THE HELEN BROWN.
not misled by any act or representation of the libelants. If they had made the advance upon the faith of tha receipted bill, the libelants would be estopped. The decree of the district court is reversed, and a. decree ordered for the libelants for $1,472.5,}, with interest from 24,1884, with costs of the district court, and of this court.
THE HELEN BROWN.!
Ma88achu8ctta. June 23, 1886.}
MARITIME LIEN-LIENS FOB REPAIRS-STATE STATUTES-PUB. ST. MASS. 192. § 14, SEC. 15.
To "depll.rt from port" mell.ns to go to ses., irrespectl"'e of the distance or duration of the voyage, under Pub. St. Mass. e. 1112, §§ 14, 15.
The libelants claimed a lien under Pub. St. Mass. c. 192, §§ 14, IEl. The claimants, the mortgagees, on the ground that provisions of the act had not bean complied with. It was admitted that no claim had been filed until more than four days after a trip to Lynn; but it was asserted that a. trip to Lynn and return, completed on the same day, was not a departure from the port, within the meaning of the act. Horace G. Allen, for libelants. O. T. Russell, Jr., for claimants. NELSON, J. This is a libel by material-men to enforce a lien for labor and materials furnished in repairmg thesteam.tug Helen Brown, at Boston, her home port. The lien is claimed under a statute of the state which gives a lien for labor performed and materials furnished in the repairs of a domestic vessel. Pub. St. c. 192, § 14. Section 15 provides that "such lien shall be dissolved unless the person claiming the same files, within four days from the time when the vessel departs from the port at which she was when the debt was contracted, in the office of the clerk of the city or town WIthin which the vessel was at such time," a statement giving a just and true account of the demand claimed to be due to him. The Helen Brown was an ordinary tug-boat, engaged in the usual business of boats of her class. After the libelants' debt was contracted, she towed a vessel from Boston to Lynn, and on several other occasions she went to Lynn, and was there engaged in towing vessels; but in each instance she returned to Boston the same day after the service was rendered. It was admitted that no statement of the libelants' demand was filed, as required by section 15, until more than four days after the last of her
by Theodore M. Etting, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
trips to Lynn; and if going to Lynn was a departure from the port at which she was when the debt was contracted, within the meaning of section 15, the libelants' original lien was dissolved as against the claimants, who were mortgagees of the vessel. The cese turns on the. meaning of the words "depart from the port," as used in that section. A vessel departs from her port when she goes to sea. When she leaves her harbor, and enters upon the high seas, whether on a voyage to another port, or in the prosecution of some business on the ocean, such as towing, fishing, rendering assistance, or the like, she is, in a legal as well as in a nautical sense, at sea, as dis.. tinguished from being iIi port.· 'ro "depart from port," to "leave port," to "go to sea," are phrases which, in popular flpeech, have I am of opinion that it is in thitl sense the same that tbewords "depart from the port" are used in this statute. U. S. v. Gru,sh, 5 Mason, 290; The Harriet, 1 Story, 251. In going to Lynn the Helen Brown went outside of the headlands and lighthouses which mark the outward geographical limits of Boston harbor, and ertered Massachusetts bay. She was then upon the high seal;; she had left her port and had gone to sea. Whether her departure was for a longer or shorterr voyage, or with the intention of returning sooner or later, can make no difference. She went, not secretly, or for the purpose of avoiding the lien, but openly, and in the line of her regular employment. . Reference was made to chapter 70, § 7. Pub. St., which, for pilotage purposes, defined the harbor of Boston to include all the wators within Nahant rock, on the north, and Point Alderton, on the south, Lynn being within those limits. But it is apparent that this purposes only, and can is an arbitrary Lne, established for have no application in cases arising under chapter 192. Libel dismissed, with costs.
ATTLEBOROUGH NAT. BANK V. NORTHWESTERN MANUF'G & CAR CO.
ATTLEBOROUGH NAT. BANK V. NORTHWESTERN MANUF'a
(Oircuit (Jourt, JJ. Minnesota. July, 1886.)
COURTS-CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION-RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS-CON8pmACY.
Where a court of competent jurisdiction has possession of the res, the United States circuit court will not interfere with such possession on the ground that the court was imposed upon by a conspiracy, and the possession of the res obtained by fraud.
Demurrer to Bill of Complaint. P. M. Babcock, for complainant. J. N. Castle, Searles, Ewing. Gail, and Bigelow, Flandrau tI; Squires, for defendants. NELSON, J. The facts are briefly these: The Northwestern Manufacturing & Car Company, a corporation existing under the laws of the state of Minnesota, is in the bands of a receiver, under an order of the district court of Washington county, with a view of winding up the concern, and all its property is sequestrated. That court has possession, and is proceeding to ascertain the debts, and liquidate. The complainant, a citizen of Massachusetts, is a creditor of the car compan.y, aud has a judgment obtained in an action at law in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, pending these procl1edings. While a distribution of the property by the district court of the state is progressing, a bill in equity is filed, and this court is asked to set aside all the proceedings by which that court gained possession of the res. There is no complaint that the state court refused to recognize the debt of the complainant. The allegation to give this court jurisdiction is that a. fraudulent conspiracy existed between the car company and a creaitor, by which the state court was imposed upon, and possession of the res acquired by this fraud. To entertain this suit not only involves a review of the judgment of the district court of the state, bllt is a direct interference with property in custodia legis, by authority of a court having jurisdiction over the parties thereto and the subjectmatter of the controversy. Such interference cannot be tolerated. After a court of competent jurisdiction, having possession of the res, has let go its hold, a suit could be brought in auother court of concurrent jurisdiction, in which it might be the duty of the court, if fraud was alleged and proven in obtaining a decree, to prevent the parties who obtained it, and who are before the court, and claim the property by virtue of a sale with knowledge of the fraud, from appropriating the property. Sahlgard v. Kennedy, 2 Fed. Rep. 295, cited by complainant's counsel, and decided in this court, was of that character; also Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640; S. C. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619. In Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, jurisdiction was sustained v.28F.no.2-8