There is no question of law involved. It was the libelants' duty to exercise reasonable vigilance to enforce payment. Had the vessel returned to Jersey City, and they known it, or under such circum. stances that they should have known it, and been pel'mitted to depart without payment, the lien would have, been lost. While she was abroad, of course, no amount of vigilance would have accomplished anything, except to ascertain her whereabouts. The libelants were not required to follow her then. The only time when she was within reach were the two occasions when she visited Philadelphia in 1883. The libelants were ignorant of these visits; otherwise they should have attached her there. The only question therefore is, should this ignorance be ascribed to carelessness,-want of proper vigilance? This is certainly a serious question,-one about which there is room for doubt. The libelants could have ascertained the fact, of course, either by keeping a constant watch upon the vessel's movements, or upon the entries at the port of Philadelphia. Did their duty, how· ever, require this? Is such a course, under similar conditions, customary? I think not. When all the circumstances are considered, I think the libelants must be held to a higher degree of vigilanee than is usually exercised or required, to visit them with the consequences of remissness, for failing to discover these visits. Certainly they were not bound to inquire into the proposed movements of the vessel when she left their dock, nor to hunt her up while treating with her supposed agents for payment. To do this would have been unusual, and to require -it would be unreasonable. They expected payment from the agents, and, as is customary and proper, first exhausted their efforts in that direction. As soon as they ascertained, or could well ascertain, that the lien must be resorted to, they sought for and found the vessel. When she next visited the country they attached her. I think no more was required. Although a good deal of time elapsed between the creation of the lien and the attachment, I am not satisfied that the libelants are blamable respecting it. While the holders of such liens should be held t,o a proper degree of vigilance as against innocent purchasers, unreasonable activity and haste should not be required. It must not be overlooked that the purchaser al· ways has it within his power to protect himself by his contract. I do not esteem it necessary to consider the question whether the respondents were guilty of negligence in the purchase; nor the question of Zetlosen's solvency. If the libelants failed to exercise proper vigilance, their lien was lost thereby, irrespective of these questions; otherwise it continues to exist. In the light of adjudicated cases, I believe, as before stated, it must be held that they did not so fail. The Prospect, 3 Blatchf. 526; The Walkyrien, 11 Blatchf. 241; The Europa, Brown & L. 89; The A tJantic, Crabbe, 440. A decree will be entered accordingly.
GLENN V. WALKER.
Trustee, etc., v.
(Oircuit Oourt. W. D. Virginia. March 22,1886.)
REMOVAL OF CAUSE-SUIT NOT ORlGTNALLY WITHIN JURISDICTION OF CmCUIT COURT-ACT OF 1875.
G., a citizen of Maryland, as trustee and assignee of a corporation chartered under the laws of Virginia, instituted suit against W. & S., citizens of Virginia, in a court of that state, and on motion of plaintiff the case was reo moved to the circuit court of the United States, whereupon defendants moved to remand. Held, that the suit was removable, and that the motion should be overruled.
Motion to Remand to the corporation court of the city of'Lynch. burg. These suits were instituted in the corporation court for the city of Lynchburg against Walker & Scott, citizens of Lynchburg, Virginia, by Glenn, trustee, a citizen of Baltimore, Maryland, and assignee of the National Express & Transportation Company, a corporation chartered under the laws of the state of Virginia. On the motion of the non-resident plaintiff they were removed to the United States circuit court for the Western district of Virginia. L. M. Kean, for Walker & Scott, argued that Claflin v. Insurance Co., 110 U. S. 81, S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507, does not control these cases, because Claflin v. Insurance Co. might have been removed, as it was, under the law as it existed bMore third March, 1875; and that, therefore, the only legitimate effect of that decision was that a case removable on third March, 1875, was also removable after that act; that the constrnction given to the'former acts had been given under the rule to "read the whole act to gether, and give effect to every part of it;" and that the application of the same rule to the act of third March, 1875, led to the construction that the limitation of section 1 applied to section 2; that to read sections 1 and 2 separately would be to nullify the plain language of the act, and that, in so far as Claflin v. Insurance Co. was inconsistent with this view, it was on questions not necessary to the decision of the case before the court, and obiter dictum; t.hat the principle on which the cases had been decided before third March, 1875, was not to read sections separately, but to read the whole act together, and give effect to every pal·t of it. John Howard and Ed. S. Brown, coutra.
PAUL, J. It is unnecessary for the conrt to discuss at length, or to review in detail, the various propositions presented by counsel, and so ably argued during the consideration of this motion. The important questions raised here have all been settled by precedents that leave this court without embarrassment as to the decision it must render. The discussion here, as in the cases quoted in argument, v.27F.no.8-37