EX PARTE LEVI.
overreached by Ford and his lawyer who drew the contract; but, I the words repeat, we have nothing to do witb that,-we only they used by the instrument they signed, and they cannot evade the force of these potential words by showing that the term "plastering" may have two meanings, both of which have been pointed out in this contract, and employed by the specifications. has been used in both ways bere by the draughtsman of the specifications, but only in one by Ford and the Mellens in their contract. The fact that parties use the same word in a contract to express different meanings does not necessarily make the contract ambiguous. Judgment for defendant.
NOTE. PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT. An unambiguous contract cannot be interpreted by evidence as to the understanding of the parties. Brewster v. Potrufi', (Mich.) W. Rep. 823 ; Eggert v. White, (Iowa,) 13 N. W.Rep. 426; Johnson v. Cranage, (MIch.) 7 N. W. Rep.1SB; Van Evera v. DaVIS, (Iowa,) 2 N. W. Rep. 509, 512; Donohoe .v. Mariposa L. & M. Co., (CaL) 5 Pac. Rep. 495. . Parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning attached to expressions used. when their meaning is doubtful, Rhodes v. Cleveland R. M. Co.,17 Fed. Rep. 426; Jaqua v. Witham & A. Co., (Ind.) 7 N. E. Rep. 314; Barton v. Anderson, (Ind.) 4 N. E. Rep. 420; or to explain an interpolation, Jenkinson v. Monroe, (Mich.) 28 N. W. Rep. 663; Rush v. Carpenter, (Iowa,) 6 N. W. Rep. 172; to explain a description in a deed o.r will, or to identify the land described, Chambers v. Watson, (Iowa,) 14 N. W. Rep. 336; Crooks v..Whitford, (Mich.) 11 N. Rep. 159; W.hit,ney v. Robertson, 10 N. W. Rep. 512 , Messerv. Ol'streIch, Id. 6, Patch v. WhIte, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611, Thornell v. City of Brockton, (Mass.) 6 N. E. Rep. 74; Whitman v. Morey, (N. H.) 2 AU. Rep. 899; Blair v. Bruns, (Colo.) 8 Pac. Rep. 569; Armijo v. New Mexico Town Co., (N. M.) 5 Pac. Rep. 709; or to show which of two persons of the same name is intended as the grantee in a deed, Bl'gg v. Begg, (Wis.) 14 N. W. Rep. 602; or the beneficiary in a will, Webster v. Morris, (Wis.) 28 N. W. Rep. 353; but \lotto explain a patent am· in a deed, Brandon v. Leddy, (Cal.) 7 Pac. Rep. 33. l:lee, also, Beason v. Kurz, (Wis.) 29 N. W. Rep. 230. ,
Ex parte W. T. Ex parte W. H.
Boutlt Oarolina. September 111, 1886.)
Witnesses in attendance on court are not privileged from arrest charged with an indictable offense.
Nix, Shuman &: Nix, for the motion. Mr. Youmans, Dist. Atty., contra.
