CORBIN V. GRAVES.
«(Ji.r/Juit Oourt, N. D. Iowa, E. D. April Term, 1886.)
PARTNERSHIP-SPECIAL PARTNER-ACTION AGAINST-Ac'rION TO ENFORCE CREE IN EQUITY.
A decree in a suit in equity, at the instance of a creditor of a firm, found that a special partner had received a sum, the property of the firm, which should have been applied to the payment of debts, and ordered such partner to pay the amount to the clerk of court in order that it might be applied to the payment of the claims that should be established against it. The partner having failed to make payment as required, held, that such decree could not be foundation for an action at law at the instance of the creditor to compel him to do so, as it did not entitle the creditor to demand judgment, either in his own right, or as trustee for the other creditors, for the entire sum; and the amount to which he was entitled was not fixed, nor could it be ascertained from the facts found in the decree. Held, further, that the action could not be maintained, even though the clerk of court be joined as co-plaintiff. as the decree did not make him a trustee or receiver. nor did it clothe him with anv power or right, or convey to him a title to the money as trustee, or otherwlse.
Law. Demurrer to petition. W. J. Knight, for plaintiff. Henderson, Hurd cf; Daniels, for defendant.
SHIRAS, J. From the allegations of the petition and amended peti. tion in this cause filed, it appears that Chester C. Corbin brought a suit in equity in the United States circuit court for the Northern district of Illinois, for the benefit of himself and other creditors, against William A.Boies, B. B. Fay, L. W. Conkey, and J. K. Graves, partners under the firm name of Boies, Fay & Conkey, and other defendants, for the purpose, among other things, of setting aside certain judgments and transfers of property, on the ground that the same were in fraud of the rights of creditors. On the twenty-sixth day of September, 1885, a decree was entered in said cause, which, 'inter alia, found that said Graves was a special partner in the firm of Boies, Fay & Conkey, having contributed $50.000 to the capital stock thereof; that through certain judgments confessed by said firm, alHl other means recited in the finding of the court, there had come into the hands of said Graves the sum of $100,7v6.71, proceeds of the property of the firm, and which equitably belonged to the creditors of said firm; that the complainant, Chester C: Corbin, owns two promissory notes executed by the firm; "and that the said limited partnership is indebted to him thereon in the sum of four thousand three hundred and fifty-nine 31-100 dollars. It is therefore ordered and adjudged and decreed that all the property and effects held by the said limited partnership, on the twentieth day of August, 1882, and subsequent thereto, and when the said judgments were confessed, were a special trust fund for the payment of the firm debts rateably among its oreditors. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the defendant Julius K. Graves pay to the clerk of this court, within 3(,
the defendant to complainant for any fixed sum, nor does it fina the data from which can be determined what sum is due complainant from said Graves. The decree finds that there is due to complainant from the firm of Boies, Fay & Conkey the sum of $4,359.31, but this does not establish the fact that J. K. Graves is liable for this sum, or any part thereof. The decree finds that he is a special partner, and has contributed $50,000 to the capital stock of the firm; and it does not appear that he is personally liable for the debts of the firm. The decree finds that said Graves has received of the property of the firm an amount equal to $100,796.71, which should be applied to the payment of the debts of the firm, and Graves is ordered to pay this sum to the clerk of the court, in order that it may be applied to the payment of the claims that may be established against it. Until the report of the master is made and confirmed, it cannot be known what amount of debts may be proven up under the reference, and, until this is known, it is impossible to ascertain the amount to which the complainant Corbin is entitled out of the amount adjudged to be in the hands of the defendant. It is absolutely certain that under the findings of the decree he cannot, in any event, be entitled to over $4,359.31, and interest. Upon the final hearing it may appear that he is entitled to but a fraction of this sum. It is manifest that the decree does not entitle him to demand judgment in his own right for the entire sum of $100,796.71, and it is equally plain that the amount to which complainant is entitled is not fixed by the decree as it now stands, nor can it be ascertained from the facts found in the decree. When, in the further progress of the case in the Illinois court, it is ascertained what amount of claims are entitled to share in the distribution of the fund, then the proportionate share coming to complainant can be ascertained and decreed; and this amount having been thus ascertained and adjudged against the defendant, and in favor of complainant, may be made t!le basis of