CLINTON NAT. BANK.
tion. But the marshal is subject to the control of the court as to any property or money in his hands by virtue of the process of the court, so long as he holds it, to be exercised on behalf of any party interested in it on proper proceedings instituted for that purpose, to prevent abuse or perversion of the process, and to insure due execution. of it. Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378; Krippendorj v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276; S. C. 4 Sup. (]t. Rep. 27. This control would be lost if he could be compelled to take the property or money before any other court, and submit it to judgment there. Money so held by him under the control of the court is not intrusted or deposited with him, or in his hands, within the meaning of that statute. It is still in the custody of the law. It is not subject to attachment any more than money in the- hands of a disbursing officer of the government, to be paid over to an employe, would be, (Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20,) or a dividend in the hands of an assignee in bankruptcy for a creditor would be, (Gilbert v. Lynch, 17 Blatchf. 402 i S. C. 1 Fed. Rep. 111.) . Trustee discharged, with costs.
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. lOUJa. July 5,1886.)
CHECKS-PAYMENT BY UNITED RECOVERy-NOTICE. STATES ON FORGED INDORSEMENT-RIGHT OF
. The right of the United States government to recover money paid on a check on the treasury, under a forged indorsement. is conditioned on promptness in giving notice to the person to whom the check was paid.
Appeal from the District Court. D. O. Finch, U. S. Atty., and D. Donov(£n, Asst. U. S. Atty., for the United States. Oummins d; Wright, for defendant. BREWER, J. The facts are these: On October 14, 1868, W. A. Rucker, a paymaster in the United States army, drew his check on the assistant treasurer of the United States at New York for $100 bounty money, payable to the order of Cornelius D. Thrall. On October 26, 1868, the defendant presented his check to said assistant treasurer, and received the money thereon. On the back of the check appeared what purported to be the indorsement of the payee, Cornelius D. Thrall, but in fact such indorsement was false and forged. On October 9, 1880, nearly 12 years thereafter, the United States com. menced this action in the district court to recover the money paid out on the strength of this forged indorsement. The defendant answered, and, among other defenses, pleaded negligence and laches on
the part of the government, in this: that it was informed by said payee, Thrall, of the fact that his indorsement was forged soon after the payment of the check, and before the end of the year 1868, and that it never notified the defendant, or any one interested in the transaction, nntil about 10 years thereafter, and until the defendant bad lost all opportunity to protect itself. To this defense the plaintiff demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and, the plaintiff standing on the demurrer, judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. From this judgment the plaintiff has appealed. Do the facts stated constitute a defense? That no mere statute of limitations will bar a claim for money due the government is settled. U. S. v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486. But the defendant contends that the government, dealing in commercial paper, is subject to the same rules and obligations that control individuals in like transactions, and that, as between individuals, "it is undoubtedly necessary that the maker, acceptor, or other party who demands res· titution of mlmey paid under a forged indorsement, or under a forged signature of the drawer of a bill, should make the demand without unnecessary delay." 2 Daniel, Neg. lnst. § 1371. The first of these two propositions was decided in Cooke v. U. S., 91 U. S. 389. See, also, U. S. v. National Bank, 6 Fed. Rep. 134. The second seems to be sustained by the common voice of the authorities. See, in addition to 2 Daniel, Neg. lnst. cited supra, 2 Pars. Notes & Bills, 598, and cases cited in notes to text of both authors. The principal cases cited by counsel for the government are those in which the liability of the defendant, being absolute, fixed, and constant, the question has been one purely of the statute of limitations, while in the case at bar the right of recovery is conditioned on promptness in giving notice. The distinction between the two is obvious. I see no error in the ruling of the district court, and its judgment must be affirmed.
((JVrcuit (Jourt, E. D. Pennsylvania. June 24,1886.)
CuSTOMS DUTIES-ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 8. 1888-SCHEDULES K AND B CONSTRUED. Schedule K, § 2502, of the act of congress of March 3, 1883, imposes a duty of 35 per centum ad valorem upon" all manufactures of wool of every description, made wholly or in part of wool, not specially enumerated or provided for" in the act. Schedule S imposes a duty of 50 per centum ad valorem upon "all goods, wares, and merchandise made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value." Held, that the two phrases must be con· strued as if standing together, and are to be read thus: All manufactures of wool of every description, not especially enumerated or provided for in thia
Reported by C. B. Taylor, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.