tandance at a future day; and although the proviso of the statute under which these persons are privileged when in attendance upon the courts uses the word "arrest," yet, at the same time, it is very evident that the word as used in the proviso relates back to the use of the same word in the body of the section; so that I have no doubt the legislature of Illinois intended that the privilege should be only from being arrested and held to bail. The eVIdent purpose and meaning of the Illinois statute, when all considered together, is, as it seems to me, to privilege an attorney from actual arrest while in attendance upon the courts where he has professional duties to perform; as, if arrested at such time and imprisoned,or obliged to seek bail, the rights of his client may be jeopardized, anfi the business of the court interrupted or delayed; but it only privileges him from such service of process as involves imprisonment or holding to bail. I do not intend in deciding this motion to be understood as dissentting from the cases where it has been held that a person coming into the district as a witness is privileged from being served by summons, nor the cases where a party has been induced by some false or fraudulent pretense to come within the territorial jurisdiction of a court, and then served with summons, as these cases, it seems to me, rest upon a different principle. I only intend to decide that, as I construe the Illinois statute, a resident attorney may be served with summons while in attendance upon the courts here, and that an attorney from another district or state has no greater privilege. The federal statute allows a civil suit to be brought against a person in the district whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he may be found at the time of serving process; and as the return in this case sbows that this defendant was found in this district, and served with process of summons therein, I think the plea or suggestion of privilege is not well taken.
& T. C. Ry. Co. and others.!
(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. Texas. March 15, 1886.)
1. BANKS AND BANKINO-DEPOSITS-COURT FUNDS-MONEYS
Where, by the orders appointing them, receivers were authorized and directed to carryon and operate railways, llnd the property thereof, and such carrying on and operating contemplated and required the handling, receiving, and paying out of moneys, the paYJlent and collection of bills, and the transaction of such financial business as would requit'e the medium anJ accommodation of banks, lteld, that in the transaction of this business, such moneys so deposited in such banks were not deposited as special funds, to be drawn out on or-
PAID INTO COURT.
lReported by Joseph P. Homor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar.
SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT CO. V. HOUSTON &: T. C. RY. CO.
der ofthe court, but were deposited generaHy, to the credit of the receivers, and to be handled and used'by the bank like deposits of its other patrons in a banking, loan, and deposit business. 1
SAME-CONTEMPT OF OFFICER OF COURT.
Hit be conceded that a bank, designated by the court as a bank of deposit. etc., of funds coming into the hands of receivers appointed by the court, by designation of the court, and by acceptance, become an officer of the court, and that the funds deposited therein were court funds, and that therefore the bank is liable for misconduct in misappropriating such funds, as in case of contempt. there is neither reason nor authority for considering that each servant or agent of the bank also become pro hac vice an officer of the court, and therefore amenable to the court, as in case of contempt, for misconduct in dealing with bank hnds. Inre Western Marine &; Fire l1U1. 00., 88 Ill. 289, distinguished.
On Rule for Contempt against William R. Baker and others. E. H. Farrar, for receivers. /. O. Hutcheson, and George Goldthwaite, for respondents.
PARDEE, J. The petition of the joint receivers in this case sets forth that the court in this case made an order naming and constituting certain banks in the city of Houston depositaries, and requiring petitioners to deposit ill said banks, for safe.keeping, the moneys which might come to their hands as receivers of the defendant cor· poration, the same to be kept solely for safe-keeping, and to be subject to the order of petitioners; that the City Bank of Honston, a banking corporation under the laws of Texas; was one of the banks con· stituted a depository aforesaid; that said bank accepted the trust, and received deposits from petitioners almost daily from said appointment up to and inclusive of the nineteenth of December, 1885; that William R. Baker is, and has been for months past, the president of said bank; that Benjamin F. Weems is, and has been for years, cashier of said bank, and a director thereof; that S. K. McIlhenny and Robert Brewster are, and have been for several years, directors of said bank; that while occupying said positions of trust in connection with said bank said Baker,Weems, Brewster, and McIlhenny did fraudulently combine and conspire together, and with other members of the board of directors, to obtain possession of all such deposits as might be made by the receivers, for their own use and for the use of .the bank and its creditors, and to oust the jurisdiction of this court, and to put the said receivers' funds beyond the control of the court; that the appointment of said Weems as receiver of said bank was procured by the respondents to be made by the judge of the Eleventh district court of the state of Texas; and that the said Weems, acting under color of such appointment, has taken possession of the greater part of the assets of said bauk, including the funds belonging to said receivers. They further aver, in support of these charges, in substance, that the said bank was, and had been for some months previous to its failure, in an involved and insolvent condition, to the
18ee note at end of case.
