$2,328 00 1,968 80 $4,296 80 24 60 $4,321 40
The damages for detention amount to 12 days, at £40, Disbursements in consequence of collision, · Interest on $1,968 80, from January 28, 1886.
Decree for libelant.
THE WOLVERTON. 1 PURNELL 'V. THE WOLVERTON.
«(Jircuit (Jourt, E.
April 22, 1886.)
Tow. The tug Wolverton, with a tow, was on her way from Brooklyn to Jersey City. She was coming down the East river, keeping as close to the New York docks as she could go with safety. The tug Packer, with libelant's bilrge in tow, was coming up, and, "'hen several lengths from the WolvertoI:, signaled her intention to go to the left, and, without waiting for an answer, changed her course, and attempted to cross that of the Wolverton. Held that, as the Wolverton was as near the docks as she could safely go, it was the duty of the Packer to keep outside of her, and that, in crossing her course, she took the risk of injurious consequences. The record and opinion of another court will not be given authoritative in the evidence presented in a case, or against any conclusIOn of fact fairly deducible therefrom.
2, EVIDENCE-WEIGHT-RECORD OF ANOTHER COURT.
In Admiralty. M. P. Henry and Edward McOarthy, for libelant. Alfred Driver and J. Warren Ooalston, for respondents.
McKENNAN, J. The libelant rests his case upon the following material allegations of fact: That the respondent started from Robert's Store, on the Brooklyn side of the East river, having in tow the barge Atlanta, and intending to proceed to the Erie Railroad dock, on the New Jersey side of the North River, rounding the Battery in her course; that she stea med diagonally down and across the East river, quartering the tide, which was running ebb, about four miles an hour.; that the tug Packer, baving the libelant in tow, rounded the Battery, passing from the North river into the East river, keeping in towards the piers on the New York side, so as to take advantage of the slackwater there; that she whistled to the respondent not to cross the course of the libelant, and that the respondent did not notice the signal, or reply to it, but pointed her helm so as to go inside of the libelant, thus crossing her bows; that the respondent passed safely,
by C. B. Taylor. Esq., of t.he Philadelphia bar.
but did not succeed in getting her tow past without collision, the latter striking the libelant, and inflicting the injury complained of. On the contrary, the respondent alleges that, having started with his tow from Brooklyn as stated, he proceeded on his course, running across the river, and keeping into the docks on the New York side, as he came down the river; that when about opposite Pier 1, East river, and proceeding on his course, and as near the New York docks as he could go safely, the Packer, with libelant's barge in tow, which was proceeding up the East river towards Brooklyn, blew two whistles, indicating thereby that she desired to go to the left, or on the inside of the respondent, between him and the New York dock; that when the whistles were sounded the tugs were three or four lengths apart, and there was no danger of collision, as they were moving in opposite directions, port to port, the respondent then being on the inside nearest the New York shore; that immediately on sounding her whistle, without waiting a reply, the Packer put her wheel to starboard, changed her course, and attempted to cross the respondent's bow. and run between her and the New York piers; and that this change of course caused the collision. It is apparent that the libelant, to bbtain a decree in her favor, , must support her hypothesis by a preponderance of evidence. The evidence is conflicting, and, upon a careful consideration of it all, I am unable to find that its weightis in favor of the libelant's allegation and theory. On the contrary, I think it preponderates in favor of the respondent. The Wolverton was rightfully pursuing a course as near to the dock as she could go, and it was the duty of the Packer to keep outside of her, however desirable it may have been to obtain the benefit of the slack-water near the dock. In crossing the course of the Wolverton, as I think she did. to obtain this advantage, she took the risk of injurious consequences. and the blame therefore is upon her. The record and opinion of the district court of New York in the case of Castle v. The Packer. ante, 156, have been furnished to me, and have been examined. While I have great respect for the opinion of the learned judge of that court, I cannot give it authoritative weight in the consideration of the evidence presented in the case before this court, or against any conclusions of fact which are fairly deducible from it. The bill is dismissed, with costs.
(OVrcuit Oourt, lJJ. IJ. Pennsylvania.
MARITIME LIEN-OWNER'S CONTRACT FOR SUPPLIES.