an action at law. As the decree now 'stands, it is not sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain an action at law thereon for the recovery of the specific sum that may be due him; neither does it enable him to maintain an action at law in his own name for the entire sum ordered to be paid into court by said Graves. The decree does not require the defendant to pay the amount named to complainant, nor does it in any way appoint or recognize Corbin as a trustee for the other creditors. The order is that the defendant pay the sum to the clerk of the court. If this court should now enter a judgment at law in favor of Corbin for the entire sum claimed, this court would have no control over the disposition or distribution of the fund, and the conrt in Illinois would also be without control overAhe fund thus collected upon a judgment at law in Iowa, for the reason that this action is not brought under the authority of that court, nor in pursuance of any order made by it. So far as Corbin is concerned, the action is brought sua sponte,
and is based upon his own right to sue at law upon the decree; and,
as already said, the decree rendered does not adjudge any specific sum to be due to complainant, and hence this court cannot give judgment in favor of Corbin upon the decree as it now stands. By the amendment filed to the petition William H. Bradley, clerk of the United States circuit court rendering the decree, is made a coplaintiff; and it is urged that by the joinder of parties plaintiff thus brought about the action can be maintained. It is manifest, however, that Bradley has no joint or common interest with Corbin in the subject-matter of the action, and the joinder of the clerk of the court not avoid the difficulty that the decree does not adjudge any specific sum to be due to Corbin. The amendment also avers that this action is brought for the benefit of said Corbin, and of all other creditors of the limited partnership who shall prove up their right to share in the distribution of the assets as provided in the decree declared on; and it is urged in argument that a recovery of the entire amount decreed to be paid in by Graves can be had in this action, the same to be distributed by the court in Illinois. This is an action at law, based upon the decree rendered in Illinois, and that decree does not authorize or empower Corbin to act as trustee or receiver for the other creditors, nor does it in any manner authorize him to sue for and recover the $100,796.71 ordered to be paid into court. There is lacking, therefore, a right at law on part of Corbin to the entire sum, either in his own right, or as trustee for the other creditors. It is also urged in argument that the provision of the decree directing Graves to pay the sum named to the clerk of the court constitutes the clerk a trustee for the benefit of the creditors, and that, as such, under the Code of Iowa, § 2544, he can sue at law to recover the amount ordered to be paid. The decree simply ordered Graves to pay the amount named to the clerk of the court. If paid to him, the money would, in effect, be held by the court for distribution. The decree does not make the clerk a trustee or receiver, nor does it clothe him with any power or right, nor does it convey to him a title to the money as trustee, or otherwise. In fact, the decree upon its face shows that one Robert E. Jenkins has been appointed receiver in the cause. It cannot be held that a simple provision in a decree, directing a party to the suit to pay a given sum to the clerk of the court, is in effect an appointment of the clerk as a trustee for the rights of creditors, with authority to go into other jurisdictions, and maintain actions at law for the recovery of the sum ordered to be paid. It is not made to appear that the court in Illinois has in any manner empowered anyone to sue for the sums ordered to be paid into that c'Jurt. To maintain the present action at law it is necessary that plaintiff shall show that they have a right at law, under the terms of the decree sued on, to recover judgment for some fix.ed amount against the defendant.
So far as the plaintiff Bradley is concerned, it is not claimed that he has any interest in or right to the fund sought to be recovered, except such as is derived from the order made that Graves should pay the amount named to the clerk of the court. This we hold to be simply an order requiring payment by Graves, and not a decree conferring a right 01' title upon the clerk as trustee or otherwise. So far as the plaintiff Corbin is cOll<lerned, he cannot, under the terms of the present decree, maintain an action at law for the entire Sllm ordered to be paid by the decree, because he had no legal title thereto; nor has he been empowered to Bue therefor in any representative capacity; nor can he take judgment for any specific sum, as his individual share of the common fund, because the amount to which he may be entitled is not ascertained by the decree Bued on, that being one of the questions not yet settled by the Illinois court. The demurrer must therefore be sustained,- and it is so ordered.
(Oircuit Oourt, S.
York. April 9 and 12,1886.)