knowledge of its officers, particularly to the .knowledge of the respondents; and that thereupon, the said bank being the owner of large quantities of real estate, which formed the basis of its credit, the said respondents Baker and Weems, for said bank, executed, about the twentieth day of November, 1885, deeds of trust for the use of respondents Baker, Brewster, and McIlhenny, conveying nearly all the valuable feal estate of said bank to secure alleged debts to said respondents; that said deeds of trust were kept secret, and not recorded until the seventeenth and nineteenth days of December, just prior to filing petition in the state court for the appointment of a receiver; that at the time said deeds were executed said Baker and Weems well knew that "the said bank was absolutely insolvent; that said deeds were executed in anticipation of the declaration of such insolvency, and with a view to give a fraudulent preference to the officials of the said bank; and that they were kept concealed to deceive petitioners and other depositors; and that petitioners, as receivers of this court were deceived, and induced thereby to make large deposits in said bank; and that said receivers did make such large deposits; and that said bank and its officials received deposits from them after the contemplated closing, and did receive the sum of about $14,644.27 after the petition for the appointment of a receiver had been prepared and was held for filing. The receivers alleging demand and refusal of the respondents, pray for process to hold them in contempt of this court until they shall pay over to the receivers the sums so obtained as aforesaid. The respondents have united in a demurrer, raising the question as to whether they were officials of this court, or had disobeyed or resisted any lawful order of the court; and have separately answered to the same purport as the demurrer; and, further, denying notice of the bank's designation as a depository by the court; denying conspiracy or fraud; and averring, in substance, that while they knew of the involved condition of the bank they believed it solvent until the time of closing the doors; that the deeds of trust were made to secure valid indebtedness; and that in all things they acted as they believed for the best interest of the bank and its creditors; that the deposits by the receivers of the Houston & Central Railway were received in the regular course of business of the bank, and treated the same as deposits by other patrons of the bank; and they deny any intention to disobey or evade anS orders of this court; and they aver many other things not necessary to recapitulate, as tending to justify their conduct in managing the affairs of said bank. From the answers of the respondents, and the evidence produced on the hearing, the facts of the case appear to be, substantially, as follows: In the above-entitled suit, pending on the equity docket of this court, an order was entered on the twentieth day of February, 1885, appointing Benjamin G. Clarke and Char!es Dillingham joint re-
SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT CO. 'lJ. HOUSTON & T. C. RY. 00.
ceivers of all the property and effects of the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company, with power to manage, control, and exercise aU the franchises of the same, and to run, operate, and manage the railways of the said company; that thereafter the said receivers qualified and entered upon the discharge of their duties, and entered into full possession and control of the said property and effects, and since have operated and managed as such receivers the railways of said company; that in the operation and management of said railways it became and was necessary that said receivers should make use of banks and depositories on the line of the railway, and at Houston, where the general offices were located, to deposit, temporarily, the moneys received by them as revenues of said railways, and necessary for them to payout in the ordinary transaction of their business; and that accordingly said receivers, on March 5, 1885, petitioned the court for an order designating two banks or bankers in Houston as depositories of their funds, which petition was referred to the special master to investigate and report; and, accordingly, on the thirteenth of April, 1885, the special master reported that after an examination of the facts, and after consultation with the receivers, he advised that three banks in the city of Houston, to-wit, the City Bank of Houston, the First National Bank, and T. W. House, banker, be designated by the court as depositories of the moneys, funds, and securities of the receivers, which report was confirmed by order of court April 18, 1885 ; that prior to the said report and order the receivers, on the seventh of March, had opened an account with the City Bank of Houston, the cashier (respondent Weems) being then notified that the court had been applied to, to designate certain banks in which the receivers should keep accounts, from which time until the nineteenth of December the said receivers made various deposits of funds derived from the property in their hands, and drew checks against their deposits, which were paid; that the accounts opened by said City Bank of Houston were with Benjamin G. Clarke and Charles Dillingham, joint receivers of the Houston & Texas Central Railway, one account being a general account, relating to the general revenues derived from operating the railway, and another being a special account, relating to the proceeds of land sales collected by the receivers, under a consent decree in the case, made on the seventh of May, 1885, and another account for collections made by said bank for account of the receivers; that on the nineteenth of December the City Bank of Houston had on deposit, to the credit of said receivers, funds derived from general revenues of the railway, the sum of $27,742; funds derived from land sales, the sum of $4,466.72; and from collections, the sum of $6,392.94; making a total of $38,601.66; the sum of $1,234 of the amount of the general account was received by the said bank and its officers on the eighteenth day of December, from shipments made by the agents of the receivers through the express companies, and the