The steam-ship Norman, an American vessel, registered at New York, was to place her under foreign regchartered to A. & Co., of that city, who ister, and to pay the expenses of victualing, manning, coaling, oiling, and running the ship, she to be at their sole use and disposal during the voyage. Possession of the ship was given to the cha' terers at New York, and there. on their order, the coal in question was furnished and delivered to the ship. The master and engineer had to do with the purchase. Held that, conceding that the ship, by reason of her foreign register, Was in a foreign port, as the liability to be imposed was not created by the act or engagllment of the master in hIS character of master, there could be no lien; and that as the coal was furnished upon the order of A. & Co., who were residents of the place where the vessel was at the time, and owners pro hac vice, the presumption was that the coal was furnished upon the personal credit of the charterers, and not upon the credit of the vessel.
In Admiralty. Thomas J. Diehl and J. Warren Coulston, for libelant. John W. Brock and Morton P. Henry, for respondent. McKENNAN, J. This is a libel in rem, brought to recover the price of 277 tons of coal amounting to $1,108, furnished by the libelant on board the steam-ship Norman, at the port of New York. The steam-ship Norman was an American built vessel, was registered at New York, and was owned by the Philadelphia & Boston Steam-ship Company. Bya charter-party dated November 6, 1878, the agents of the owners chartered the vessel to Murray, Ferris & Co., of New York, for a voyage from New York to Nassau, and the south side of Cuba, and back. It was stipulated in said charter-party that the vessel should be placed "under foreign register;" that she should be "at the sole use and disposal" of the charterers during the voyage; and that they should pay the expenses of victualing, manning, coaling, oiling, and running the ship during the continuance of the charter. Possession of the vessel was duly delivered to the charterers at New York, and upon their order the coal in question was furnished and delivered to the vessel at the port of departure, and neither the master nor engineer had any connection with the purchase. Under the circumstances, has the libelant a lien upon the vessel for the price of the coal furnished? Conceding that, by reason of her "foreign registry," the vessel is to be treated as in a foreign port, still the liability sought to be imposed upon her was not created by the engagement or act of any person authorized to bind her in this mode. This is essential to the efficacy of a maritime lien for supplies furnished. "It is only the contracts which the master enters into in his character of master that specifically
lReported by C. B. Taylor, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
bind the ship, or affect it in the way of lien or privilege." Conk. Adm. 73, 78, 80; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 417. But Murray, Ferris & Co. were residents of New York, at which port the vessel was lying when the coal was furnished, and they furnished it directly, without the intervention of the official representative of the vessel. They were oWners pro hac vice, because they had possession of the vessel, and she was at their "sale disposal" until the end of the charter. These facts repel the implication that the coal was furnished upon the credit of the vessel, but warrant the inference that it was furnished upon the personal credit of the charterers and ostensible owners. At least they were sufficient to put the libelant t1pon inquiry as to the actual relations of Murray, Ferris & Co. to the vessel, and their obligatiolls under the charter-party; and this must have resulted in the knowledge that the act of the charterers could not, under the circumstances, impose a lien upon the vessel. Beinecke v. The Secret, 3 Fed. Rep. 665; Coal Co. v. The Secret, Id. 665; S. C.15 Fed. Rep. 480; and Stephenson v. The Francis, 21 Fed. Rep. 715. The libel is dismissed, with costs.
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Oregon. August 23, 1888.)
PILOTS-COLUMBIA RIVER-RIGHT OF MASTER TO CHOOSE PILOT.
The Columbia river is the boundary between two states, Oregon and Wash· ington. within the purpose and spirit of section 4236 of the Revised Statutes; and therefore the state of Oregon cannot require a vessel bound in or out of said river to take an Oregon pilot. or pay him half or any pilotage, if the master thereof prefers to and does take a Washington pilot. The .Abercorn, 26 Fed. Rep. 877, affirmed.
Appeal in Admiralty. Suit for half pilotage. Raleigh Stott, for libelaut. Ilenry Ach, for respondent. SAWYER, J. I think the view taken by the district judge is correct. I cannot add anything of importance to the observations made by him at the hearing below. In the language of the syllabus of the case, as reported in 26 Fed. Rep. 877, it was there held that "the Columbia river is the boundary between two states,-Oregon and Washington,-within the purpose and spirit of section 4236 of the Revised Statutes; and therefore the state of Oregon cannot require a vessel bound in or out of said river to take an Oregon pilot, or pay him half or any pilotage, if the master thereof prefers to and does take a Washington pilot." For the reasons given in the opinion of the district judge, the decree must be affirmed; and it is so ordered.