A protest made in the case of merchandise not enumerated eo nomine in the tariff act in force at the time of its importation. aud stating only that the same is claimed to be dutiable at a rate of duty which is imposed by such act upon upwards of 250 articles specially enumerated. and also upon all articles "uot enumerated" therein. is insufficient. under the protest act of February 26. 1845, (5 St. at Large, 727,) aud no recovery can be had thereunder. A protest made iu the case of this merchandise, stating the rate of duty only that it is claimed should be imposed thereon, but especially referring for the grounds of the claim to a treasury circular, in which it was held by the secretary of the treasury that other merchandise therein mentioned was dutiable at that rate as being a manufacture of a certain material enumerated in the tariff act as such manufacture, is to be taken together with such circular as constituting the claimants' entire protest, and is, with such circular, sufficient, under the protest act of 184.}, to entitle them to recover. if they prove that the merchandise covered by the protest is such manufacture.
2. SAME-CIRCULAR RATE.
SA?lE-DISTINCTION MADE BY COURT.
But if this merchandise is shown to be a manufacture of a material bearing another name than the material of which the manufacture named in the protest is composed, and the tariff act makes a clear and positive distinction between these materials by imposin,g thereon eo nomine different rates of duty, the court. in considering the tariff act, will make the same distinction, although the name of the second material is the name of the genus, and the name of the first is the name of a species thereof; and the claimants are not entitled to recover.
During August and September, 1857, one Henry Hooman imported from Dundee and Glasgow, in Scotland, into the port of New York, certain carpeting, and entered the same for warehouse as
-SMITH 11. SCHELL.
"hemp carpeting." Subseqnently, and while in warehouse, Hooman transferred this carpeting to the firm of Haggerty & Co., the surviving partner of which is the plaintiff's testator. '1'he defendant's testator, the late Augustus Schell, classified this carpeting as "jute carpeting," dutiable at 24 per centum ad valorem, under the provision for "carpets, carpeting, hearth-rugs, bedsides, and other, portions of carpeting, being either Aubusson, Brussels, ingrain, Saxony, Turkey, Venetian, Wilton, or any other similar fabric," contained in Schedule 0 of the act of July 30, 1846, (9 St. at Large, 49,) as amended by the act of March 3, 1857, (11 St. at Large, 192.) Pursuant to the act of February 26, 1845, (5 St. at Large, 727,) Hooman, at the time he entered the carpeting for warehouse, made protests as follows:
"r hereby protest against the payment of twent.y-four per cent. dnty charged on the annexed entry of hemp carpeting, claiming that under the tariff act of March 3,1857, the same are only subject and liable to the duty of fifteen per cent. r claim to have the difference refunded, only paying the amount to obtain possession of the goods."
Subsequently, and on March 17, 1858, Haggerty & Co., pursuant to the same act, made protests as follows:
"We hereby protest against the payment of twenty-four per cent. duty charged on the annexed entry of hemp carpeting, claiming that especially under the recent decision of the honorable secretary of the t,reasury, and ly the circular issued by him relating to the duty on hemp carpeting, the same are only subject and liable to pay a duty of 15 per cent. ad valorem. We make this additional protest in view of these facts, and claim to have the difference refunded, only paying the amount to obtain possession of the goods."
The decision and circular of the secretary referred to by Haggarty & Co. in this protest read as follows:
"TREASUlty DEPARTMENT, March 1, 1858. "SIR: Messrs. Wyman and Acklay have appealed to this department from the decision of the collector at Foston, assessing dnty on an article invoiced. as · Dntch carppting' t t the rate of 24 per cent., under the classification in Schedule C of the tariff (,f 1857, of' carpets, carpeting, hearth-rngs, bedsides, and other portions of carpeting, being either Aubusson, Brussels, ingrain. Saxony, 'rurkpy, Venetian. Wilton, or any other similar fabric.' The appellants contend that the article in question, being manufactured of hemp, should be charged with duty at the rate of 15 per cent., under the tion in Schedule E of the tariff of 1857, of' manufactures of hemp not otherwise provided for.' ·Dutch carpeting' is a fabric differing from BOIne one or more of the dpscriptions of carpets specially named in Schedule C only in the material of which it is composed, the former of hemp and the latter of wool.; and the question is prespnted whether carpeting composed of hemp can Ll8 rpgarded as a fabric ·similar' to the enumerated varieties, within the meaning of the law. The department is of opinion that that term has reference as well to the material of which the fabric is composed, as to the mode of I&r.nufacture or the use for which it is designed, and that the article in question should be charged with duty at the rate· of 15 per cent., under the
classIfication ofSchednle E of' manufactures of hemp not otherwise provided for.' The decIsion of the collector is therefore overruled. "Very respectfully. "HOWELL COBB, Secretary of the Treasury.
