the part of the government, in this: that it was informed by said payee, Thrall, of the fact that his indorsement was forged soon after the payment of the check, and before the end of the year 1868, and that it never notified the defendant, or any one interested in the transaction, nntil about 10 years thereafter, and until the defendant bad lost all opportunity to protect itself. To this defense the plaintiff demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and, the plaintiff standing on the demurrer, judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. From this judgment the plaintiff has appealed. Do the facts stated constitute a defense? That no mere statute of limitations will bar a claim for money due the government is settled. U. S. v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486. But the defendant contends that the government, dealing in commercial paper, is subject to the same rules and obligations that control individuals in like transactions, and that, as between individuals, "it is undoubtedly necessary that the maker, acceptor, or other party who demands res· titution of mlmey paid under a forged indorsement, or under a forged signature of the drawer of a bill, should make the demand without unnecessary delay." 2 Daniel, Neg. lnst. § 1371. The first of these two propositions was decided in Cooke v. U. S., 91 U. S. 389. See, also, U. S. v. National Bank, 6 Fed. Rep. 134. The second seems to be sustained by the common voice of the authorities. See, in addition to 2 Daniel, Neg. lnst. cited supra, 2 Pars. Notes & Bills, 598, and cases cited in notes to text of both authors. The principal cases cited by counsel for the government are those in which the liability of the defendant, being absolute, fixed, and constant, the question has been one purely of the statute of limitations, while in the case at bar the right of recovery is conditioned on promptness in giving notice. The distinction between the two is obvious. I see no error in the ruling of the district court, and its judgment must be affirmed.
((JVrcuit (Jourt, E. D. Pennsylvania. June 24,1886.)
CuSTOMS DUTIES-ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 8. 1888-SCHEDULES K AND B CONSTRUED. Schedule K, § 2502, of the act of congress of March 3, 1883, imposes a duty of 35 per centum ad valorem upon" all manufactures of wool of every description, made wholly or in part of wool, not specially enumerated or provided for" in the act. Schedule S imposes a duty of 50 per centum ad valorem upon "all goods, wares, and merchandise made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value." Held, that the two phrases must be con· strued as if standing together, and are to be read thus: All manufactures of wool of every description, not especially enumerated or provided for in thia
Reported by C. B. Taylor, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
act, shall be subject to a duty of 35 per cent. ad'lJaloremj but ifsilk is the compotent material of chief value, they shall be subject to a duty of 50 per cent.
At Law. John K. Valentine, for Hartranft, Collector. Frank Prichard, for defendant. McKENNAN, J. The special verdict in this case presents a single question for determination, viz., are the goods described in it dutiable under Schedule K (section 2502) of the act of March 3, 1883, or under Schedule S of the same act? These schedules ara parts oftha same act, and, presumably, were not intended to impose different rates-of duty upon the same subjects. Schedule K imposes a certain rate of duty upon "all manufactures of wool of every description, made wholly or in part of wool, not specially enumerated or provided for" in the act. This is a very general and comprehensive description, and undoubtedly embraces all goods of which wool is in part a constituent. But are the goods in question excluded from its scope by being specially provided for in another part of the act? I think they are, by the terms of Schedule S. That schedule imposes a different rate of duty "on all goods, ware,,;, and merchandise made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value." It is clear that silk goods are chargeable only with the duty enacted by this schedule, and it is equally clear that goods of which silk is. the component material of chief value are placed in the same category, and are subject to the same duty. It does, in terms and effect, identify goods of which silk is the component material of chief value with goods composed entirely of silk, and is a special provision touching such goods, and withdraws them entirely from the operation of Schedule K. In Solomon v. Arthur, 102 U. S. 212, the application of two general clauses in different acts of congress was before the court for determination. The court held that they were to be considered as contained in the same act; Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in delivering the opinion of the court, saying: "It is observable that this description of 'manufactures made of mixed materials, in part of cotton, silk,' etc., is more general than that of 'manufactures of which silk is the component material of chief value.' Logically, the two phrases, standing together in the same act or system of laws, would be related as follows: 'Goods made of mixed materials, cotton, silk, etc., should pay a duty of thirty-five per cent.; but if silk is the component part of chief value, they shall pay a duty of fifty per cent.'" So, here, while the presumption is against a construction which would make different clauses of acts imposing different rates applicable to the same subjects, yet, even if, by the generality of their terms, they might apparently be so applicable, they are to be read thus: All manufactures of wool of every description, not especially enumerated or provided for in this act, shall be subject to a duty
of 35 per cent. ad valorem, but if silk is the component material of ehief value, they shall be subject to a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem. I am therefore of opinion that the goods described in the special verdict are dutiable under Schedule S of the act of March 3, 1883, and that judgment must be entered thereon in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $615.60, with interest upon the separate items thereof from the respective dates of payment, as shown by the bill of particulars annexed to said verdict; and it is ordered that judgment be entered accordingly by the clerk for the amount of said principal and interest.
Co. and others.1
(Oircuit Oourt, B. 1.
07lio, E. D. June, 1886.)
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-PATENTABILITy-INVENTION.
Improvements, although new and useful. are not necessarily or primafaciB inventions; they mayor may not be patentable. The state of the art being shown, the jury is not bound by any presumption of patentability arising from the patent.
SAME-PRESUMPTION OF PATENTABILITy-STATE OF THE ART.
3. SAME-SCOPE OF PATENT FOR IMPROVEMENT.
Where the state of the prior art is such that the field of invention is limited and circumscribed, not admitting of great original discovery, a patentee must be confined strictly to the claim he makes. The mere change of location of the parts of a mechanism, so long as no different or additional function is introduced, is not patentable.
SAME-PATENTABILITy-OHANGE OF LOCATION.
SAME-DOUBLE F U N C T I O N . '
Ohange of location of parts, whereby one of the parts transposed is made to perform a double function, is not patentable if such part had been before used to perform the same functions separately.
SAME-ANTICIPATION-PRIOR PUBLICATION-FUNCTION OF JURY.
It is for the jury to determine whether prior publications offered in evidence to defeat a patent describe the improvement claimed.
SlifE-REQUISITES OF PRIOR PUBI,ICATION TO DEFEAT PATENT.
A description in prior publications, in order to·defeat a patent, must be in such terms as would enable a person skilled in the art to make, construct, or practice the invention as he could from a prior patent, or from the patent sought to be defeated. The substitution for two catches of a hinge and catch, to secure a lantdrn top to the guard, the several parts being old, required no invention, but simply mechanical skill.
SAME-bUBSTITUTION OF MECHANICAL DEVICES.
9, SA.."'l:E-ANTICIPATION-PRIOR PATENT TO SAME INVENTOR-ABANDONMEN'r.
A patentee cannot claim the same thing described by him in a prior patent in which there is no reservation, and what he omitted to claim and reserve in such prior patent he dedicates to the public.
10. SAlIrE-IDENTITY OF PATENTS, HOW DETERMINED. Whether two patents of different dates, to the same inventor, cover the same thing, must be determined by the scope of the claim in the later patent, rather than by the description in the specification.
'Edited by Charles C. Linthicum, Esq., of the Chicago bar.