trial, a reference may be taken; otherwise damages will be allowed for the loss of 55,545 pounds of sugar at the market rates on March 20, 1884, with costs.
THE EUGENE VESTA.
(District (Jowt, E. D. Michigan. February 15, 1886.)
TOWAGE-COMPENSATION-VESSEL AGROUND-AUTHORITY OF MASTER.
W.here a vessel in process of loading was driven ashore and damaged, aurl the owner of the cargo demanded a return of the property shipped by him, offering to pay the expense of unloading, but the master refused thIS, and employed a tug to haul the vessel off and tow her to a place of safety, held, the master had no power to bind the car&,o, and the owner of the tug must look to the vessel alone for his compensatIOn.
In Admiralty. This was a libel against the scow Eugene Vesta and her cargo, to recover for the services of the tug International in rescuing the scow and her cargo from being wrecked on the shore of Lake Erie at the port of Tyrconnell during the month of August, 1885. The services were renderdat the instance of the master of the scow. The scow was loading wood for transport-ation to Detroit, and had taken on board about 80 cords, or two-thirds of a load, when a storm arose, which rendered it necessary to stop loading. The storm increasing, the vessel began to drag her anchor; and the master, fearing that if she drifted ashore she would be lost, voluntarily beached her not far from the dock, after throwing overboard some 15 or 20 cords of wood. The vessel suffered some damage from the stranding; and, as there were no means of getting her off the beach, the mastertelegraphed the owner, who sent the tug International, owned by the libelant, and the lighter Benedict, together with a steam-pump, to effect her rescue. The tug and lighter, with the steam-pump, left Windsor about noon of August 23d, but, meeting with heavy weather, were obliged to lie over at Port Stanley, and did not reach the wreck until the evening of the day following their departure from Windsor. Arriving at the place of stranding, the tug pulled the scow off without much difficulty, and brought her to Trenton with 60 or 65 cords of wood on board. The value of the vessel as she lay stranded upon the beach was estimated at from $600 to $900, and the value of the wood at the place of loading was three dollars to three and a half per cord. There was testimony tending to show that the wood had depreciated by the water-logging of the vessel. . The wrecking expedition arrived at Trenton in safety, but was there detained overnight, and did not reach Detroit until about noon of the next day. No tender was made to the libelant on behalf of the vessel or cargo, and no payment made for the services of the tug, lighter, or steam-pump. No appearance
was entered on behalf of the scow or owner. The owner of the cargo appeared, and filed an answer denying that the libelant had any claim or lien against the cargo. It appeared that while the scow was aground at Tyrconnell, and before the arrival of the tug, the claimant of the cargo demanded the return of the wood remaining on board, and offered to unload it himself without expense to the vessel or to the master. The evidence shows that this could have been done at a very trifling expense, but the master declined to allow the claimant to take off the wood, because, as he said in his deposition, it might imperil the vessel. There was practically no dispute as to these facts, both the claimant and master testifying to substantially the same thing. It appeared that, after the wood was unloaded in Detroit at the dock, the consignees paid the scow upwards of $80 for freight, and for extra expenses claimed by the master on account of the services of the tug. At the time of this payment, the consignees had no notice that the libelant would make any claim against the cargo, and they received the cargo, and settled with the master, without notice of libelant's claim. H. H. Su'an, for libelant. F. H. Canfield, for owner of the cargo.
BROWN, J. The real question in this case is whether the owner of the wood had the right, after the vessel had gone ashore at Tyrconnell, and before she had broken ground upon her voyage, to demand a return of the wood upon payment of the expenses, or whether the lien of the master had attached to the cargo, so that he had a right to bring it to Detroit, and compel it to contribute to the general average occasioned by the stranding. There can be no doubt there is an implied warranty on the part of the carrier that his vessel shall be seaworthy, not only when she begins to take cargo on board, but when she breaks ground for the VOyAge. The theory of the law is that the implied warranty of seaworthiness shall protect the owner of the cargo until his policy of insurance commences to run; and, as it is well settled that the risk under the policy attaches only from the time the vessel breaks ground, this is fixed as the point up to which the warranty of seaworthiness. extends. The case of Cohn v. David· son, 2 Q. B. Div. 455, is a recent and instructive authority upon this point, and lays down a principle of general application. In this case the owners of a vessel chartered her to carry a cargo of cement from Sunderland to Dundee. After starting, the vessel became leaky; but, the wind being fair for the voyage, the captain resolved to go on, and the vesselsank, with her cargo on board, before reaching her port of destination. It appeared that the ship was not in fact sea· wOl,thy at the time she set sail, and that, as she was found to be sea· worthy when she commenced taking cargo, she must have received the damage in the course of loading. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice FIELD observed that "no degree of seawortbi·