".A. W. ,Au,sttn. Esq., Oollector, Boston, Mass."
Thereafter Haggerty & Co. withdrew the carpe,ting in suit from warehouse for consumption, paid duty thereon at the rate of 24 per centum ad valorem, and brought this suit to recover the excess of duties exacted above 15 per centum ad valorem. In Schedule E of the tariff act of 1846, as amended by that of 1857, are upwards of 250 specially enumerated articles, e/llch dutiable at 15 per centum ad valorem. Section 1 of the act of 1857 imposed a duty of 15 per centum ad valorem upon all articles "not enumerated" in either of these acts. Schedule D of the act of 1846, as amended, imposed a duty of 19 per centum ad valorem on "jute, sisal grallB, coir, and other vegetable substances, unmanufactured, not otherwise provided for," and on "matting, China, and other floor-matting, and mats made of flags, jute, or grass." Schedule C imposed a duty of 24 per centum ad valorem on "hemp unmanufactured;" and, as already stated, Schedule E a duty of 15 per centum on "manufactures of hemp not otherwise provided for," and Schedule C a duty of 24 per centum on carpeting," etc.; but in neither of these acts is "hemp carpeti1lg" or "ju,te carpeting" provided for eo nomine. (Hemp and jute are also treated as separate articles in the following named tariff acts: Section 8 of the act of August 30,1842; sections 14 and 15 of the act of March 2,1861; sections 10 and 11 of the act of July 14, 1862; section 7 of the act of June 30, 1864; section 21 of the act of July 14, 1870; Schedule C, section 2504, Rev. St.; Schedule J of the act of March 3,1883.) Upan the trial, when the plaintiffs offered in evidence the protests made by Hooman. the defendants objected to their admission on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement of the protest act of 1845 for the following reasons: (1) 'rhese protests do not point out (and did not point out to the collector) the precise error of fact or law which it is now claimed rendered his exactIOn of duty unauthorized. (2) They do not refer in terms to any article or the name of any article, specially or generally. in either of the tariff acts of 1846.01' 1857, or in any way to the provision for non-enumerated articles contained in the latter act; "hemp carpeting" not being mentioned eo nomine in either of these acts. (3) The only particular of fact or law pointed out in them is that under the tariff act in force the carpeting in suit is "only subject and liable to the duty of fifteen per cent." Schedule E of the act of 1846, as amended by that of 1857, contains upwards of 250 articles, and imposed a duty of 15 per centum ad valorem on each of them. Section 1 of the act of 1857.also: imposed a duty of 15 ·per centum ad valorem on articles "not act.; These protests do· not point out or
SMITH t1. SCHELL.
specify whether it is claimed that the carpeting in question was dutiable under Schedule E of the first act, or section 1 of the second act. (4) The protest act of 1845 did not require a collector to search through a list of 250 articles or more to ascertain whether these protests could possibly be made to apply under Schedule E; and, if not then to search throngh all the other parts of the tariff acts of 1846 and 1857 to ascertain whether they could pOHsibly be made to apply under the provision for non-ennmerated articles of the latter act. The protest act of 1845 made it the duty of the claimant to set forth distinctly and specifically the grounds of his objection to the collector's classification of the merchandise in question, and his exaction of duty thereon. Stephen A. Walker, U. S. Atty., and Thomas Greenwood, Ass't U. S. Atty., for defendants, cited Davies v. Arthur, 13 BIatchf. 34; S. C. 96 U. S. 148, and cases therein cited. A. W. Griswold, for plaintiff, cited Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U. S. <195; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; Steegman v. Jlaxwell, 3 Blatchf. 365; Stone v. Redfield, decided November 25, 1861, by NELSON, J.; Vaccori v. Maxwell, 3 BIatchf. 