THE CITY OF OHEs'rER.
from a vessel at anchor to a vessel drifting rapidly athwart her course, should not, in my opinion, be imputed to her as a. fault. The libel must be dismissed, with costs.
THE CITY OF CHESTER.
(Dunce Oourt, 8. D. New York.
CoLLISTON-DAMAGES-REPAIRS IN EXCESS-SURVEY.
When repairs of a general character, beyond the injuries inflicted by a col· lision, Rre made at the same time, and without separation of the items of the work as the repairs progress, the bills of repairs presented are no criterion of the damages, and the items of repairs claimed will be closely scrutinized to prevent exaggeration. The estimate of competent surveyors made immedi/Ltelyafter the injury may be used in evidence. The commissioner in this case having, upon a careful investigation, allowed much less than the estimate of the surveyors, the report was confirmed; though the repairs, as made, adopted different methods from those recommended by the surveyors, by allowing the expense of strengthening pieces, and disallowing the surveyors' estimate of permanent depreciation.
In Admiralty. E. D. McCarthy, for libelant. Wilcox, Adams &; Macklin, for claimants. BROWN, J. Notwithstanding the skillful and ingenious argument of counsel in behalf of the exceptions in the above case, I am satisfied, upon a careful consideration of the testimony, that no injustice is done to the claimants by the commissioner's report. 'I'he court, so far as in its power, will take equal care to prevent the exaggeration of claims, and to afford full reparation for the actual injury. Where repairing is delayed,and the repairs finally made are more extensive than the injury calls for, the closest scrutiny in separating the charges made is obligatory. The repairs are not in any case the necessary and sole criterion of the damages. The actual damage properly proved may be recovered though the boat never be repaired; or the repairs may be partial only, and recovery may be had for the partial repair, with an allowance for permanent depreciation. One of the chief objections in this case is to the expense attendant on putting in strengthening timbers. This mode of repair was adopted instead of that recommended upon the survey made shortly after the accident. But the survey, which was made by competent experts, while providing for certain repairs, gave a further estimated allowance of $2,000 for permanent damage. This last sum alone is much in excess of all the damage allowed by the commissioner. He has allowed the expense of the strengthening pieces in the place of certain other recommendations in the survey, but disallows all claims of permanent de-
preciation, thus finding a sum far less than the amount 01 the survey. In the details of the expenses he has also cut off $200 from the la.bor account, by reason of its apparent large excess above the usual average relation to the material used. The nature of the repairs done, however, would, in this case, involve a larger proportion of labor than usual. Upon a careful review of the whole subject, I do not think the claimants have any just cause of complaint, and the report is therefore confirmed.
w: D. Tennessee.
March 23, 1886.)
ADMIRALTY PRACTICE-JURATORY CAUTION OR PAUPER'S OATH.
Poor persons may sue in the admiralty, without giving security for the costs, on complying with the practice of the 'court for giving the juratory caution, which practice is explained.
In Admiralty. Ga,ntt ct Patterson, for libelant.
HAMMOND, J. This is an application to sue for personal injuries upon taking the pauper's oath. So far as it is a libel in rem against the steam-boat, the pleading must be reformed, as there can be no joinder of actions in personam and in rem in cases like this. Admiralty Rule 16. Otherwise the proceeding seems to be correct, and conforms to the practice and forms prescribed by this court for allowing poor persons to sue in the admiralty without security for costs. Southworth v. Adams, 2 Flippin, 282, in notis; Bradford v. Bradford, 2 Flippin, 282. The clerk will file the libel and issue process on the libelant taking the required oath as was done in that case. So ordered.
HANCOCK 17. HOLBROOK:.
(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. LouUiiana. March 15,1886.)
1. In causes where the parties, plaintiff or defendant, consist of more than one, they must be collectively so situated as to authorize a removal. Sewing-mach. 00. v. Grover &; Baker Sewing-ma,ch. Co., 18 Wall. 553; Knapp v. Railroad 00.,20 Wall. 117. 2; SAME-LoCAL PUEJUDICE ACT OF 1867. Citizenship of different states is not enough, under the local prejudice act of 'l'he locality-the citizenship-of the party adverse to that of him seeking the removal should be in the state where the local prej udice is averred to exist.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-CITIZENSHIP-PARTIES.
On Motion to Remand. John D. Rouse and Wm. Grant, for plllintiff; Thomas J. Semmes and Robert Mott, for defendants.
BILLINGS, J. In the year 1876, plaintiff, describing himself as a citizen of the state of Louisiana, commenced this action in the state court. The cause was, apparently by consent, brought to the circuit court; has been tried and appealed to the supreme court of the United States, which held that the jurisdiction of the circuit court did not appear in the record, and directed the circuit court to remand the cause. This was done. Subsequently to the cause having been remanded to the state court, to-wit, on the eighth day of December, 1885, the plaintiff filed a petition for removal of the cause to the circuit court, verified by his affidavit and accompanied by his proper bond. The affidavit is to the effect that the phtintiff was, at the time of making the same, a citizen of New York, and that the four respondents (the suit having been discontinued as to the fifth defendant) were citizens of the state of Louisiana. The state court refused the transfer; but an authenticated copy of the record has been filed in this court. The issue has been presented by two of the defendants, namely, Mrs. George Nicholson (formerly Mrs. Eliza Jane Holbrook) and George Nicholson, that they were at the time this last petition for removal was filed in the state court citizens of the state of Mississippi. The application for removal was made under the act of 1867, called the "Local Prejudice Act." The affidavit of the plaintiff that he had become, and was at the time of filing his last petition for removal, a citizen of the state of New York is uncontradicted. Mr. and Mrs. Nicholson have offered the testimony and affidavits of numerous witnesses, and have abundantly established that they were, at the time of the filing of the plaintiff's last petition lor removal, citizens of Mississippi.
'Reported by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar.