had to dispose of the cotton to spinners, they would pay him a commission; and they not only understood that he was receiving commissions from the spinners, but they tacitly acquiesced. The double agency was therefore clearly understood by both parties. The plaintiff furnished the means, not only to pay for the cotton, but frequently to give time to the spinners who bought from him. This was legitimate. Rice v. Wood, 18 Amer. Rep. 459; 3 Cent. Law J. 316; Scribner v. Collar, 8 Cent. Law J. 205; Fritz v. Finnerty, 10 Cent. Law J. 487. In fact, all the cotton purchased was the property of the plaintiff, and the defendants' profits were to be made by the use of his money; and it is not to be supposed that he would sell the cotton for less than its market value. On the review of the whole case, I am satisfied that there is no error in the report of the auditor. It is therefore approved, and judgment directed for the amount of his finding.