368. COXE, J., (orally.) There is no escape from the conclusion that this protest is insufficient. '1.'he statute provides that a person who feels himself aggrieved must, by his protest, point out clearly and specifically the grounds of his objection. The importer of the carpeting in suit protests against paying the duties charged by the collector, insisting that under the tariff act of 1857 his importations are only subject to a duty of 15 per cent. ad valorem. This is simply referring the collector to the tariff act of 1857. The protest does not point out to the section or the clause upon which the importer relies. There are, in that act, two sections under which the importations in question might be assessed at the rate of 15 per cent., and the plaintiffs are, even now, unprepared to say upon which they will finally rest their case. The collector is referred to neither. The protest leaves everything to speculation and conjecture. The collector is informed that he has made a mistake, but is left without the slightest information by which to correct it. The law requires more than this of the importer. The defendants' objection is therefore sustained, and the protests made by Hooman are excluded. The defendants' counsel made the same objection to the admission in evidence of the protests made by Haggerty & Co. as was taken to the Hooman protests; but the court held that the secretary's circular of March 1, 1858, to which these protests refer, must be taken as a part of them, and that consequently it is evident that the grounds of objection taken to the payment of duty at 24 per centum ad valorein by Haggerty & Co. in their protests are that the carpeting 'in suit is dutiable at 15 per centdmadvalorem, under the provisioIl for
"manufactures of hemp" contained in Schedule E of the act of 1846 as amended. The court thereupon defendants' objection, and admitted in evidence Haggerty & Oo.'s protests. The plaintiffs then produced two witnesses to show that "hemp carpeting, " or "jute carpeting," as it was sometimes called, was made in 1,857, and as far back as 1846, of one article commercially known as "jute," and never of anything else; that jute is the fibre of a plant called "jute," and hemp the fibre of a plant called "hemp:" that in both cases this fibre is the inner bark of the plant; that there is as much difference, possibly more difference, between jute and some species of hemp than there is between one species of hemp and another: that jute is less woody than hemp, and softer, if by "woody," "stiffness" is meant: that jute is a product of India, and hemp of Russia, Sweden and Norway, Italy, India, and other countries; that jute is cheaper than hemp, and in fact the cheapest article grown or produced that could be put into a carpet or carpeting; that originally hemp was used in Dundee, Scotland, and in England; that subsequently jute was introduced, and was and is now used as a substitute for it: that jute and hemp are sometimes mixed in manufacturing; that "hemp carpeting" is a species of carpet or carpeting which, like ordinary carpets or carpeting, is spread on the entire floor, or in strips, as the purchaser may fancy. One of these witnesses testified that jute is a species of hemp. But it did not appear, however, from the testimony of either of these witnesses, that jute was ever commercially known in 1846 or in 1857, or at any time between these years, as a speciea of hemp. Plaintiff also read the definition of "hemp" as given at page 64 of volume 11 of the Encyclopredia Britannica and in Ures' Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, etc.; and section 13 of the tariff act of 1861, and section 9 of the act of 1862, as to hemp and jute carpeting. The plaintiffs having rested, the defendants' counsel moved the court to direct a verdict in their favor on the ground that plaintiffs had not proven facts sufficient to constitute a causo of action. Defendants' Counsel. The merchandise in suit has not been proven to be a manufacture of hemp, and upon plaintiffs' theory of the case, before they are entitled to recover, such proof must be made. Under Schedule C of the tariff act of 1846, as amended by that of 1857, "hemp unmanufactured" was subject to a duty of 24 per centum ad valorem; uuder Schedule D "jute, sisal grass, coir, and other egetable substances, unmanufactured, not otherwise provided for," and i'matting, China and other fioor-matting, and mats made of flags, jute, or grass, were subject to a duty of 19 per centum ad valorem; and, under Schedule E, "manufactures of hemp not otherwise provided for," to a duty of 15 per centum ad v(llorem. It thus appears that congress has in these acts made a clear and positive distinction between jute and hemp. As congress has made this distinction, this is bound. in considering these acts, to make the same distinc-
llMlTH fl. SCHELL.