SIMONTON, J. These two cases depend on the same state of facts. W. T. Levi and W. H. Levi were witnesses under bond. to testify before the grand jnry at this term of the court. They are residents of North Carolina. Having given their testimony before the grand jury, they were discharged from furtber·attondance on the court, and
on the same day each of them was arrested on a warrant charging them with perjury in the evidence before the grand jury, issllod by Mr. Heyward, a commissioner of this court. Failing to give bond, they are here in the Greenville jail. These applications are based on affidavits stating these facts. The prisoners claim that their arrest was not legal, and that they are entitled to a discharge. As no question is made as to the truth of the facts stated, and the question in the case is made fairly, I do not propose to discuss the form in which the matter comes up. 'l'he discharge is claimed on the ground that these prisoners were in actual attendance on court under process as witnesses, and that they are privileged from arrest, coming to, remaining at, and returninp; from the place at which the court is sitting. The counsel who presented the case of these prisoners admits that their immunity from arrest does not extend to charges of treason, felony, and breach of the peace; but he insists that, inasmuch as perjury, under the statutes of the United States, is not a felony, they are entitled to the privilege under the charge of perjury. There can be no question that a witness, as well in a criminal as in a civil case, is protected from arrest under civil process, goinp; to, remaining at, and returning from the court where he has been summoned to appear and testify. Greenl. Ev. §§ 316, 317; Vincent v. Watson, 1 Rich. 194; Sadler v. Ray, 5 Rich. 523; Jones v. Knauss, 31 N. J. Eq. 211, and note by reporter collating cases; Larned v. Griffin, 12 Fed. Rep. 593. Does the same exemption exist from an arrest on a criminal charge? The care and research of the learned counsel in this case, both for the prisoners and for the United States, have been able to find very many cases in which this privilege had been discussed and illustrated in arrests under civil process. Not one case has been found-and I think that I can now safely say can be found-in the decisions of the supreme court of the United States or of South Carolina in which the pl'ivilege has been claimed under an arrest on a criminal charge. No case has been cited from any state of the Union. We are left to a decision of the question upon other sources of authority. In South Carolina, under section 2071 of the General Statutes, all witnesses are exempted from service of all process, going to and remaining at and returning from court to which they have been subpamaed or bound, except upon criminal charges of treason, felony, or breach of the peace. Assuming, for the purposes of this decision, without expressly so holding, that the statute of South Carolina comes within the provisions of section 721 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and therefore is binding on this court, we inquire what is meant by the words "treason, felony, and breach of the peace?" In Bishop on Criminal Procedure (section 207) these words are held to include all indictable offenses. The authority quoted is Rawlins v. Ellis, 16 Mees. & W. 172. In that case a person was aI'-
EX PARTE BROWN.
rested on Sunday upon the charge of a criminal conspiracy. The Sunday act made void all arrests on Sunday, (2 Car. II. c. 7,) except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. It was contended that the offense charged was neither treason nor felony, nor was it breach of the peace. The court held that all indictable offenses were included under the term "breach of the peace." So Lord HALE held that every offense against a statute should be laid contra pacem, (Bish. Crim. Proc. §"648;) and in 1 Atk. 157, an arrest for contempt was permitted on Sunday as a constructive breach of the peace. The motion is refused. In the future, when an application of this character is heard, tice of the motion and copies of the affidavit must be served upon the commissioner making the arrest, and upon the district attorney.
Ex parte BROWN.
(DiBtrlet Court, N. D. New York.
October 1, 1886.)
EXTRADITION-HABEAS CORPUS-PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF ACT OF THE Ex· ECUTIVE.
Although the courts have power, on habeas corpus, to review the decisions of the executive authority in extradition proceedings, they will not overrule such decisions unless they are clearly satisfied that an error has been com· mitted. The federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in extradition proceedings.
SAME-CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS.
SAME-ARREST EFFECTED BY STRATAGEM.
A fugitive from justice charged with crime will not be released, onhabeqa corpus, because he was induced by a stratagem to come within territory where he could be properly arrested, provided the stratagem ustld was not itself an infraction of law.
SAME-FuGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.
A fugitive from justice is one who having, within a state, committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, leaves its jurisdiction when it Is sought to subject him to its criminal process to answer for his offense, and is found in the jurisdiction of another state. It is not necessary that he should have left after indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution an. ticipated or begun.
On Habeas Corpus. John E. Pound, for petitioner. J. R. Thompson, for the State of Pennsylvania. COXE, J. The petitioner was, in February, 1886, indicted in Erie county, Pennsylvania, for perjury alleged to have been committed in that county in May, 1885. In August, 1885, he left his home in Pennsylvania, and went to Brantford, in the province of Ontario. On the twenty-fourth of July, 1886, he was induced by the false statements of parties employed by those interested in his conviction