& P. R. R. CO. v. HENDEE, Receiver, etc.
EQUITY-ORIGINAL BILL-DISMISSAL BY PLAINTIFF-COSTS.
A complainant in an original bill has, as a general rule, the right to dlsml·· his bill upon payment of costs, provided no decree has been made by which the defendant's rights have been adjudicated.
In Equity. Edwards, Dickerman cf Young, for orator. George W. Hendee and Albert P. Cross, for defendant.
WHEELER, J. This cause is at issue on bill, answer, and replication. The defendant has taken and filed testimony; the orator has not. There has been no hearing, and the cause has not been set down for hearing, nor ready to be so set down. The orator claims the right to discontinue the suit on payment of costs to the defendant, and asks leave to enter such discontinuance. In Chicago d; A. B. 00. v. Union Rolling·mill Co., 109 U. S. 702, S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594, it is said by Mr. Justice WOODS, in the opinion of the court, that, "as a general rule, a complainant in an original bill has the right at any time, upon payment of costs, to dismiss his but "subject to a distinct and well-settled exception, namely, that after a decree, whether final or interlocutory, has been made, by which the rights of a party defendant have been adjudicated, or such proceedings have been taken as entitle the defendant to a decree, the complainant will not be allowed to dismiss his bill without the consent of the defendant." This case falls within the general rule stated, and not within the exception, and the orator appears to be entitled to have the lea.ve granted. Oarrington v. Holly, 1 Dick. 280. Leave to enter discontinuance on payment of costs granted.
«(Jtrouit (Jourt, S.
n. New York.
determine whether or not immigrants are likely to become a public charge, and therefore not entitled to land. Their decision. made upon competent evidence, cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus, but may be reconsidered by them at any time before the return of the passeugers. Additional evidence, tending to show that the passengers are not likely to become a public charge, cannot be considered upon habeas corpus, but must be presented to the com· misl!ioners.
DREN-LANDING STOPPED-HABEAS CORPus-EvIDENCE NOT REVIEWABLE. The act of August 3, 1882, vests in the commissioners exclusive power to
IN RE DAY.
SAME-CME STATED-COMMISSIONERS MAY RECONSIDER DECISION.
Seven boys, from 12 to 15 years old, from a reform school in Bristol, England, arrived on the steam-ship W., designed to be sent to homes in Manitoba andin Kansas, their tickets being provided and paid for. The commissioners, not satisfied with the provision said to be made for them, refused per· mission to land. During investigation, by an arrangement sanctioned by the secretary of the treasury, they were taken to Ward's island, the same not being deemed a landing, and the children were brought, on habeas corpus, before the court. Additional facts were presented to the court, showing further sponsors, and pecuniary guaranties against their becoming a public charge. Held, that the commissioners had acted within their jurisdiction, and upon competent evidence; and that the new matter must be presented to them; and that the writ must be dismissed.
Habeas Oorplls. Foster et Thompson, for petitioners. Kelly et Macrae, for Commissioners of Immigration.
BROWN, J. Arthur Day, and the seven other persons for whose benefit this writ of habeas corpus was procured, arrived at this port as passengers on the steamer Warwick, on the twenty-fourth of April, 1886. The petition and return show that they are children from 12 to 15 years old, who had been supported by charity at a reform and industrial school, in Bristol, England; that they had been committed to that school by the local magistrates, as truants; that most of them have one parent or both parents living in Bristol; that they were put on the Warwick, and their passage money paid to this country; that certain arrangements had been made looking to the placing of two of the children with a Mr. Hopkins, a farmer, in Manitoba, and of the rest, with persons in Kansas; and that their tickets to Kansas and Manitoba had been provided and paid for. The commissioners of emigration, acting in pursuance of the provisions of the act of congress approved August 3,1882, (22 St. at Large, 214,) under their employment by the secretary of the treasury, in reference to passengers arriving at this port, upon examination of these children on their arrival, not being wholly satisfied as to the provisions designed for them, found that they were "unable to take care of themselves without becoming a public charge," and reported accordingly to the collector of the port, and their landing was stopped. Upon this writ of habeas corpus it is sought to review the finding of the commissioners of emigration, and to reverse their decision that the children ought not to be permitted to land. Some additional facts favorable to the children have been made known on this hearing, not presented to the commissioners, including a written obliga.. tion for each of the children by a responsible resident here, furnish. ing indemnity against any charge that might be incurred on their account for a period of two years. 1. It is the business of the commissioners, and not of this court, to ascertain the facts, and to determine whether or not any particular passenger comes within the provisions of the statute, so as not
to be entitled to land. Section 2 of the act provides that the commissioners "shall examine into the condition of passengers arriving in any ship or vessel; and, for that purpose, they are authorized to go on board and through any such ship or vessel; and if, on such examination, there shall be found among such passengers any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself 01' herself without becoming a public charge, they shall report Hie same in writing to the collector of such port, and such person shall not b6 permitted to land." The authority of congress to pass such reglllations has been repeatedly affirmed; and the validity of the act of 1882 was sustained by the supreme court in the case of Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247. The provisions above quoted manifestly impose upon the commissioners the duty of determining the facts upon which the refusal of the right to land depends. The general doctrine of the law in such cases is that where the determination of the facts is lodged in a particular officer or tribunal, the decision of that officer or tribunal is conclusive, and cannot be reviewed except as authorized by law. Foley v. Harrison, 15 How. 448; Dorsheimer v. U. S., 7 Wall. 166; Goodyear v. Providence Rubber Co., 2 Cliff. 351, 375, affirmed 9 Wall. 788,798; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; Clinkenbeard v. U. S., 21 \Yall. 65, 70; The Philadelphia, etc., v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, 458. See U. S. v. Leng, ,18 Fed. Rep. 15-20, and cases there cited; U. S. v. llJcDowell, 21 Fed. Rep. 563. The statute of 1882 makes no provision for any review of the, decision of the commissioners upon the evidence before them. No such review can therefore be had upon a writ of habeas corpus. That subject was elaborately considered by BLATCHFORD, J., in the Cllse ofStupp, 12 £latchf. 501, 519, who had been held by a United States commis(lionel' for extradition under the treaty with Belgium. The rule deduced from an examination of the authorities, and of the statutes in reference to the powers of a federal court under a writ of hl/beas corpus, is that "the court issuing the writ must inquire and adjudge whether the commissioner acquired jurisdiction of the matter, by conforming to the requirements of the treaty and the statute; whether he exceeded his jurisdiction; and whether he had any legal or competent evidence of facts before him on which to exercise a judgment as to the criminality of the accused. But such court is not to inquire whether the legal evidence of facts before the commissioner was sufficient or insufficient to warrant his conclusion. lit '* · The proper inquiry is to be limited to ascertaining whether the commissioner had jurisdiction, and did not exceed his jurisdiction, and had before him legal and competent evidence of facts whereon to pass judgment as to the fact of criminality, and did not arbitrarily commit the accused for surrender without any legal evidence." This rule has been since repeatedly applied, and must govern the present case. .see In re Fowler, 18 Blatchf. 430, 443, S. C. 4 Fed. Rep. 303, and