:make proper entry of the years for which the taxes are delinquent, upon the tax-book, a sale made therefor is invalid. If, however, the property owner does not avail himself of the in validity, but permits a deed to be executed, then the provisions of section 891 come in force, and the deed becomes evidence that the steps necessary to constitute a sale of the property for delinquent taxes have been performed; and, if the property owner allows five years from the execution of tho deed to elapse, he cannot afterwards be heard to question the validity of the sale on the ground of the failure to make entry upon the taxbook of the years for which the taxes were unpaid. The other ground of objection to the tax deed, to-wit, that it was executed by the treasurer to himself,-it thus appearing that he was the owner of the tax certificate,-would present a grave question if the litigation was between complainants and said Inman. In view of the fact, however, that the deed was recorded in 1869, and no excep- . tiOD was then taken thereto, and that the land has been sold to several parties, who purchased relying upon the validity of the deed, and that the present defendants bought the land in 1881, long after the lapse of the five-years limitation, it must be held that it is too late to question the right of the treasurer to buy the certificate of sale, and to eX6cutethe deed to himself. Decree for defendants.
NOTE. The statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of the llOlder ofa tax deed by merely recording the same. To avail himself of the benefits of the statute, his possession must be actual and adverse, and continued for the stiltutory period. Baldwin v. Merriam, (Neb,) 20 N. W. Rep. 250. The statute of limitations commences to mn against defense to tax dced from date of sale. Shawler v. Johnson, (Iowa,) 3 N. W. Rep. 604. See Clark v. 'fhompson, 37 Iowa,536. In Wisconsin it is held that the fact that the tax deed issued is void does not prevent the running of the statute in favor of the holder. Peck v. Comstock, 6 Fed. Rep. 22. See .Milledge v. Coleman, (Wis.) 2 N. W. Rep. 77; Edgerton v. Bird, 6 Wis. 527; Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 246; T.awrence v. Kenney, 32 Wis; 281; Wood v. Meyer, 36 Wis. 308; Mars)1 v. Supervisors, 42 Wis. 502; Philleo v. Hiles, ld. 527; Oconto' Co. v. Jerrard, 46 Wia. 324.
INS. CO. v. HANFORD and
«(Jircuit (Jourt, N. D. Illinoia. April 5, 1886.)
1. ,STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-SUIT ON PROMISSORY NOTE, WHEN BARRED.
Suit on promissory note is not barred, under Illinois statute, until 10 years from maturity of note. . . Where grantee of mortgagor assumes l?ayment of mortgage debt, and obtains from mortgagee extension of perlOd for payment, mortgagor is discb&r(8d from personalliabilUy to mortgagee.
HORTGAGE-MORTGAGOn'S PERSONAL LIABILITY, WHEN DISCHARGED.
, 'Edited b;y Rwtlell H. Curtia, Esq., of the Chical:o bar.
UNION MUT. LIFE INS. CO. '/1. HANFORD.
Swett, Gr08cup If Swett, for complainant. Fairchild et Blackman, for defendants.
BLODGET'f, J. This case now comes before the court upon an plication for a deficiency decree to be entered against the defendants, Philander C. Hanford, Orrin P. Chase, and Lucy Duncan Fake. The original bill was for the foreclosure of a mortgage given by the defendants Hanford and Chase to Jacob L. Schureman, bearing date September 9, 1870, upon certain property in the city of Chicago, to secure the payment of three notes: one for $5,000, due in one year from the date of said mortgage; one for $5,000, due in two years from that date,-each of said notes bearing interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum; and one note for $6,OUO, payable in three years from said date, and bearing interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum. Such steps were taken in the suit as that a decree of fore:' closure was entered May 10, 1879, finding the amount of the Illort· gage debt at that time to be $15,881.67, and directing the sale of the mortgaged premises by one of the masters of this conrt at public auction for the pnrpose of making the amount of said indebtedness. At the master's sale, made in pursuance of this decree, the mortgagEid premises brought the sum of $12,000, from which, after the paYlllent of costs and expenses, the sum of $11,716.12 was applied upon the mortgage debt, leaving a deficiency of $4,284.65, for which a defi. ciency decree was entered against the defendants Hanford and Chase, October 27, 1880; afterwards, upon the application of Hanford and Chase, and on the suggestion that the report of the receiver appointed in said case had not been filed, and that there were still funds irihi's hands to be applied on the mortgage indebtedness, that decree was set aside, with leave to the complainant to apply for a deficiency decree at a future day, whenever the receiver's account should be adjusted. This has bEien adjusted, and shows a balance in the hands of the receiver of $64.49, which should have been applied upon the deficiency shown by the master's report. which would have made the deficiency at that time $4-,220.16. The complainant now moves for a deficiency decree against these defendants, and the de.fendant Lucy D. Fake. The defendants Hanford and Chase resist this application, and insist that no deficiency decree can or should be entered against them for the following reasons: First, because the 'statute of limitations has barred the debt as a personal liability; secondly, because the complainant has so dealt with the mortgage indebtedness as to release the personal liability of said Hanford and Chase. . As to the statute of limitations, I do not see any good ground upon which this defense can be supported. The indebtedness was by promissory notes, which are not barred by the Illinois statute until 10 years from the time they mature, the last of which matured on September 9, 1874, !lond the bill in. this case ·was filed in 1878.