tion. The nndisputed testimony in this case shows that at and prior to the dates of the passage of these acts" hemp carpeting" was made of jute. Within the purview of these acts, it is not a manufacture of hemp. But it matters not whether hemp carpeting was made of hemp or of jute; the merchandise in suit was carpeting, and was therefore properly classified for duty under the provision for carpeting contained in Schedule U. If further reason for this classification be needed, it is found in the fact that no evidence has been produced by the plaintiffs to show of what material or materials this merchandise was composed. Plaintiffs' Counsel. No inference must be drawn to the damage or detriment of the plaintiffs by reason of the difference between unmanufactured hemp and unmanufactured jute; because, at the very time of the passage of the act of 1857, congress had made several appropriations for the encouragement of the manufactures of what is known as "Russian hemp, II or hemp proper, and contracts were made by direction of congress for the purchase of American hemp in place of this foreign hemp, for the uses then made of it. The whole question in this case is, was this hemp which was called by the importer "hemp carpeting, II and which was returned by the appraiser as jute carpeting, manufactured hemp? And that all turns upon the question whether or not jute is a species of hemp. If jute is a. species of hemp, then the plaintiffs' carpeting is a manufacture of hemp, and he is entitled to a verdict. That is all there is to it. The plaintiffs insist that there ha.s been evidence enough offered in this ease to go to the jury upon the question whether or not jute is a species of hemp. He has the testimony of one of his witnesses upon that question, and he bas the authorities in two books that jute is a species of hemp. THE COURT, (orally.) I think the counsel for the defendants states the controversy in this case perfectly. The burden is upon the plaintiffs to satisfy the jury that these importations are manufactures of hemp. Unless the plaintiffs succeed in doing so, they are not en. titled to recover. Instead of proving that their importations are manufactures of hemp, they have proved beyond any question tha.t they are manufactures of jute. They have, it is true, supplemented this evidence by the opinions of learned gentlemen, taken from various periodicals, that hemp and jute are substantially the same thing, and it is insisted that the proof is sufficient to uphold a finding by the jnry to this effect. But the short answer, in my judgment, is that we are construing the tariff acts of 1846 and 1857, where the law-makers have drawn a clear distinction between the two materials. So I do not see how I can leave it to the jury as a question'of fact to say whether the two are the same, when congress has said that they are'different. Congress, throughout the law, has recognized the dis.. tinction between "jute" and "hemp." The two wordsll:re repeatedly
used, and duties are imposed upon manufactures of each respectively. As there is no question of fact, gentlemen, you will render a verdict in favor of the defendants. ' Such verdict was thereupon rendered.
CUMMINS and others v. ROBERTSON, Collector.
(Circuzt Court, S.
n. New York.
April 20, 1886.)
CuSTOMS DUTmS-PRoTEST-REV. ST.
§ 2931. A protest. under section 2931, Rev. St., stating the rate of duty which im· ported merchandise should pay, and not specifying under what section, schedule. clause. or paragraph of the tariff act, or under what name in said act, the same is claimed to be dutiable. is invalid and insufficient, where there is more than one clause or paragraph in said act imposing the saIlle rate of duty, and where the imported merchandise is not specifically designated in said act by the same name as that stated in the protest.
This was an action against William H. Robertson, collector of the port of New York, to recover an alleged excess of duties upon certain importations of bichromate of soda, made by the plaintiffs in the years 1884 and 1885. The collector assessed the duty thereon at three cents per pound, under the provision for bichromate of potash contained in Schedule A of tariff act of March 3, 1883, (22 St. at Large, 488; section 2499, Rev. St.) The plaintiffs protested under section 2931, Rev. St., as follows:
"We hereby protest against the liquidation of the duties as made by you upon our entry of bichromate of soda, per steam-ship Noordland, from Antwerp. dated December 27, 1884, and against the payment of the duties as assessed, demanded, and exacted by you thereon. 'l.'he grounds of our objection are that bichromate of soda should pay a duty of 25 per cent., not 3 cts. per lb., as assessed by you. We also protest against the payment of any and all duties not legally chargeable upon said importation. and hereby especially reserve all questions of law or fact that may arise. Being under compulsion and dnress, we pay the amount of duties demanded and exacted by you in order to obtllin possession of our goods, and hereby notify you that we shall hold yoursplf and the United States jointly and severally liable for the excess exacted, and also notify you that we intend this protest to apply to all future similar exactions. "Dated New York, February 16,1885."
The plaintiffs' attorneys, in opening the case, claimed that the imported merchandise was dutiable at 25 per cent. ad valorem as a chemical salt, under Schedule A of tariff act of March 3, 1883, under the provision for "all chemical compounds and by whatever name known, and not specially enumerated or provided for in t,his act." The case turned upon the sufficiency of the protest, on the objection of the defendant to its reception in evidence when offered the trial by the plaintiffs.